IN THE MINDS OF MEN : A THEORY OF COMPLIANCE
WITH THE LAWS OF WAR
William Bradford1
Introduction
Does international law matter, or is it but a “fairy ship upon a fairy sea: a beautiful construct of
the legal imagination floating upon a sea of false assumptions[?]”2 For many scholars the international
system has matured since the end of the Cold War and international law, no longer a primitive legal
system constantly obligated to prove its existence and utterly dependent upon politics for its
enforcement,3 now significantly constrains and shapes the behavior of states.4 Some go so far as to posit
that the diffusion of the international rule of law is so advanced that the demise of state sovereignty as
traditionally conceived is nigh.5 For these observers, the famous aphorism—that “it is probably the case
that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time”6—waxes ever more descriptive of the political universe with each successive wave
of legalization, for on those increasingly rare instances when states violate international law they are
compelled to justify their conduct in the face of vigorous denunciations and recriminations.7 Convinced
that history has released them from the tiresome obligation to prove that international law is really law,8
legalization theorists conclude that solutions to contemporary transnational problems are to be found in
more, or at least better-tempered, legal regulation,9 for if international law does not per se dictate state
behavior, compliance10 is the rule and not the exception.

See UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, at Preamble (“Since wars
begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.”), available at
<http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=6206&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>.
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Skeptics have subjected this argument to post-ontological inquires such as why, and under what
conditions, states choose to create and comply with international law.11 Empirical observation suggests
that noncompliance is common, particularly in issue-areas such as human rights12 and ethnic conflicts that
13

challenge state sovereignty, and states appear to accept legal obligations without intending to honor
them.14 Some suggest that international legal regimes are little more than aspirational ventures; others
wonder whether increased formalization actually inversely correlates with compliance with the normative
principles underlying regimes.15 For skeptics, if perfect compliance is not necessary to establish the
significance of law to international relations, a clear and consistent pattern of compliance is sine qua non,
and legalization theorists have abjectly failed to carry their burden of proving that states consistently obey
legal rules contrary to their parochial interests.16
Whether, and, if so, why states elect to comply with international law are now the most central
questions within the international legal academy, and the answers are laden with implications for the role
of law in the ordering of international relations.17 The former question alone bifurcates the field.
Uncertainty as to the meaning of ambiguous treaty terms, along with contestation over the parameters of
customary international law, erode consensus as to precisely what rules apply to a given issue-area,18 and
thus the very process of operationalizing “compliance” requires subjective judgments. Investigators
must decide how to interpret partial or unintentional compliance,19 and information is not always readily
available and reliable.20 Moreover, because they are more likely to self-report compliance accurately than
authoritarian states, liberal democracies may spuriously appear less compliant than their counterparts.21
Finally, certain issue-areas, including armed conflict and weapons development, are more closely
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shrouded in secrecy and thus less amenable to investigation. In subjecting the question of whether states
comply with international law to empirical examination, and in redesigning legal regimes to enhance
compliance, epistemological problems abound.
Moreover, in regard to the “Why?” question, a skein of theories has been woven over the last
decade to explain and predict state compliance, and a number of factors, including, inter alia, a desire to
generate reciprocity, an interest in reducing transaction costs, normative commitments, domestic
considerations, the degree of domestic incorporation, reputational concerns, and fear of punishment, are
purported to be causally linked.23 However, as the study of international legal compliance [“ILC”] has
matured, intramural divisions have been compounded by a gathering suspicion that many states are prone
to accept only those legal obligations that do not significantly impose real constraints24 and that the
concept “compliance” may thus not be an adequate framework within which to evaluate whether
international legal regimes further their normative policy objectives.25 A high level of compliance with a
given regime may simply reflect the failure to require states to undertake anything more than “modest
departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement.”26 Many treaties may in fact
be mere codifications of the lowest common denominator achievable across an array of states none of
whom have internalized norms obligating conduct contrary to their independent preferences, and thus a
high rate of observed compliance is not necessarily an objective indicator of a normative commitment to
cooperate. By the same token, certain agreements that impose significant constraints may meet with
relatively low levels of compliance without sabotaging the norms states-parties seek to advance.27 In
short, the development of compliance theories requires that causal relationships between the normative
fabric from which international legal obligations are woven and state behavior be clearly established.28
However, further complicating resolution of the debate between champions of the causal
significance of international law and those who view law as epiphenomenal to state practice is the relative
paucity of empirical studies testing general propositions regarding relationships between rules and
behaviors.29 Although all social science theories are “indirect, presumptive, [and] obliquely and
22
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incompletely corroborated at best[,]” the field organized around the concept of international legal
compliance is undernourished with insights from other disciplines: the few studies that describe patterns
of compliance without tracing these relationships and establishing their effectiveness are insufficiently
rigorous and too under-specified to offer many useful insights.31 To be sure, international law and
international relations theorists have catalogued and described patterns of compliance. However, no ILC
scholar has offered anything like the list of nomothetic propositions that one expects from a theory.
Moreover, insufficient rigor is not all that bedevils the field of ILC: the tacit assumption central to
the discipline of international law that regards international relations as uniformly susceptible to legal
regulation may well be false. A hierarchy of issue-areas32 orders the international legal system, and
patterns of cooperation have been far easier to generate and sustain in respect to “low politics,” generally
understood as economic, cultural, and social issues, than in questions of “high politics,” defined narrowly
as matters of war and peace.33 Because empirical evidence suggests that the obligations most breached
are those trenching in questions of high politics,34 the ultimate test of whether international law matters
may well be whether it can be crafted to regulate the “muscular aspects of international life.”35 If
international relations are inevitably little more than a Hobbesian state of nature, and if war is inescapably
the negation of the rule of law, then international law is and will always be epiphenomenal. If, on the
other hand, states can be induced to comply with meaningful normative limitations on their conduct even
in issue-areas that profoundly implicate their sovereignty, the long-deferred dream of a functioning civil
society is no longer fanciful. Thus, if the laws of war, or international humanitarian law [“IHL”],36 are the
soft underbelly of global legalization,37 developing a theory that can explain and predict IHL compliance
and suggest ways in which it can be re-engineered to enhance its effectiveness is of great moment to the
broader venture of making international law matter.
To note that this is no small undertaking is an understatement. Whether the gap between
international law and state practice is closing, as legalization theorists believe, or widening, as their critics
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insist, a great many scholars of diverse theoretical commitments agree that a “striking contrast [remains]
between the richness of the normative order and the behaviour [sic] of men[.]”38 This contrast is most
marked in the issue-area of IHL, where the record of compliance is, at best, mixed.39 It is thus especially
40

regrettable that if the field of ILC is still a “primitive science,” our ability to explain and predict the
effectiveness of IHL is even more protean.41 While the relative youth of the broader field accounts for
some of this theoretical underdevelopment, and the desire to retain parsimony for still more,42 the inability
to explain and predict IHL compliance is primarily the result of a failure to specify the variables most
closely associated with compliance decisions. That compliance studies designed by scholars of
international law, a discipline that for centuries has reified states atop the hierarchy of subjects
responsible for the generation, application, and interpretation of rules and norms, has paid short shrift to
the causal significance of non-state levels of analysis, and particularly to the individual heads-of-state
whose decisions are ultimately responsible for committing states to compliance with or violation of IHL,
is unsurprising. However, IHL compliance, and compliance with international law more generally, will
remain idiopathic phenomena so long as scholars fail to render a coherent body of testable hypotheses
that permit empirical investigation of the entities directly and ultimately responsible for compliance.
In other words, the discipline of ILC must recognize that states are an abstraction utterly lacking
in the capacity to exercise a choice between alternatives and that those who would answer the question,
“Why do states choose to comply with or violate IHL?,” must first ask and answer the prior, yet much
more impenetrable, question: “Why do the individuals who exercise decisional authority commit their
states to comply with or violate IHL?” States do not make decisions; people do. Any theory of IHL
compliance that aspires to sufficient determinacy to guide practitioners and scholars alike must account
for the individual level of analysis and in particular the microfoundations of personality that frame
decisions and yield variation across the range of decisionmakers. Accordingly, Part I will briefly survey
and critique existing pretheories of ILC generally and particularly with respect to IHL.43 Part II will
present an alternative theory that draws from the insights of personality theory to trace the causal
processes whereby the personalities of individual decisionmakers associate with decisions to comply with
or violate obligations arising under the IHL regime governing the resort to anticipatory self-defense
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[“ASD”]. Part III will survey historical data to heuristically test the proffered theory, and Part IV,
followed by a Conclusion, will anticipate criticisms and propose directions for further research.
I. Theories of IHL Compliance: A Survey and A Critique
ILC theories can be organized into six clusters: realism, enforcement theory, rational choice,
institutionalism, liberalism, and normativism.44
A. Theoretical Survey
1. Realism
Realism assumes that the international system is immutably anarchic, that states will always be
the sole relevant actors, and that a perpetual struggle for power obligates states, if they wish to preserve
their territory and their existence, to maximize their relative power.45 Realists assert that international
cooperation is possible only inasmuch as it reinforces the interests of states in maximizing their power
and prospects for survival.46 Because state behavior is determined solely by structural factors—i.e., the
relative balance of power—states will not pursue cooperation on the basis of normative commitments.
The role of norms is, therefore, much abridged in an account that purports to explain all state behaviors as
caused by transformation in the relative power distribution, and many realist scholars treat norms as
entirely epiphenomenal.
Neither the role of the individuals that exercise command of the foreign policy apparatus of states
nor their unique psychologies are of any theoretical interest to realism: even if they were not unknowable,
motives and preferences would exert no causal influence on the behavior of decisionmakers who are
presumed rational calculators of the relationship between state decisions and national power and
committed to the singular pursuit of the latter.47 Moreover, regardless of their idiosyncracies, all
decisionmakers choose identically, or nearly so, in response to external stimuli, and changes in the
international system account for variations in foreign policy decisionmaking.48
Predictably, the role of international law is narrowly circumscribed in realist accounts of
international relations. Although states may create international law as a pretext for decisions that in
actuality serve their relentless pursuit of power49 or the subordination of weaker states,50 there are no
norms capable of inducing states to voluntarily abridge their sovereign prerogatives, and those legal
agreements into which states enter will be carefully and purposefully limited to peripheral matters that do
not implicate their power or meaningfully limit their autonomy.51 Moreover, for realists compliance with
international law is to a large degree a function of power: the more powerful a state, the less likely it will
44
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suffer punishment from other states for its legal transgressions and the less likely it is, therefore, to
comply with law or to agree in the first instance to be bound. Furthermore, because state survival is the
superordinate value in the international system, realism predicts that compliance will correlate inversely
with the degree to which the substantive rules place the territorial integrity, and thus the survival, of states
at risk.52 Finally, realism maintains that should state self-interest ever militate in favor of breaching legal
obligations—in other words, should state self-interest ever cease to coincide with governing norms—
states, which as realists remind us are nothing more than “legally sovereign unit[s] in a tenuous net of
breakable obligations[,]”53 will invariably violate the law.
For realists, the strength of the general proposition that law exerts no independent causal
influence on international relations54 is at a zenith in the context of IHL. Realism predicts that states will
voluntarily accept only those constraints on their freedom to employ force that either enhance their
relative power or that they intend to violate deliberately to their advantage.55 To the extent that it imposes
restrictions on the methods and means states may employ in prosecuting their interests, particularly when
rules distribute burdens asymmetrically or deny certain weapons or tactics that are likely to ensure
survival, and to the degree that it limits the lawfulness of the resort to force in the first instance, especially
when only the resort to force is likely to prevent political extinction at the hand of a stronger state, IHL is
inimical to self-preservation.56
In sum, for realists it is axiomatic that armed conflict is a decidedly unfruitful arena in which to
foster normative cooperation, and IHL cannot surmount the fact that it is an aspirational regime tangential
at best to explanations of state behavior. Strong states do what they can, and weak states accept what they
must. If law has a role in regulating armed conflict, it is through the extension of the domestic law of a
powerful state, and this act itself is the assertion of power rather than of the power of a universal norm.57
Inter armes, silent leges.58
2. Enforcement Theory
Enforcement theory [“ET”] shares the core realist assumption that legalization is largely
epiphenomenal to state behavior, particularly “when the [legal regime] tries to address issues for which an
agreement is probably not enforceable.”59 ET thus joins with realism in its skepticism toward the capacity
to regulate high politics. However, ET departs from realism, principally on the questions of whether
systematic cooperation is possible and whether measures short of the direct application of force or the
52
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naked threat thereof can impel states toward compliance. Although it accepts that military sanctions may
ultimately be necessary to hold states to their obligations,60 ET envisions the potential for a well-designed
legal regime—even in IHL—to publicize clear rules, enhance monitoring,61 and institutionalize collective
procedures for punishing violations, thereby enhancing the deterrent and coercive effects of a stable
62
balance of power. Failures in compliance are thus, for ET theorists, failures to impose adequate

punishment on prior violators.63
Still, while it is more optimistic as regards the possibility for international cooperation, ET theory
clings fast to core realist assumptions: the greater the depth of intended cooperation in any given issuearea, and the greater the degree to which the territorial integrity or political independence is implicated by
a contemplated legal regime, the harsher must be the consequences for violation of the primary rules.64
Consequently, ET regards as dubious the prospect that legal engineers can ever muster more than the
shallowest of regimes in IHL without constant and vigilant monitoring65 and, even more vitally, a stalwart
commitment from powerful states to swiftly punish violations.
3. Liberalism
Liberalism shifts the inquiry from the systemic balance of power to the domestic level of analysis
and posits that the key actors in international relations, and thus the primary independent variables in
regard to compliance, are not states but rather individuals, institutions, organizations, and other
components of civil society.66 Rather than accept the realist presumption that states are unitary actors
consumed by the pursuit of power, liberalism contends that it is the nature of the domestic politics that
predominate within state borders that determines the composition of representative governments and in
turn the willingness of states to subordinate sovereignty to normative regulation.67 Rather than attribute
causation to exogenous factors, liberalism regards state behaviors as a function of the manner in which
60

See Moore, supra note 13, at 887 (“In a system lacking adequate centralized mechanisms . . . , permitting the parties to . . . take
responsive countermeasures may be one of the most important mechanisms . . . for encouraging compliance[.]”).
61
See SHELTON, supra note 29, at 5 (stressing the centrality of monitoring measures to ET).
62
See Morrow, supra note 39, at 41-42 (elaborating the preconditions specified by ET for an effective compliance regime); see
also Richard Baxter, Forces for Compliance with the Law of War, AM. SOC. INT’L L. 82, 82-83 (1964) (stressing that the threat
of punishment—individual and collective—is a crucial support mechanism to the enforcement of international law generally and
IHL specifically). Punishment need not be meted out by international institutions: ET contemplates that domestic prosecution of
violators of IHL can suffice to deter and prevent future violations. Id.
63
See, e.g., Robert A. Bailey, Why Do States Violate the Law of War? A Comparison of Iraqi Violations in Two Gulf Wars, 27
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 103, 104 (2000) (linking erosion of deterrence created by the prosecution of Nazi defendants
at Nuremburg to subsequent failures to enforce IHL). ET theorists link failures of law more generally to the minimal
probabilities that violations will be discovered and their authors identified and punished. See Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with
International Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 222 (1997) (describing the
objective risk of detection, apprehension, and prosecution as very low in regard to almost all crimes).
64
Downs et al., supra note 26, at 379-80; see also Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International
Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 979 (2000) (stressing that sanctions best promote compliance).
65
ET theorists reposit some confidence in measures established under relevant IHL treaties to publicize the content of the
substantive rules, develop information and find facts with regard to allegations of breaches, resolve disputes, and hold individual
violators legally accountable for their actions. See, e.g., FOX & MEYER, supra note 37, at xiv-116 (describing “important”
mechanisms that aid IHL enforcement). Still, the crucial element of compliance, viewed through the ET prism, is robust
sanctions, particularly of the military sort.
66
See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG.
513 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and the Future of the United
Nations, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 397-400 (1994). Liberalism is very much a theory of elite political
participation: because not all issues resonate uniformly within the polity, maximizing the intensity of individual preferences and
mobilizing political support, along with stifling dissent, is at least as significant as is creating a political majority. See
SHELTON, supra note 29, at 47 (“Compliance is . . . a matter of choice by the state to discipline civil society, often at the request
of activist sources in civil society.”).
67
Moravcsik, supra note 66, at 513 (“Societal ideas, interests, and institutions . . . shap[e] state preferences[.]”).
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states are internally constituted. Because it theorizes democracies as inherently more committed to the
“rule of law,”68 more prone to absorb international legal obligations into their domestic legal orders and to
diffuse these obligations through foreign policy bureaucracies, and more willing to permit interest groups
to mobilize mass electoral support for international legal norms than non-democratic states, liberalism
predicts that democracies are more likely to accept and honor international legal obligations69 and less
likely to engage in armed conflict in the first instance.70
Moreover, because it regards compliance as a function of the degree to which the aggregation of
the preferences of key domestic individuals and groups directs the representative state toward normfollowing and legal regulation, liberalism predicts that IHL compliance is likely to be maximized by
programs that alter domestic preferences in favor of democratization independently of the substantive
norms at the heart of the IHL regime.71 Foremost among such measures are packages of domestic
legislation that internalize international legal norms, “blur” the distinction between international and
domestic,72 and obligate officials to observe universal normative prescriptions as a matter of domestic
law.73 Thus, by inducing democratic commitments to IHL norms, such programs encourage elected
74
leaders to translate domestic preferences into official policies limiting the resort to force and

constraining methods and means75 while compelling them to conform their conduct in battle to the rules
these norms reflect.
4. Rational Choice
Although no universally accepted definition of “rationality” has yet been propounded,76 various
“rational choice” theories [“RCT”] converge around a core set of assumptions and premises: (1)
individuals pursue their material self-interests by the means they calculate as most likely to attain
objectives at the lowest costs; (2) individuals search for information, evaluate outcomes and probabilities,
and make purposive choices as to means, but not as to ends, for welfare maximization is the

68

See Philip Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 842 (1990) (“Some
societies [i.e., liberal democracies] are more dedicated to legalism and the ‘rule of law’ than others.).
69
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 6, at 62 (contending that liberal states are more likely to honor international legal obligations
than are illiberal states); Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, Yale Law School, Working Paper Series 274 (April 1, 2003), at
116 (contending that even where there are few external incentives, such as sanctions, for states to comply with international legal
obligations, many democracies will comply because domestic constituencies will impose internal (i.e., electoral) sanctions if they
do not). For a critique of liberalism as a “culture of law,” see Jose E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of
Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, EUR. J. INT’L L. 183, 184 (2001).
70
For an analysis of research suggesting that democracies are less war-prone than non-democracies, along with an explanation for
this phenomenon, see generally JOHN NORTON MOORE, SOLVING THE WAR PUZZLE (2004).
71
See Posner, supra note 7, at 314 (analyzing state ratifications of IHL treaties and concluding that democracies are “more
enthusiastic” about IHL than non-democracies). In the liberalist account, nongovernmental organizations marshal domestic
support for IHL compliance and deploy that pressure against governments. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVEREIGNTY 21 (1995).
72
FISHER, supra note 26, at 142 (describing this process as securing “first-order compliance”).
73
Williamson, supra note 20, at 80-81.
74
See generally Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett, Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 87 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 624 (1993) (contending that the type of regime has a dampening effect on participation in armed conflict and that
democracies are inherently more peaceful).
75
See Kahler, supra note 9, at 677 (2000) (illustrating connections asserted by liberalists between domestic opinion and state
military policies).
76
See Amartya Sen, Rational Fools, in SCIENTIFIC MODELS AND MAN (H. Harris ed., 1979) at 1, 5. For a general
discussion of the origins of rational choice theory, along with an examination of early theoretical divisions within rational choice
scholarship that continue to bifurcate the theoretical plain, see HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957).
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77

predetermined preference of each decisionmaker; (3) although individuals are not perfect processors of
information,78 they possess the analytic capacity to choose the alternative most likely to contribute to their
welfare;79 (4) neither norms nor any other idiosyncratic elements of personality account for individual
80

behaviors; rather, behavioral regularities that come to be labeled as “norms” are in reality the result of
individuals pursuing self-interests;81 (6) states act as unitary actors through the decisions of key
individuals or groups;82 (7) state actions are the product of the decisions of a single individual or a small
group of crucial individuals who possess the authority, or at least the power, to commit the state;83 and (8)
state decisions are egoistic choices undertaken to advance the material self-interests of these key
individuals and groups along with the populations of which they are representative.84
Because the rational pursuit of self-interest is the explanandum of behavior, law is theoretically
significant within RCT explanations only insomuch as it alters the relative costs of particular means: in
other words, legal rules alter the payoff structure of certain strategies and decisions, and decisions about
compliance are evaluated on materialist, rather than normative, grounds. States will not comply
altruistically, yet noncompliance may be costly if other states impose economic or military sanctions.85 In
essence, if legal architects craft a formula that converges state interests with the rules of the regime and
ensures that effective sanctions are available to deter defections through the imposition of costs that
exceed the gains to be had through violations,86 an effective regime can be sustained. RCT thus explains
compliance with legal rules in starkly instrumental terms: if compliance is the decision strategy most
likely to yield the greatest benefit, a state will comply; conversely, if violation of the law is the strategy

77

See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 487, 495
(“The basic [RCT] heuristic is to attribute observed behavior to the rational pursuit of self-interest.”).
78
Only a very few RCT scholars regard the individual as homo economicus, an “omniscient calculator who can easily perform all
cognitive calculations necessary to reach decision.” DAVID O. SEARS, LEONIE HUDDY, & ROBERT JERVIS, EDS.,
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 24 (2003). Most take a more “bounded” approach and accept that
imperfect reasoning does not defeat the procedural rationality of individual decisions.
79
Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 345, 349 (1998).
80
See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 46 (rejecting the causal significance of the “cauldron of instincts,
passions, and deeply ingrained cultural attitudes” in relation to the generation of social norms or the explanation of behavior).
For RCT scholars, parsimony and investigability override efforts to build norms into their enterprise, and nonrational sources of
preference and motivation are considered “just not well enough understood by psychologists to support a theory of social norms,
and repeated but puzzled acknowledgments of their importance would muddy the exposition of the argument without providing
any offsetting benefits.” Id.
81
See KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, ED., CONTEMPORARY EMPIRICAL POLITICAL THEORY 284 (1997) (describing
the RCT position that behavior is independent of norms and that the proclivity to engage in norm-neutral patterns of individual
wealth maximization “constitutes a universal, even a defining, characteristic of humanity.”). “Thin” versions of RCT, which
ignore social values, symbols, and normative practices central to theories of social ontology, predominate in the international
relations and international legal literature; so-called “thick theories,” which make room for detailed descriptions of norms, values,
cultural assumptions, metaphors, religious beliefs, and personal commitments, have heretofore been either subsumed into other
paradigms or largely overlooked in the literature.
82
See BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA, THE WAR TRAP (1981) (arguing that top executive decisionmakers represent the
state).
83
See Peter H. Huang, International Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 237, 241 (2002).
84
YOUNG, supra note 10, at 18.
85
See POSNER, supra note 80, at 8 (explaining that RCT posits that sanctions alter preferences in the direction of compliance).
Noncompliance may also trigger indirect costs, as a habit of violation may dissuade other states from joining with the
noncomplier to resolve collective action problems, such as the establishment of security or environmental regimes. Posner, supra
note 7, at 309. However, in many issue-areas, and in particular in regard to the issue of territorial integrity, the price of a bad
reputation may well be lower than in more cooperative issue-areas, such as trade. Id.
86
See Jack A. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114-15 (1999)
(rejecting the argument that legal rules exert any compliance pull per se and stressing that convergence of state interest and legal
rules, and not widely shared norms, are essential to an effective regime).
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most conducive to the maximization of welfare, it will violate the law even if other states stand ready to
apply sanctions or impose reputational costs. Norms do not command compliance; power does.
If the effectiveness of international law hinges upon the convergence of regime rules with the
self-interest of states or with the threat or use of the ultimate sanction, one would not anticipate that IHL,
a series of rules that limits the circumstances under which resort to force is lawful and the methods and
means that may be employed, would secure much compliance from states whose leaders are committed
not to the norms undergirding these rules but to the maximization of their security, wealth, and power in
an anarchic international system.87 IHL is effectively a pre-war agreement to abstain from enumerated
“battle strategies,” and RCT predicts that states will comply with rules that limit the resort to particular
methods or means only if the benefits gained through the resort to these methods or means are less than
the costs imposed by third states, whether reputational or, more likely, economic and military.88 States
will readily consent to the proscription of methods and means that have little inherent operational utility
and thus do not favor one state over another,89 or that they are unable to employ due to an inability to
produce or fund the relevant technology.90 States will also consent to constraints on the use of weapons
that are not cost-effective in that they consume significant resources to produce without contributing
sufficiently to the destruction of the enemy. However, states will either withhold consent to the
prohibition of battle strategies the benefits of which, by their subjective calculations, outweigh the sum of
the costs of their retaliatory use by enemies plus the costs of external sanctions,91 or state consent to such
prohibitions will itself constitute a battle strategy: devious states will take whatever gains are available
from the first use of methods and means they fraudulently disclaimed against their duped enemies.
Specifically, RCT has explained a general pattern of state compliance with rules governing the
treatment of POWs not in terms of fundamental shared conceptions of humanity but as consistent with
calculations that humane treatment of enemy POWs will encourage enemy soldiers to surrender and
thereby terminate the conflict quickly and on favorable terms.92 Differential rates of compliance
suggesting that wealthier states are more prone to observe rules regarding POWs are rationalized as
consistent with the greater material capacities of resource-rich states to comply with expensive
obligations to properly house, transport, and interrogate enemy captives; for wealthy states, if their
compliance promotes enemy surrenders, it may register as cost-neutral or even as a gain, whereas for poor
87

See Posner, supra note 7, at 308-09 (denying that “humanity,” other normative considerations, or legal rules themselves exert
causal influence on state compliance decisions in regard to IHL).
88
Morrow, supra note 39, at 46. RCT scholars discount the importance of reputational sanctions in the armed conflict issue-area
as under conditions of war states define welfare maximization in terms of the enhancement of their survival and power rather
than in terms of their social standing. See Posner, supra note 7, at 309 (“Neither reputational concerns nor interior controls . . .
have much influence on the conduct of states during war.”). Because reputational costs matter little, IHL is thus enforceable only
“to the extent that nations . . . retaliate against belligerents who violate [it.]” Id. at 297.
89
Morrow, supra note 39, at 46. RCT assumes that states will not spend resources on war if they can dedicate them to civilian
expenditures instead, and that states will thus eschew battle strategies of little martial benefit if in so doing they can generate
“greater production and consumption for civilians than would occur if military investment were unconstrained.” Posner, supra
note 7 at 314.
90
In other words, each method and means of warfare has distributional effects in that it does not benefit all states equally, and
RCT predicts that each state will seek to ban those methods and means that exceed its technological sophistication or that it
believes will be more effective in the hands of other states than in its own. Id. at 305, 310-312.
91
See id. at 297, 299-302 (indicating that some prohibited battle strategies, such as targeting civilians and civilian property, may
aid a violator in terminating a war quickly on favorable terms, while others, such as the feigning of surrender to lure enemy
troops into the open only to dispatch them, favors the weaker of two belligerents).
92
Id. at 312. At worst, compliance with the rules supports reciprocity, and the net cost of this strategy is zero. Id. at 308.
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states compliance consumes resources better directed toward the destruction of the enemy, and violation
of rules concerning POWs is an efficient battle strategy.
Furthermore, the remarkably stable and general pattern of compliance with rules prohibiting
CWs, a low-cost, incredibly effective weapons system, is susceptible to explanation by RCT. Wealthy
states will support bans on cheap and effective weapons per se in order to deny as many useful methods
to poorer states as possible,93 and all states will have little incentive to employ terribly destructive yet
technologically unsophisticated and widely available weapons from the use of which little advantage, due
to the likelihood of retaliation in kind, will accrue to either side. RCT speaks not only to means but to
methods: the customary principles of military necessity,94 proportionality,95 and distinction96 are nothing
but the result of continuous pressure placed upon more powerful states by less powerful states seeking,
under the guise of professions of humanitarian concern over unnecessary suffering attendant to war, to
force the former to employ less potent weapons readily available to the latter and thus to tilt the battlefield
toward equilibrium.97
Finally, RCT accounts for a generalized failure of compliance with rules limiting the resort to
98
force in the first instance, also known as the jus ad bellum, by simply noting that, although in theory

states can converge their interests to form a collective security regime,99 in practice states have calculated
that their interests in survival, wealth preservation, or power maximization have been better served by
engaging in the unauthorized use of force.100
5. Institutionalism
Institutionalism can be disaggregated into three interrelated theories: managerialism, reputational
theory, and transnational legal process.
a. Managerialism
Managerialism [“MT”] can be distilled into the following series of premises: (1) the long-term
interests of states are best served through cooperation on collective action problems; (2) states are
naturally imbued with a propensity to comply with legal rules because a reputation as an international
“good citizen” is intrinsically valuable101 and because violations may result in exclusion from the benefits

93

Id. at 303 (postulating that IHL prohibitions on weapons systems will be “directed foremost at the most efficient weapons”,
defined as those with the highest ratio of military effectiveness to cost, e.g., CWs).
94
The customary IHL principle of necessity implicitly authorizes all operations undertaken in the immediate interest of selfpreservation provided a minimal threshold requirement—that they be intended and tended directly toward the military defeat of
the enemy—is satisfied. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 5 (1995) (defining military necessity as “the
principle that a belligerent is justified in applying compulsion and force of any kind, to the extent necessary for . . . the complete
submission of the enemy[.]”
95
The customary IHL principle of proportionality, designed to shield civilians from the suffering of war, dictates that military
force not be employed to cause damage excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. R.R.
Baxter, Modernizing the Law of War, 78 MIL. L. REV. 165, 178-79 (1972) (defining proportionality).
96
The customary IHL principle of distinction, which maintains that the only legitimate object of war is to destroy enemy armed
forces, imposes a strict prohibition against the deliberate targeting of noncombatant personnel and civilian targets. See
Christopher C. Burris, Re-Examining the Prisoner of War Status of PLO Fedayeen, 22 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 943,
966 (1987) (discussing origins and application of principle of distinction).
97
Posner, supra note 7, at 302.
98
See infra at pp._.
99
See STEPHEN KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 173 (1983).
100
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No.
63 (April 2004), at 10-13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id.=546104.
101
See Moore, supra note 34, at 880.
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associated with cooperation; (3) norms widely perceived as fair and equitable and therefore legitimate

are responsible for tapping into this natural propensity and fostering cooperative legal arrangements; (4)
instances of noncompliance with international law are the exception rather than the rule;104 (5) most
noncompliance is the result not of deliberate violation but rather of a lack of precision in specifying
obligations in ambiguous or indeterminate treaties, a lack of technical capacity that prevents states willing
to comply from physically doing so, or fundamental changes in circumstances that render compliance
impossible;105 (6) states’ inherent preference for compliance defends legal regimes against decay in the
face of violations: most states will continue to observe international legal obligations even if some states
do not,106 and thus perfect compliance is unnecessary to define a legal regime as effective;107 (7) because
states are interested in and prone to cooperation, compliance failures are remediable not through
enforcement—an expensive “waste of time”108—but by consultation, negotiation, and persuasion; when
disputes or defections occur, non-coercive methods alone are sufficient to adjust preferences and steer
states back into conformity;109 and (8) because noncompliance is largely unintentional, the problem is
neither structural nor rooted in divergent preferences but managerial—enhancement of regime
effectiveness therefore requires enhancement of the capacities of weaker and poorer states and the
removal of obstacles to compliance, formalization and clarification of legal obligations to render rules
more compelling internalization of international norms in domestic legislation, and dissemination of

102

See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 71 (contending that the threat of alienation from a “complex web of international
arrangements” that have become “central to most states’ security and economic well-being” fosters compliance).
103
See id. at 127 (defining “legitimacy” as a relative judgment that a norm “emanates from a fair and accepted procedure, . . . is
applied equally and without invidious discrimination, and . . . does not offend minimum substantive standards of fairness and
equity.”). MT predicts that the greater the clarity and “wisdom” of a given rule, the more likely states will be to accord it their
compliance. Williamson, supra note 20, at 62.
104
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 71, at 9. The question of partial compliance can be answered to support the MT contention
that compliance is the norm: partial compliance requires an interpretive judgment as to whether performance has met the legally
obligated standard, and MT scholars are loathe to find noncompliance:
[T]here is a considerable zone within which behavior is accepted as adequately conforming . . . An “acceptable level of
compliance” is not an invariant standard. It changes over time with the capacities of the parties and the urgency of the
problem. It may depend on the type of treaty, the context, the exact behavior involved. The matter is further
complicated because, for many legal norms . . . questions of compliance are often contestable and call for complex,
subtle, and frequently subjective evaluation.
Id. at 17.
105
Downs et al, supra note 26, at 380. Recent MT scholarship suggests that compliance with certain multilateral treaties may
benefit from overt recognition of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” [“CDR”] which provides that
states will vary with regard to their technical and economic capacities for implementation and that the formal rules, or at least
interpretations of compliance, must take into consideration inequalities in capacities. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Common
But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L.276 (2004). Whether the principle of CDR would
attenuate the obligation to comply with treaties that codify norms of jus cogens or provide for important public goods has as yet
not been subject to theoretical inquiry. Id. at 301.
106
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 71, at 19.
107
See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 542 (explaining that for MT scholars compliance is a “continuum with the
appropriate or tolerable level of compliance set through an interactive, sometimes tacit process[,]” and that some regimes are very
tolerant of noncompliance). MT views international legal regimes as flexible enough to sustain some degree of noncompliance
without breaking, particularly if necessary to maintain prevent powerful states from abandoning them. See Jeol P. Trachtman,
Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance, EUR. J. INT’L L. (1999) (“It is a realistic recognition that law and politics must coexist,
and that the nirvana of perfect compliance is a chimera.”).
108
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 71, at 2 (arguing that military sanctions expend too many lives and too much treasure, and
economic sanctions are too slow and ineffective, to secure compliance with the vast majority of legal regimes).
109
See ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 51 (1979).
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normative content through institutions and training programs.

In sum, MT states will comply with legal

regimes if only they are properly organized by powerful states willing to bear management costs.111
For MT scholars, IHL is just another legal regime, and proper management is key to its
effectiveness. Well-elaborated treaty instruments that plainly remove particular battle strategies from the
112

repertoire of ratifying states will generate strong incentives toward compliance of their own accord,
even under conditions of uncertainty as to the conduct of enemies that appertain during the “fog of
war.”113 Although it does not predict perfect compliance—a distinction is drawn between individual

violations not sanctioned by the state on the one hand and official state policies authorizing violations on
the other,114 and urges tolerance in respect to localized “feuds of reciprocal punishments” carried out by
limited numbers of combatants in order to preserve the regime115--MT contends that the creation of treatybased monitoring and verification mechanisms to capitalize upon the inherent proclivity of states to honor
their substantive obligations is an effective approach to facilitating cooperation even during war.116
Enforcement measures, such as reprisal, are therefore to be used sparingly and, because they are of the
most limited utility, only where management fails.
b. Reputational Theory
For adherents of reputational theories [“RT”], reputation, the “bulwark for the maintenance of
commitments,” matters. States, just as individuals, wish to claim the respect of their peers and avoid their
reprobation,117 and considerations of national honor and prestige play an important role in restraining selfinterested state behavior.118 Therefore, states do not lightly enter into international agreements, but tend to
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See Raustiala, supra note 27, at 293 (describing the MT agenda for enhancing compliance through greater specification and
implementation of regime norms and rules).
111
Management costs typically involve supporting the institutions necessary to harmonize interests, facilitate negotiations, and
provide monitoring and information dissemination. See generally Keohane, supra note 77.
112
See James D. Morrow, The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties, 55 INT’L ORG. 971, 973 (2001)
(explaining that IHL “sways actors’ decisions about which strategies they will use in pursuit of victory.”).
113
IHL poses a “two-level problem” in that compliance is a function not only of official state choices but of the fidelity of
individual combatants to the prescriptions and proscriptions established by IHL instruments as well as to the orders of their
governments. MT scholars term uncertainty as to the compliance of other states as “noise” and concede that the battlefield is a
particularly noisy place; however, the source of noise on the battlefield—whether state decisions or individual violations—is
difficult to attribute without unavailable information. For MT scholars legal regimes permit states to resolve the ignore reports
of low-level violations of agreements by presuming that other states remain committed to the legal regime in question and that
violations are not attributable to the state but rather to individual noncompliers. See Morrow, supra note 39, at 52 (noting that
individual violations may be difficult to discover and to prove, that even if proven may be contrary to state policy, and that the
evaluation of state compliance with IHL is thus a strategic problem difficult to resolve without a theory of agency).
114
See id. (explaining that while “[t]here will always be some violations when the policing of individuals is critical for an issue”
under MT “[t]he management of individual violations is generally left to the militaries of those violators.”).
115
Morrow, supra note 113, at 975-76.
116
See id. at 982 (pointing to treaties establishing neutral third-parties as fact-finders, protecting powers, and other formal
procedures for developing information as mechanism for managing compliance with IHL).
117
See Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2064
(2003) (stressing that although fear of reprisal is an important constraint on state compliance decisions, the desire to avoid shame
associated with violating law is a significant consideration); YOUNG, supra note 10, at 22 (contending that states are sensitive to
social pressures and seek to avoid ostracism while gaining from peers their social approval, extension of status, and friendship).
More general research suggests that most social norms are observed to maintain and enhance status within a peer group rather
than to avoid punishment. See B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841, 841-44 (1994) (arguing
that individuals conform “because they recognize that even small departures from the norm will seriously impair their
popularity.”). For a discussion of the role of social norms as they relate to law, see generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW (1991); Harold G. Grasmicj & Robert J. Bursik, Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice:
Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 837 (1990)..
118
See Tyler, supra note 63, at 225 (noting importance of peer groups in fostering compliance with legal norms); Williamson,
supra note 20, at 81 (suggesting states have an interest in “fostering a reputation for reliability in the eyes of other [states]”);
Keohane, supra note 77, at 490 (“In an interdependent . . . world, a reputation for reliability matters.”).
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observe those legal obligations they do undertake and to undertake those obligations widely deemed by
other states to be constitutive of the “modern or civilized state.”120 Treaties are thus screening devices: by
accepting legal obligations and honoring them, states demonstrate to the international community that
they are good international citizens and deserve inclusion in cooperative regimes;121 conversely, by
refusing to accept a legal obligation, a state “signals” to other states its rejection of community normative
standards and self-classifies as an outlier from the pattern of norm-governed international relations.122
Because most states do not wish to forfeit the reputational benefits of association with “good” states or
incur the reputational costs of being classified with “bad” states,123 and because some states are eager to
publicly signal their approval of the normative content of certain kinds of legal obligations,124 RT explains
ratification of treaties as a process whereby states demonstrate, protect, and enhance their reputations.125
Within RT theory, the very act of undertaking an international legal obligation, whether through
ratification of a treaty or supporting a declaration of custom, positively affects state incentives.126
Although the choice to comply with a legal obligation may be costlier in material terms than
noncompliance, the reputational harm self-inflicted by a violation is costlier still in many instances.127
While RT concedes that some states, desirous of the reputational gains that accrue upon signaling their
acceptance of legal norms, may prove incapable or even unwilling to meet their obligations in practice,128
it maintains that most states will comply with regimes even when rules conflict with their short-term selfinterests because the process of socialization with other states effectively redefines self-interest and
motivates states to wish to protect a reputation for compliance.129 At worst, states will attempt to justify or
explain away their violations of law as somehow either faithful to the spirit (if not the letter) of the legal
rule in question or as having occasioned only de minimis harm.130 In a real sense, compliance, viewed
through the RT lens, is “herd behavior”131 secured through strategic mobilization of peer pressure.
As to IHL, RT makes no specific claims, yet some RT theorists concede that the potency of
reputational effects is probably lowest in issue-areas where the stakes are highest and that for states the
benefits that accrue from being perceived as a rule-follower are far less than the gains to be had through
the election of prohibited but highly useful battle strategies. In other words, short-term gains relative to
119
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only in the face of military or economic sanctions).
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See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1830 (noting that states accused of violations of law “proclaim [their] innocence or expend
resources fighting to exonerate themselves[.]”).
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enemy states are far more valuable than long-term reputational considerations, and when threatened,
states will do whatever they deem necessary to ensure their territorial integrity and political
independence; only if they survive do they worry about what other states think of them.
c. Transnational Legal Process
Transnational legal process theory [“TLP”] shares the realist premise that states are unitary
rational actors in an anarchic system but nonetheless insists that states are in fact inclined toward
cooperation and that international legal norms emerge through patterns of state cooperation.133
International legal regimes clarify and formalize patterns of cooperative behavior, transforming state
incentives and conditioning further cooperation on compliance with rules within and across various issueareas;134 at the same time, transnational epistemic communities consisting largely of foreign policy elites
arise to internalize cooperative norms and rules in domestic law and legal institutions, a process that
deepens cooperation still further.135 It is this parallel process of institutionalization in international and
domestic fora that accounts for the creation and internalization of legal norms and rules and the
progressive evolution of cooperation.
For TLP theorists, compliance is a function of the degree to which a given legal regime is
internalized in domestic law. Variance in rates of state compliance is thus the result of variance in rates
and degrees of incorporation of the relevant international legal regime.136 Once all states reach full
incorporation, obedience—not merely compliance—will be achieved. Although they do not eschew
enforcement measures, TLP theorists concentrate upon tasking institutions, and the epistemic
communities captaining them, with diffusing the normative content of international legal regimes and
urging relevant constituencies to accede to further measures of internalization.137 Although TLP has paid
little mind to the question of IHL compliance, the theory presumes that compliance should be greatest for
those states that have (1) ratified the greatest number of IHL instruments and expressed the most
unqualified support for customary obligations and (2) passed the most comprehensive domestic
implementing legislation incorporating treaty-based and customary obligations in their civil and military
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laws. TLP might further predict that membership in international institutions created to monitor
compliance and adjudicate disputes and violations will correlate with increased compliance.add note
6. Normativism
138

Normativism is the cluster of pretheories concerned with the influence of morality and justice
and committed to several primary principles: (1) sources of non-legal obligation exert theoretically

significant causal effects on individual and state behaviors that are not reducible to rational or utilitarian
calculations of material costs and benefits;139 (2) even in a world without “law,” individuals and states
would engage in norm-governed behaviors;140 (3) states will accept legal obligations not solely to advance
material self-interests but to further normative conduct;141 (4) individuals and states are motivated to obey
obligations even when compliance runs counter to material self-interests;142 and (5) state compliance with
international law reflects, to some measurable degree, commitments to norms. Normativism consists of
three distinct but interrelated theories each of which treats norms143 as vital to compliance: legitimacy
theory, organizational theory, and constructivism.
a. Legitimacy Theory
Legitimacy theory [“LT”] posits that the more legitimate a regime, the more likely states will be
to afford it compliance. In turn, LT defines legitimacy as “a property of a rule . . . which itself exerts a
pull toward compliance . . . because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process[.]”144 LT describes
add note

See, e.g., Johanna van Sambeek & Mireille Hector, Disseminating of IHL at the Domestic Level, in MAKING THE VOICE
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139
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when the probability of punishment for noncompliance is almost nil and to break laws in cases involving substantial risks.
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140
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them[.]”); FRIEDERICH W. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS (1989) (stressing importance of non-legal
norms in international relations); ELLICKSON, supra note 118 (same).
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142
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, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946 (1990) (theorizing that non -legal sources of
normative prescription regarding “what is right and good for human life” that precede attempts at positive legal regulation are
more effective in securing compliance with behavioral objectives); YOUNG, supra note 10, at 23 (noting that “inner pressures”
to comply with the law out of a sense of duty can overwhelm short-term seld interest in violating the law). In normativist
accounts of individual behavior, norms are “part of [an] internal motive system and guide [individuals’] behavior even in the
absence of external authority.” M. Hoffman, Moral Internalization: Current Theory and Research, in ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (L. Nerkowitz ed., 1977). As Tyler explains, considerations of self-interest and
the effectiveness of enforcement measures are subordinate in theoretical terms to the power of norms:
If people view compliance with the law as appropriate because of their attitudes about how they should behave, they
will voluntarily assume the obligation to follow legal rules. They will feel personally committed to obeying the law,
irrespective of whether they risk punishment for breaking the law.
TYLER, supra note 139, at 3.
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An operational definition describes norms as “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations” or as a “set of
intersubjective understandings readily apparent to actors that makes behavioral claims on those actors” and “leave broad patterns
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thusly, is distinct from morality inasmuch as commitment to obey law on moral grounds implies that the substantive content of
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the primary determinants of legitimacy as (1) the clarity or transparency of the legal rules and the norms
they reflect;145 (2) the symbolic importance of the rules; (3) the “coherence” of the regime, defined as the
degree to which rules are connected to principles of reason;146 and (4) adherence to the regime, defined as
147

the connection between its primary and secondary rules.

Although some LT theorists suggest that

compliance is more multivariate, hinging in part on the likelihood that violations will be detected and
punished and in part on the views of relevant peer groups,148 LT invariably regards compliance as a
function of legitimacy: those regimes widely perceived to be created and administered fairly are entitled
to, and do in fact reap, compliance.149
Specifying LT still further, if compliance is a function of legitimacy, LT theory predicts that the
degree to which any particular state complies with international law is in turn a function of the degree to
which that state deems international law generally, or the particular regime in question specifically, to
have been derived through fair procedures. LT theory assesses whether the rules in question are
perceived to be substantively just—i.e., connected to principles of reason, justice, morality, or other first
principles150—as justice is a necessary precondition for compliance. Finally, if legitimacy is held constant
as between two alternative sets of rules, LT theory predicts that compliance will be greatest with that
151

regime that expresses the most moral content.

Thus, in regard to IHL, a regime consisting of numerous instruments to which essentially all
states are parties and constituting what are arguably a series of obligations erga omnes, LT would predict
that most states should perceive it as legitimate and that compliance should be high,152 particularly for
those states for whom the primary rules are reasonable and the procedures for resolving disputes about the
the law is perceived as inherently just, whereas a commitment to compliance on the ground that the regime is legitimate, while it
need not exclude moral considerations, rest upon the narrower procedural conclusion that “the authority enforcing the law has the
right to dictate behavior.” TYLER, supra note 139, at 3 (differentiating morality and legitimacy).
145
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proportion to the extent to which it makes sense to whom it applies.”); Mark W. Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm:
International Boundaries and the Use of Force, 55 INT’L ORG. 215 (2001) (linking compliance with law to the degree to which
“the norms it embodies are widely shared by its subjects.”).
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banished from LT, the theoretical significance of legitimacy, defined as procedural fairness, is regarded as greater than that of
moral considerations, which are rooted more in substantive justice: an advantage of privileging legitimacy over morality in
securing compliance is that
when the law is viewed as legitimate people feel that they “ought to obey” all laws, not just those that are consistent
with their own moral principles. Hence, legitimacy is a more widespread, “blanket” endorsement of law’s value than
morality. If authorities are legitimate, people are generally willing to accept the rules they create, whatever those rules
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rules are fair. Compliance failures, in turn, are attributable not to any failure to capture important
normative principles but to failures of treaty drafters to specify clear primary rules,153 to the perceived
unreasonableness of particular rules, or, most importantly, to perceptions of unfairness in the adjudication
of disputes. Finally, as understandings of the meanings of rules converge through practice, LT predicts
that the legitimacy of, and compliance with, IHL should increase incrementally.154 To some degree, LT
theory considers compliance with law to be a cultural preference promotable through fair procedural
practice.
b. Constructivism
In addition to the central premises of normative theories—that states are motivated by non-legal
sources of obligation and that states will comply with international law even when to do so conflict with
their material self-interest—constructivism posits the following: (1) states are not simply material
creatures with pre-established preferences but are in fact ideational entities continuously reconstituted by
the socially-generated values, morals, and ideas of the individuals and groups who form and direct
them;155 (2) normative scripts of key individuals and groups are principally responsible for constructing
states and investing them with preferences; (3) the constructive process is reciprocal and dynamic: the
156

normative structure of the state is instilled in those who participate in its formation and direction; (4)
politics is constructed at domestic and transnational levels, and preferences are flexible: individuals and
groups in one state, through patterns of “persuasion, socialization, and pressure[,]” influence the
normative perceptions and political agendae of their counterparts in other states;157 at the same time, state
preferences are not immutable, and states actively and passively urge other states to reconstruct
themselves and adopt their normative prescriptions;158 (5) legal rules qua rules do not independently
generate compliance pull: laws are, in effect, “restate[ments] [of] social values and norms[,]”159 and
individuals and states conform their conduct not to the formal content of rules but to a set of internalized
norms that may or may not be reflected in formal legal regimes;160 and (6) to a large extent, compliance is
a function of the congruence between operative norms and legal rules.
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Constructivism has left the terrain of IHL largely untilled. Nonetheless, explanations and
predictions of IHL compliance would seem to require, for constructivists, determinations of the extent to
which the norms animating particular conventional and customary sources correspond with the
preferences of key states and individuals as well as the extent to which those norms are faithfully
reflected in formal rules of law. Constructivism is vitally concerned with “who we are and what we want
to become as a nation[,]”161 and provided states and key individuals have been “constructed” by, or
conditioned to adhere to, a norm proscribing a method of warfare—i.e., assassination—and provided rules
of law correspond to and tap into the normative prohibition, constructivism would predict that states
would eschew the practice even if it is a substantively rational battle strategy.162 For constructivists,
therefore, building a culture of IHL compliance requires a joint program of norm inculcation and legal
engineering.
c. Organizational-Cultural Theory
Organizational-cultural theory [“OCT”], a cluster of theories that disaggregate states and treat
government bureaucracies, rather than states themselves, as the primary level of analysis of theoretical
interest,163 has evolved from the presumption that bureaucracies are rational actors164 to more sophisticated
models that account for state decisions through the analysis of the specific and idiosyncratic
organizational culture165 in which relevant foreign policy behaviors are debated and advocated. OCT
posits that a common core of beliefs, values, and philosophies arises over time and specifies a code that
dictates how a social group reacts to external stimuli and organizes its internal affairs; norms, rather than
interests, drive the development of this organizational culture.166 In turn, each member is socialized
through participation in his nomos167 and thus comes to internalize and espouse this culture and to
conform his conduct to the expectations of the group.168 At the same time, the organizational cultures of
certain social groups exert transformative influences upon other social groups and key individuals who
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hold positions of authority both within states and across state boundaries via networks of professionals
that form transnational epistemic communities around the nuclei of their domestic organizational
cultures.170 Ultimately, OCT maintains that state preferences are neither predetermined nor dictated by
rules but are created and shaped by the organizational cultures of those groups most salient to the issuearea of international relations in question, and that state compliance choices are mediated and shaped by
these organizational cultures.171
The armed forces of states monopolize the capacity to use force and possess virtually all the
available military expertise. Consequently, although civilian decisionmakers possess ultimate decisional
authority in most states, national military bureaucracies [“NMBs”] are extremely influential social groups
in respect to warfighting. Organizational-cultural variables define the preferences of NMBs and “shap[e]
how soldiers th[ink] about themselves, perceiv[e] the world, formulat[e] plans, advis[e] leaders, and [go]
into action.”172 Although early OCT theorists predicted NMBs would invariably seek to maximize their
autonomy and thus advocate to civilian decisionmakers conflict over peace and the use of all battle
strategies over restraint,173 empirical data174 undermines this presumption and suggests to the contrary that
NMBs routinely reject battle strategies that would directly contribute to victory for reasons rooted in
175

organizational norms.

In part this reciprocal restraint may be attributable to the disproportionate risk

that decisions resulting in war or escalating the intensity of conflict impose upon the military caste
relative to all other citizens:176 indeed, “the soldier above all prays for peace, for it is the soldier who must
suffer and bear the deepest scars of war.”177 Even more important, however, is the fidelity that NMBs owe
to the chivalric code that prescribes how, where, and when force may be used to subdue enemies and what
methods and means may be employed to do so.
Since ancient times, certain acts committed during war, including the deliberate murder of
civilians and the perfidious have been widely known to be “manifestly wrongful, on account of their
flagrant inconsistency . . . with [the] professional character as an honorable [soldier.]”178 The medieval
code of chivalry, which developed a detailed set of principles for the violation of which knighthood could
169
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be stripped, further developed this martial code.

Knights engaged in a casuistic process of self-

reflection and –criticism to determine whether particular acts breached this martial code.180 By the
Renaissance a set of norms, internalized by a transnational professional caste requiring, inter alia,
minimization of civilian casualties consistent with military objectives as a matter of honor,181 had perfused
warfare.182 Further, the martial code, by rejecting the inhumanity of the enemy in favor of a conception of
the foe as a fellow professional, directed the honorable soldier to renounce treachery and criminality in
combating him,183 even if these tactics could be otherwise construed as rational. As the martial code
diffused and matured, a collective narrative developed to inform soldiers in the discharge of their duties;
when in doubt, soldiers conformed to “stories about the great deeds of honorable soldiers” drawn from the
“collective narrative of [their] corps.”184 In short, as a constituent aspect of their professional honor,
185
soldiers are conditioned to accept risks by renouncing certain battle strategies, and it is this self-imposed

commitment, undertaken as the price of membership in a global epistemic community,186 that upholds a
common sociality and inspires adherence to the norms underlying IHL.187 Although variance exists across
the range of NMBs, the chivalric code is a universal culture.188
For OCT then, predicting IHL compliance is a matter of determining the isomorphism between
the formal rules of the legal regime and the behavioral dictates of the chivalric code: compliance
correlates with congruence. NMBs may well resist the use of lawful battle strategies and advocate
unlawful strategies for reasons having little to do with IHL and everything to do with their organizational
179
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that detail how heroic soldiers behaved in combat. Id. (citing, as exemplary of such stories, Dept. of the Army, Values: A
Handbook for Soldiers, sec. 2, Pamphlet 600 (Jan. 1987)).
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See Statement of General Douglas MacArthur in Confirming the Death Dentence Imposed by a United States Military
Commission on Japanese General Tomayuki Yamashita for Command Responsibility in the Murder of U.S. POWs, October 1946
(“The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak and unarmed. It is the very essence and reason for
his being. When he violates this sacred trust, he no only profanes his entire cult but threatens the very fabric of international
society. The traditions of fighting men are long and honorable. They are based upon the noblest of human traits—sacrifice.”);
see also FISHER, supra note 26, at 92 (“[S]oldiers are brought up to risk almost certain death rather than fail in their duty . . .
even though there is no compensating chance of personal gain.”); Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22- A, 7 October
1997, at para. 84 (holding that, by virtue of their special protective role, soldiers “are expected to exercise fortitude and a greater
degree of resistance to a threat than civilians” and “by the very nature of their occupation . . . envisag[e] the possibility of violent
death in pursuance of the cause for which they fight.”).
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See Haas, supra note 171, at 1 (defining “epistemic community” as a “network of professionals with recongized expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain” as well as to a set
of shared norms and practices to guide self-regulation); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 55, at 1783 (describing NMBs as a global
epistemic community that adheres to prescriptive norms of conduct).
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See RICHARD HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 5 (1983) (suggesting restraint in combat “d(oes)
not stem from conscious articulation of principles of [IHL] so much as from a soldier’s honor[.]”).
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See LEGRO, supra note 55, at 27, 149 (noting that although the code of chivalry is universal, the degree of concordance
between the organizational cultures of NMBs and the chivalric code varies across the universe of states).
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cultures.

OCT predicts that there are some battle strategies, such as the use of chemical weapons, that

are universally rejected by a transnational consensus of NMBs.190 However, where the organizational
culture of the NMB of the state in question is sufficiently deviant from the universal norms that inhere in
the chivalric code,191 OCT directs investigators to treat this normative structure as significant in
determining the range of battle strategies the NMB will advocate to civilian decisionmakers and to
incorporate this variable in deriving compliance predictions.
B. Criticisms of Existing Pretheories
1. Realism
The realist assumptions that systemic variables alone are sufficient to explain state behavior, and
that states pursue material self-interest, measured in power, to the exclusion of all other ends, are readily
falsifiable. States generally employ the least costly options that will secure their objectives, and
cooperation is frequently preferable to unilateralist approaches. Moreover, state policies change over
time even in the absence of transformations in the systemic distribution of political and military
capabilities, and consequently something other than power must have causal influence upon state
preferences.192 Furthermore, not all states are as committed to power, or as agnostic with regard to the
importance of norms, as realists would have us believe, and realism simply lacks any explanation for how
states come by their preferences.193 Thus, unless international law boosts state power, realism cannot
explain why states enter into treaties, particularly those that inhibit the accumulation and deployment of
power as do IHL instruments, let alone pay them any heed during the clash of arms.
2. ET
Enforcement of law requires will and capacity, and many states are unwilling to muster either or
both. Evidence that the threat of punishment is often insufficient to deter noncompliance by powerful
states whose military capacity largely immunizes their foreign policy decisions,194 as well as evidence that
law-governed behavior can flourish even where no credible sanction can be imposed,195 leaves ET
vulnerable to criticism as only slightly less ontologically primitive than realism.
189

See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 55, at 1772 (noting that the U.S. policy of assassinating suspected terrorist leadership
is lawful but has been opposed by senior members of the U.S. military bureaucracy on normative grounds).
190
OCT theorists attribute a strong transnational aversion to the use of chemical weapons by NMBs to the widely-diffused view
that chemical weapons are dishonorable, in that they kill indiscriminately and are largely indefensible, and foreign, inasmuch as
their development and, to some extent, deployment is controlled by civilian scientists. See LEGRO, supra note 55, at 150
(summarizing this conclusion); see also Goodman and Jinks, supra note 55, at 1776 (stating that “[i]t has arguably become an
unconditional feature of the modern state to forbear use of specific types of weapons[,]” such as chemical weapons, due to the
overpowering influence of an opposed transnational military organizational culture).
191
Explanations for deviance include national level variables (the political culture of the state) or governmental unit variables
(group-level norms that motivate key decisionmakers) that are inconsistent with the chivalric code. In other words, the normative
structure of the state or decisional unit affects the organizational culture and state decisions.
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See, e.g., ERIC SINGER & VALERIE HUDSON, ED., POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 24 (1992)
(“One of the most central criticisms of [realism] has been [its] inability to cope with change in a state’s policies.”).
193
See DAVID EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1953)
(insisting that all theories of international relations, including realism must account for the formation of state preferences).
194
See FISHER, supra note 26, at 92 (“[O]f all the factors affecting President Kennedy and his advisers during the October 1962
Cuban missile crisis, fear of possible punishment before a future Nuremburg Tribunal for having violated international law was
not considered and, had it been raised, would have been dismissed out of hand.”). States battling for their national survival are
liberated from the threat of enforcement action: if they adhere to legal obligations but fail to survive, the question of enforcement
is moot; if they violate the law and in so doing survive, whatever costs are imposed through enforcement measures are more than
offset by the gains achieved through violation.
195
See YOUNG, supra note 10, at 18 (“Even when there are no public authorities and social pressures are absent, . . . compliance
will sometimes emerge as a preferred option[.]”).
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3. Liberalism
The conclusion that liberal democratic states are more likely to comply with IHL than illiberal
states is exceedingly difficult to prove, in part because the designation of particular states as liberal or
illiberal is a subjective enterprise in which selection effects bias outcomes,196 and in part because most
empirical studies have examined correlations between government regime type and war participation
frequency, rather than IHL compliance.197 Although some scholars suggest that liberal states are more
likely than illiberal states to accede to legal regimes, others question whether their willingness to do so is
motivated by a desire to abide by their normative content as opposed to an interest in “satisfying the
public face of international law” and appeasing domestic constituencies while surreptitiously carrying on
as usual.198 Others query whether democratic states, because they are more tolerant of the proliferation of
interest groups than illiberal states, are more prone to contestation over the process of incorporating legal
obligations into the domestic framework and thus less likely to comply with legal regimes that, by virtue
of their imprecision or ambiguity, are more vulnerable to self-serving interpretations.199 Still others note
that even illiberal states comply with many of their obligations, including those to which they have
acceded in issue-areas trenching in high politics, such as the use of force.200 Finally, liberalist scholars
offer little to explain the microprocesses whereby the preferences of domestic groups and individuals
transform the preferences of states in favor of IHL compliance.201
4. RCT
Although RCT presents a parsimonious explanation for state compliance with IHL, if the central
postulate upon which it rests—that individuals are rational and equally endowed with fixed preferences
for welfare maximization—is falsifiable or, at least, subject to conditions and limitations, its
generalizability is suspect.202 Although nearly all decisionmakers will flee a burning house, they are
differentiable even in regard to their responses to stark existential threats, and in respect to lesser-order
challenges preferences vary tremendously in response to a host of non-material inputs, including social
norms, emotions, cultural practices, and the need for identity, security, recognition, self-esteem, and
justice.203 The world is home not only to homo economicus but to idiosyncratics, ideologues, fools,
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See Toril Aalberg, Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View, 33 J. PEACE RES. 1 (1996) (noting that the taxonomy of
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See, e.g., Nils Petter Gleditsch, Democracy and Peace, 29 J. PEACE RES. 369 (1992) (finding that war participation rates do
not vary as between democracies and non-democracies); BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1994)
(recognizing that “democratic peace” theory has ignored the question of IHL compliance)
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See, e.g., Jacqueline Alder & Gaul Lugten, Frozen Fish Block: How Committed are North Atlantic States to Accountability,
Conservation and Management of Fisheries?, 26 MARINE POL’Y 345, 356 (2002); Hathaway, supra note 12, at 2016
(suggesting that for some states, treaty ratification allows a state to express insincere support for treaty norms while diffusing
domestic and international pressure to actually comply. Some even suggest that, because accession often associates with
reductions in compliance, and because liberal states are more likely to accede to treaties than illiberal states, a negative
association exists between liberalism and compliance. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 34, at 881.
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See, e.g., Ho, supra note 24, at 663-83.
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See Williamson, supra note 20, at 81 (indicating that many illiberal states, including “dictatorships,” comply with legal
obligations under arms control and security agreements).
201
For a constructivist critique of the inability of liberalism to account for the process whereby liberal states acquire and adapt
their preferences, see KECK & KSIKKINK, supra note 158, at 214.
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See Thomas Ulen, Rational Choice in Law and Economics, in Boudewijn Boukert & Geerit de Geest, eds., Encyclopedia of
Law and Economics 790 (Edward Elgar 2000) (contending that this core assumption of RCT is indeed falsifiable).
203
See generally JOHN W. BURTON, CONFLICT: HUMAN NEEDS THEORY (1990). For a critique of RCT as a reductionist
approach, see William H. Riker, The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory, 16 POL. PSCYH. 23 (1995); MARY ANN
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wishful and delusional thinkers, altruists, martyrs, and those who actively prefer violence and misery to
wealth and comfort,205 and many nonrational persons wend their ways into command of states and key
institutions.206 Decisionmaking pathologies produce substantial deviation from RCT predictions, i.e., the
decision by Saddam Hussein to remain in Kuwait and await a U.S.-led invasion in 1991 or the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor. Moreover, even if one accepts the RCT premise that individuals are selfinterested, the complexity and uncertainty that characterize many foreign policy decisional environments
force decisionmakers who lack relevant information to adopt “short-cuts to rationality” that produce
systematic and motivated errors in judgment at variance with RCT predictions.207 People make mistakes,
and some critics of RCT would go so far as to reverse the presumption and require decisionmakers to
“establis[h] that their . . . decisions for war and peace are fully based on truly national and objective
considerations, rather than expressing mere rationalizations of private emotional dispositions.”208 In sum,
RCT critics insist that because state preferences vary as a function of variance in the preferences of key
decisionmakers,209 and therefore explanations of state compliance with IHL are reducible to explanations
of the foundations of the preferences of key decisionmakers with regard to that regime.210
5. Managerialism
The assumption that states comply with law because well-articulated and –managed legal regimes
facilitate their collective interest in cooperation is controvertible in the case of IHL, a legal regime
directed to the conduct of states that have placed themselves in the least cooperative posture imaginable.
MT, committed to the notion of states as inherently cooperative, cannot explain why states deliberately
choose to reject the constraints imposed by IHL and employ prohibited battle strategies in order to prevail
over their adversaries, and the MT response—enhancement of monitoring and verification—is
particularly ill-suited to addressing deliberate noncompliance. States may simply be disinterested in
cooperation during war no matter how clear the rules that purport to govern its conduct nor how welldeveloped the mechanisms designed to spread information and thereby cooperation. If so it may simply

TETREAULT & CHARLES FREDERICK ABEL, DEPENDENCY THEORY AND THE RETURN OF HIGH POLITICS 1417 (1986) (arguing that foreign policy decisionmaking is “much less rational than we all pretend it is”).
204
“Wishful thinking” is a motivated bias in which decisionmakers evaluate the probability of outcomes they prefer as more likely
to occur, and the probability of outcomes they disfavor as less likely to occur, than rational analysis would suggest to be the case.
See SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 268.
205
See DONALD A. SYLVAN & STEVE CHAN, EDS., FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: PERCEPTION,
COGNITION, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 2-3 (1984) (offering examples to reject the presumption of individual
rationality).
206
See KEOHANE, supra note 109, at 72 (warning that RCT cannot be “applied mechanically” to the study of international
relations because there are “sinners and saints” in the world); see also David G. Winter, Personality and Political Behavior, in
SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 110 (stressing that the “intrusion of personal appetites, needs, fears, and obsessions g[i]ve a
quality—irrational, self-defeating, and/or violently aggressive—to many [foreign policy decisions.]”).
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ROBERT M. JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION 113 (1976). “Motivated errors” are judgments based not on
objective evaluations of available evidence but on the basis of needs or desires. SEARS ET AL, supra note 78, at 267.
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LLOYD S. ETHEREDGE, A WORLD OF MEN: THE PRIVATE SOURCES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 100
(1978). For many critics of RCT, “”assumptions about the inherent rationality of humans rests upon little, if any, foundation.”
SINGER & HUDSON, supra note 193, at 24.
209
See Morrow, supra note 39, at 50 (“States vary greatly in their interest in supporting restrictions on violence during wartime.”).
210
Id. at 51 (attributing state decisions as to IHL compliance to the beliefs and moral judgments of their decisionmakers with
respect to the substance of that regime).
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be the case that the policy guidance offered by MT is limited in its applicability to issue-areas in which
states can enjoy material benefits from cooperative behavior, such as trade or environmental protection.211
6. Reputational Theory
RT has been challenged as limited in its theoretical reach to those issue-areas in which states
value a reputation. Although a reputation for honesty, fairness, and cooperation is valuable in economic
and diplomatic transactions because other states will refrain from dealing with states that do not possess
such characteristics, in the issue-area of armed conflict such a reputation may actually be perceived as a
weakness, and states may actually prefer a reputation “for toughness or even for being willing to bully
weaker states, more than they value reputations for compliance.”212 Critics of RT suggest that when the
potential gains for violating law are great enough, particularly in comparison to the probable reputational
costs that must be absorbed for pursuing self-interest, reputational concerns shrink to nothing.213 In regard
to the use of force, where the stakes are greatest, even some RT scholars admit that reputation is all but
irrelevant.214
7. TLP
Nearly every state has incorporated all the primary instruments of IHL. If, as TLP contends,
compliance is a function of the degree to which a given legal regime is internalized in domestic law,
states should reflexively and uniformly obey IHL. Because practice contradicts this prediction, it is
reasonable to question whether in fact the norms expressed in the rules elaborated by IHL instruments are
internalized, and whether incorporation is necessarily, as TLP theorists believe, instructive in any
meaningful sense as to how much legitimacy is to be imputed to the relevant norms. The principle
shortcomings of TLP theory are that it fails to treat the process of norm incorporation as the proper
subject of inquiry and that it leaves unexplored the mechanisms whereby norms change behavior or
attitudes. As a consequence, TLP cannot offer insights into why and when states comply with IHL and is
left simply presuming that they do notwithstanding evidence to the contrary.
8. LT
If LT is arguably more than simply the bare assertion that nations obey the law, it is not a testable
theory. Mere observation of state compliance without an explanatory model is a descriptive, but not a
nomothetic, statement of the relationship between law and behavior. LT builds no causal bridge between
the norms of procedural fairness it identifies as essential to the legitimacy of international legal rules and
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See Downs et al, supra note 26, at 391 (reaching this conclusion); see also Raustiala, supra note 27, at 405-08 (criticizing MT
as “dangerously contaminated by selection problems” for failing to draw cases from a range of issue-areas, including security and
armed conflict, that would more appropriately represent the entire spectrum of international relations); Moore, supra note_, at
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Keohane, supra note 77, at 497. Skeptics of RT note that legal commitments involving national security are qualitatively
different from those in other issue-areas and are, in some sense, made to be broken: because all states are presumably prepared to
do whatever necessary to ensure their physical survival, other states discount the reliability of commitments that would limit
states in this regard, and consequently do not impose significant reputational costs for their violation. See, e.g., Richard Baxter,
International Law in “Her Infinite Variety,” 29 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 551 (1980).
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See, e.g., Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 86, at 1135-36.
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See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1883-84 (conceding that “[t]he value of a reputation for compliance with international
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their effects upon decisionmakers who must make compliance decisions, and as a consequence it is
unable to elaborate any testable explanatory hypotheses.215
9. Constructivism
By offering slightly more insight into the pathways whereby norms alter preferences and give rise
to formal legal regimes, constructivism does permit the generation of some testable hypotheses.
However, just as is LT, constructivism is grossly underspecified: no account is offered for the process
whereby norms are acculturated and linked with individual decisions, and constructivists simply offer a
loose explanation that relies on the workings of international civil society as a sort of deus ex machina.216
What is worse, constructivism rests upon a contestable assumption regarding human and state nature.
Constructivists tacitly assume that the norms that come to predominate in the construction of individual
and state preferences will invariably motivate the transformation from power and self-interest toward
greater transnational cooperation. Throughout human history, destructive ideologies and the lust for
power have proven at least as susceptible of proliferation, and it is equally plausible that individual and
state preferences strongly favoring the self-interested maximization of power may emerge, diffuse
through the international system, and prove fatal to law-governed cooperation.217 Moreover, not all
individuals are as amenable to construction as are others, and some actively resist normative
socialization.218 Although the potential that individuals and states can be “constructed” by norms
destructive of law and international civil society neither precludes compliance with IHL nor invalidates
constructivism, it does demonstrate the need for additional theoretical articulation and substantiation.
10. OCT
OCT offers a coherent explanation for state compliance with rules of IHL that are congruent with
the martial code, and predicts state compliance where both the martial code and IHL either prohibit the
battle strategy in question (states will not employ the strategy) or permit it (states will employ the
strategy). However, OCT cannot explain instances where NMBs refrain from battle strategies that, while
prohibited by positive law, are clearly permissible under the martial code. If organizational culture is the
independent variable, one would expect NMBs to discount the significance of IHL in favor of
organizational preferences. Moreover, OCT theory cannot explain noncompliance with rules that mirror
the commandments and injunctions of the martial code without incorporating levels of analysis
exogenous to the NMB. Some individuals and groups may simply be resistant to socialization and thus
impervious to the influence of organizational-cultural norms. Perhaps most significantly, OCT is unable
to explain instances where NMBs refrain from employing battle strategies permissible under both the
martial code and IHL without importing variables from levels of analysis that are conceptually distinct
from organizational culture. In short, to explain and predict IHL compliance it is not enough simply to
215

For a critique of LT, see Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 356-57.
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gauge the goodness of fit of the formal legal rules to the organizational culture the rules are meant to
govern; rather, the causes and effects of organizational culture must themselves be problematized.
C. Compliance Decisionmaking and the Inadequacy of Existing Theories
Notwithstanding their individual merits, all existing theories are hobbled by structural biases that
obscure human agency. Realists and adherents of ET and RCT characterize individuals as simply rational
calculators of the relationship between state self-interests and compliance, while theorists of all other
stripes treat them as, to greater or lesser degree, mere captives of rules embedded in regimes, institutions,
and patterned cultural imperatives. Although subnational and supranational actors wax ever more
important, the question of IHL compliance is ultimately directed to the question of responsibility for
decisions, and neither the international system, nor states, nor domestic interest groups, nor bureaucracies
have the capacity to elect compliance or noncompliance.219 The sole entities with the capacity to exercise
choice are individuals, and only those individuals with the authority and power to commit the state are
directly relevant to the study of compliance generally and IHL compliance in particular.220 People, and
not abstractions such as organizations, cultures, interest groups, states, or systems,221 decide whether or
not to comply with law, and even if individual preferences, attitudes, or values are derived from these
entities these determinants of behavior constitute personality-based individual-level variables that may
account for much of the systematic variance in compliance as between decisionmakers and, in turn, as
between the states on behalf of which they decide. If so—if failures of compliance are often due to
“indiscipline, ignorance, and cruelty”222 among other personality-based factors—a robust theory of human
agency is essential to any explanation or prediction of state compliance with IHL.
This is not to suggest that other levels of analysis are theoretical blind alleys. The decision
whether to comply with IHL is a question of foreign policy, and foreign policy is no more simply a
question of personality than it is simply a question of power. The manner in which organizational
machinery conditions and shapes individual preferences, as well as the political features of the
government regime, the national and cultural attributes of the society in which the individual makes
decisions, and the opportunities and constraints yielded and imposed by the distribution of power and
resources in the international system all exert causal influences on individual decisions with regard to
compliance with law, and each of these levels of analysis223 must be investigated, operationalized, and
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See id. at 41 (“[The] special feature of the compliance problem of collective entities is the question of who is ultimately
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integrated into a theoretical model if its full explanatory and predictive potential is to be realized.

By

the same token, neglect of the structure in which decisions are made can ignore important constraints
within which decisionmakers identify and select between choices. All levels of analysis are necessary,
and no one level is sufficient. The objective of long-term research programs should be to build bridges
between the various levels of analysis rather than to force a choice between them.225 The complexity of
the phenomenon under analysis generates natural resistance to reductionism.
Nevertheless, the most determinate of explanations requires that theoretical relationships between
be established at the most specific level of analysis at which investigation is possible. Because none of
the existing theories accord significant theoretical weight to the individual decisionmaker, the
determinacy and explanatory power of resulting explanations suffer accordingly. If individual-level
variables were not investigable, or not determinable, or if the results of experiments at the individual level
of analysis were not generalizeable, failures to incorporate these variables into theories of IHL
compliance would be defensible. If, however, the tendency to give short shrift to the role of individuals
in the study of legal compliance results from a lack of capacity to employ requisite methodologies drawn
primarily from other disciplines,226 or, worse, the unwillingness to invest the labor and time necessary to
acquire training in these methodologies and disciplines, the sacrifice of explanatory capacity in the name
of convenience and parsimony is, to put it mildly, “particularly troubling.”227 Whatever the reasons, it is
no longer adequate to simply speculate as to the existence and importance of the individual-level
variables that are causally related to state compliance with IHL228 or, still worse, to assume, because they
are difficult to observe and measure, that they are irrelevant.229
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The geopolitical history of the 20 century is inexplicable without reference to Wilson, Hitler,
Stalin, Churchill, Roosevelt, Reagan, Gorbachev, and Hussein, and the “policymaking community in
Washington takes it as an article of faith that who is the prime minister of Great Britain, the chancellor of
Germany, or the king of Saudi Arabia has real repercussions for the United States and the rest of the
world.”230 That this is so is because people, not states, make decisions, and because people, not states, are
the primary actors in the international system. Personality231 matters in international relations and in
international law, and war, along with the decisions regarding its commencement, prosecution, and
conclusion, may well “begin[] in the minds of men”232 and women. If so—if “what you decide depends
ultimately upon who you are”233—then the answers to the “‘why?” questions in international relations”234
and international law will remain beyond our ken unless and until we accept this methodological
imperative and turn inward to probe the decisionmaking process itself. While the proposition that
individuals are indispensable to the explanation of their decisions235 might strike some observers as
intuitively obvious, it is one thing to sense that personality is crucial, but quite another to specify how,
when, and above all why it is so. What we suspect is greater than what we know. A worthwhile theory of
IHL compliance must offer a precise and accurate description of compliance decisions, a parsimonious
yet valid explanation of compliance and noncompliance, and the promise of reliable prediction.
Accordingly, Part II elaborates a positive theory236 that treats state decisions and judgments regarding
compliance with the sub-regime of IHL governing the resort to self-defense as dependent variables
explainable by the incorporation of individual-level independent variables within the chain of causation.
II. A Personality Theory of IHL Compliance
A. Personality Theory
1. Political Psychology
The century-old237 field of political psychology [“PP”] posits the individual as not merely causally
significant but rather as central to explanations and predictions of the political behavior of collective
entities.238 Individuals are not prisoners of fell circumstances but rather exert positive influence on the
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“Personality” is the unique and systematic pattern of cognitive, affective, and behavioral functioning that each individual
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ROSENAU, supra note 222, at 89.
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RICHARD C. SNYDER, H.W. BRUCK, & BURTON SAPIN, EDS., FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING 33 (1962).
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See Raymond Birt, Personality and Foreign Policy: The Case of Stalin, 14 POL. PSYCH 607, 608-09 (1987) (elaborating the
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personality is important in explaining decisions).
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specification of constructs or concepts, a set of hypotheses, and criteria for explanation of behavior.
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The earliest political psychological theorization was conducted in the early 20 century by famed Viennese psychiatrist
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displacement in terms of the public interest. See HAROLD LASWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 75-76
(1930).
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world around them.

Although variables drawn from other levels of analysis factor into explanations of

the behavior of the social abstractions called “states,” because it is individual political elites, and not
states, who develop and implement the policies that shape the political universe,240 PP regards all political
behavior as the consequence of the complex interaction of psychological phenomena in the minds of the
241
individuals responsible for those policies. Thus, viewed through the prism of PP it is the psychology of

individual decisionmakers that is the orienting focus for the study of international relations. Because the
psychologies of decisionmakers have consequential correlates, and because each individual is endowed
with a unique personal psychology, PP dictates a research agenda that can explain how “who” the
decisionmaker is translates into the decisions he has made and will make. Accordingly, the political
psychologist must (1) develop a theory of personality that models the causal relationship between relevant
psychological variables and foreign policy decisions and accounts for variance across the broadest
possible range of decisionmakers, (2) assess the relative potency of variables from other levels of analysis
in terms of their contribution to decisional latitude or constraint, and integrate them into the theory.
2. General Premises and Assumptions
“Personality” refers to the “all aspects of an individual qua individual”242 that influence his
behavior.243 Within personality theory [“PT”], each individual is an aggregate of a unique complex of
constructs that drive a constant process of selection from among decisional alternatives. Choices are
made to satisfy internal motivational, valuational, or attitudinal dispositions and preferences and to
preserve desirable aspects or alter undesirable aspects of the environment as understood through the
unique frame of reference supplied by the decisionmaker’s personality, and it is this personality that
dictates the substance and process of these choices and yields behavioral and consequential effects.244
Although PT regards decisions as deliberate and conscious, it emphatically does not presume
rationality.245 In making decisions, individuals are obligated to perform a series of complex tasks,
including the search for information, the ordering of preferences, the development of decisional
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“The individual, far from being a mechanism manipulated by forces such as the ‘national interest’ or ‘power relationships,’ is a
significant independent factor in the decisionmaking process.” PATRICK J. McGOWAN & HOWARD B. SHAPIRO, THE
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY 53 (1973).
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PT assumes that through decisionmaking “individuals contribute to the situations they encounter” and “modify the
situation[s][.]” DAVID MAGNUSSON, PERSONALITY AT THE CROSSROADS: CURRENT ISSUES IN
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See LAWRENCE S. FALKOWSKI, PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 304 (1979)
(differentiating PP from disciplines that presume causation to flow in the opposite direction—i.e., that individual decisions are
caused by the influence of variables at higher levels of sociopolitical organization). Although it recognizes that social and
systemic variables exert reciprocal influence on individual decisionmakers, PP regards the causative pathway primarily directed
from individuals outward. Id.
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MARGARET G. HERMANN, A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS 2 (1977).
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See LEROY N. RIESELBACH & GEORGE I. BALACH, PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS 6 (defining personality as “what .
. . the individual . .. brings into the behavioral situation.”).
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See SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 21 (postulating that every decisional alternative is “associated with a set of beliefs about
the outcomes that are potentially associated with each alternative” and are “idiosyncratic to every decision-maker.”).
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See ROSENAU, supra note 222, at 195 (describing decisions as “more or less deliberate and conscious choices” but refraining
from characterizing decisionmaking as a rational process); see also JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY
OF DECISION: NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS 138 (contending that decisions made under conditions of
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alternatives, and the making of choices, and most are simply incapable of absorbing sufficient
information and undertaking adequate evaluation to reach decisions that consistently maximize their
welfare, or that of their constituents.247 The human mind is a limited instrument, and under conditions of
uncertainty and complexity individuals must simplify the decisionmaking process to avoid cognitive
248

overload and reach closure.

As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explains,

During fast-moving events those at the center of decisions are overwhelmed by floods of reports
compounded by conjecture, knowledge, hope, and worry. These must be sieved through their own
preconceptions. Only rarely does a coherent picture emerge; in a sense coherence must be imposed on
249
events by the decisionmaker[.]

To lighten their burdens, decisionmakers unconsciously resort to heuristic mechanisms that
250

conserve mental resources by creating shortcuts to judgments.

These various mechanisms—beliefs,

images, values, experiences, motivations, attitudes, perceptions, operational codes, and traits—represent
the basic constituents of personality and function as the primary determinants of decisions. Identifying
the relevant set of mechanisms, or constructs, operative in the decisionmaking context affords valuable
insight into the explanation and prediction of behavior.251 Establishing the process whereby these
mechanisms influence decisional tasks permits the generation of testable propositions and the
development of a theory.252 To explain and predict behavior thus requires the conceptualization of the
role of personality with behavioral referents for specific constructs.
c. Personality Constructs
a. beliefs
“Beliefs” are internalized scripts about the nature of reality and about expected or preferred future
outcomes253 that create a set of cognitive predispositions that shape the manner in which incoming
information is processed and interpreted.254 Individuals acquire a systematic tendency to see what they
expect to see on the basis of the content of beliefs that they acquire early in life255 and which exert great
influence upon
the individual’s interpretation of events, and thus the individual’s identification of when there is a need or
opportunity for making a choice; the individual’s choice and use of information, the individual’s definition
of what constitutes realistic alternative courses of action, and what values are considered in a choice
between alternative(s) . . . [Beliefs] influence the actor’s definition of both the objectives and alternative
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POST, supra note 232, at 77-78.
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Beliefs are essentially statements about relationships between cause and effect. See DANIEL HERADSTVEIT, THE ARABISRAELI CONFLICT: PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSTACLES TO PEACE 20 (1979) (“If a man perceives some relationship
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SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 264.
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See JERVIS, supra note 208, at 281 (tracing beliefs and perceptions to early first-hand experiences).
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courses of action available to his opponent, and the actor’s perception of the likely consequences of his
256
own and his opponent’s actions.

Individuals are systematically more receptive to information that is consistent with their beliefs
than to information that contradicts them, and decisionmakers are prone to selectively process
information in such a manner as to lend support to their belief systems,257 particularly under conditions of
situational complexity, informational uncertainty, lack of historical guidance, time pressure, and stress.258
Relevant actors seek information and then structure reality in a manner consistent with their beliefs and in
so doing selectively ignore or fail to integrate necessary information, building bias into their
decisionmaking.259 When confronted with repeated inconsistencies between belief systems and the
empirical world, individuals, to avoid cognitive dissonance, must either modify their beliefs or disconfirm
the validity of inconsistent information. However, so powerful are beliefs in dictating perceptions and
decisions that individuals exhibit a strong tendency to resist adaptation and to structure their interactions
with other actors in a manner consistent with the content of their beliefs regardless of contrary empirical
evidence.260
In other words, beliefs are remarkably stable conceptual anchors that resist reality, and it is the
variance in the constellations of beliefs that constitute individual personalities that explains, in some
measure, variance in diagnostic and decisional propensities. Beliefs may be hierarchically organized
around a small set of master beliefs, and operational code and cognitive mapping models261 suggest that
the most central, stable, consistent, and, therefore, theoretically relevant beliefs as regards theories of
international relations are those concerning the fundamental nature of human beings (good or evil), the
nature of politics (conflictual or cooperative, malleable or predetermined, predictable or unpredictable),
the value of human life, the role of chance, and the nature of the opponent.262
b. images
“Images” are the accumulated understandings about himself and the world an individual
organizes into an affective and evaluative structure to simplify decisionmaking.263 Although images may
reflect empirical reality, they are subjective interpretations: individuals “respon[d] not only to the
‘objective’ characteristics of a situation, but also to the meaning the situation has for [the]m.”264
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See MICHAEL BRECHER, CRISES IN WORLD POLITICS 12 (1993).
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L. COTTAM, FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: THE INFLUENCE OF COGNITION 9-17 (1986) (tracing the
development of operational code modeling and second-stage “cognitive mapping” models).
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See, e.g., David G. Winter, Margaret G. Hermann, Walter Weibtraub, & Stephen G. Walker, The Personalities of Bush and
Gorbachev Measured at a Distance: Procedures, Portraits, and Policy, 12 POL. PSYCH. 215, 221 (1991). A belief is
considered central to the degree that other beliefs in a given individual belief system are dependent upon it and to the degree that
it is resistant to change over time. A belief is stable to the degree that it maintains is value as a predictor variable from situation
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supra note 254, at 17-25 (elaborating a belief systems theory).
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Perhaps the most relevant image is the stereotype, defined as
a simplistic, unsophisticated belief about an individual or group that can be used to determine the proper
way to think about individuals or groups and to enable decisionmakers to fit a broad range of events into
well-defined, narrow categories, allowing speed and economy of mental effort . . . and justifi[cation of]
265
particular patterns of behavior and thinking[.]

Stereotypes artificially rationalize decisions by attributing admirable qualities to allies and venality to
opponents, thus enhancing perceptions of the probabilities of success while introducing bias and
increasing the likelihood of decisional failure.266
Stereotypes of other actors may be the master key to understanding foreign policy
decisionmaking.267 If states are external abstractions that can only be experienced as an internal function,
it is logical that images of states should reflect the personalities of those who experience and construct
them.268 Empirical evidence suggests that the pattern of behavior directed toward a given state is
congruent with the images held by the decisionmaker about the given state: a positive image corresponds
with friendly, cooperative behavior, whereas a negative image corresponds with hostile, conflictual
behavior.269 In short, the image of a state or other actor held by the decisionmaker firmly guides his
selection of decisional alternatives with respect to that state or actor.
c. values
“Values” are normative statements about behaviors, objects, and situations that are situated along
a relative continuum, superimposed upon information, and used to evaluate information.270 Values are
interwoven with beliefs and images but can be modeled as separate causal factors.
d. attitudes
“Attitudes,” defined as ideational formations having affective and cognitive dimensions that
create a disposition for a particular pattern of behavior toward categories of objects and social
situations,”271 are, like values, intimately connected to images and beliefs. Individuals tend to discard
information incongruent with their attitudes and to search for information that supports attitudinal
proclivities.272 The most theoretically significant attitudes as identified in foreign policy research tend to
be those which create predispositions to feel or act positively or negatively toward other states.273
e. traits
“Traits” are the “public, observable element of personality, the consistencies of style readily
noticed by other[s]” that “reflect the language of ‘first impressions,’ the adjectives and adverbs of
everyday language that we used to describe other people.”274 Trait theorists maintain that factors such as
energy level, self-confidence, communication style, organizational capacity, impulsivity, sociability,
265
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emotional expressiveness, intelligence, extraversion, and sensitivity are stable behavioral dispositions
that exert latent influence upon individual choices and behaviors.276
f. motives
“Motives” are latent dispositions that direct decisionmakers to define situations, make evaluative
277

judgments, mobilize energy and resources, and selectively pursue end states in the empirical world.
Researchers identify needs for power, achievement, and affiliation as among the most theoretically
important motives in explaining decisionmaking in international relations.278
g. summary
Whether scholars incorporate beliefs, images, values, attitudes, traits, motives, or other

personality constructs in their decisionmaking models, each term references a mechanism operant in the
mind of an individual faced with uncertainty and time constraints which filters, orders, simplifies, and
explains the political universe while facilitating the task of identifying, evaluating, and selecting from
between decisional alternatives. For purposes of simplicity and clarity, the general term “personality
construct” references each of the various elements of personality described herein.
d. Measuring Personality
Problems with data access hamper the development and testing of a PT model of decisionmaking.
Attempts to specify the manner in which personality translates into foreign policy decisions require the
opening of the black box of the decisional unit to ascertain precisely what decisionmakers think, say, and
do during the decisionmaking process, yet this is generally impossible prior to the declassification of
official records. Moreover, public officials tend to zealously guard national and personal secrets, and
what data leaks to the research and lay communities, such as memoirs, retrospective accounts, and
secondary source materials, tend to be less than completely reliable,279 particularly while principals are
still alive.280 Similarly, assessments of the link between personality and foreign policy decisionmaking
which rely on literature reviews, insider interviews, and biographies, are subject to validity problems due
to temporal and spatial distance from the subject, deliberate or unintentional deception, faulty interview
designs, and human fallibility.281 Content analysis has been utilized as an alternative form of personality
measurement in all the major studies which have applied PT to foreign policy analysis,282 yet it too is
beset with validity problems. Speeches, interviews, and private conversations may not reflect the true
beliefs, images, or values of decisionmakers or offer a faithful guide to their personalities.283
Establishing the role of personality in the decisionmaking process requires a measurement
protocol. Direct measurement is possible through interviews by psychiatrists and psychologists, direct
275
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observation, and formal tests. However, unless decisionmakers submit to psychometric testing or clinical
anamnesis,284 personality must be inferred from behavior. The “psychobiographical approach,” or
“assessment at a distance,”285 establishes an a priori measurement protocol and then gathers all possible
sources, including letters, speeches, interviews, documents, newspapers, autobiographies, anecdotal
evidence, and direct observation data, to generate an explicit, valid, and reliable assessment of
personality.286 Psychobiographers engage in an iterative process of data collection, aggregation, and
testing, comparing each source to the others, to judge the reliability and validity of empirical data.287 PT
scholars draw upon this psychobiographical data to “score” decisionmakers on those personality
constructs hypothesized to give rise to variance in the political behaviors under analysis, with the ultimate
objective the explanation of how particular combinations of personality constructs, known as “personality
profiles,” direct decisionmakers to elect particular decisions and, in turn, produce specific behaviors.288
5. Conditionality and Contingency: Other Levels of Analysis
The relationship between personality and state behavior is one of contingency: assertions of
causality are couched by PT theorists as true only in some cases and under certain conditions, and caution
must be exercised when generalizing from their findings.289 Individuals make decisions within a wide
range of decisional environments, and they are constrained and influenced, to greater or lesser extent, by
external political, economic, and social realities,290 as well as by the culture of relevant governmental
bureaucracies291 and domestic public opinion. Although more powerful states face fewer external
limitations than weaker states, and hegemons face even fewer, no state, and therefore no decisionmaker,
is omnipotent. However, the influence of exogenous constraints is bounded.
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The role occupied by the individual is relevant to assessing the weight attributable to personality
in PT. The individual at the apex of the state hierarchy is invested with maximum decisional autonomy,292
293

and may be more impervious to other inputs than previously imagined even if he or she does not
294

command an authoritarian regime.

295

Head decisionmakers [“HDs”], whether by the textual

commitments of constitutions or by tradition, are invested with the greatest quantum of power relative to
other domestic actors in the field of foreign policy,296 and as decisional freedom increases the role of
exogenous constraints diminishes.
Furthermore, situational context is crucial, and constraints ebb with the nature of the impetus
toward decisionmaking, and with the issue-area in question. During situations of heightened ambiguity,
instability, and uncertainty, PT accords far greater causal weight to personality constructs than to other
variables,297 and an absence of precedent, increased time constraints, and increased emotional stress
further diminish the theoretical significance of exogenous factors.298 Responsibility follows power, and
HDs, upon whom the ultimate responsibility for power rests heavily, tend to rely less upon external
sources of guidance when their state is subject to external threat. Because the role of government
bureaucracies and the influence of domestic opinion contracts during conditions of ambiguity or
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uncertainty, the salience of exogenous constraints is at a nadir and the role of the personality of the HD
in the chain of causation resulting in state behaviors is at a zenith in the buildup to, and during, conflict
and war.300 Although legislative and bureaucratic actors, and to some extent public opinion, can be
301

influential on questions of war and peace, when a HD projects force outward institutional constraints
wither.302
While the relationship between personality and decisionmaking may be contingent and
conditional it is positive, and the foreign policy behaviors of a state, and in particular those involving the
use of armed force, reflect the personality of the HD at the helm of the state and are inexplicable without
reference thereto.303 Although PT does not advance the “naïve view of political outcomes as merely the
projection of leaders’ personalities,” neither does it accept the “equally simplistic view that individual
personalities have no effect.”304 If PT concedes that personality-based theories are often supplemental to,
rather than replacements for, more general and abstract explanations,305 it nevertheless insists that under
delimited circumstances the personality of the HD contributes in causally significant measure to the
formation and implementation of policy choices.306 In sum, although it is insufficient to the development
of a general theory of foreign policy, the singular importance of personality to the explanation and
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prediction of state behavior in certain circumstances where HDs make essentially unconstrained and
authoritative decisions is an “existential reality.”307
B. An Integrated Pretheory of IHL Compliance
1. Introduction
Although a diverse array of theories can be subsumed within the rubric of PT,308 all treat empirical
behavior(s) as the explanandum—the thing(s) to be explained—and one or more personality constructs as
the explanans—the explanatory variables.309 In other words, state behaviors are dependent variables that
are the end result of a chain of causation that runs through the personality of the individual who sets the
course the state will follow, and the personality constructs that constitute this unique personality are
independent variables.310 A review of the historical record of state IHL compliance suggests that a model
which allows for psychobiographical measurement of several policy-relevant personality constructs may
enable enriched explanations of compliance decisions while retaining parsimony. In the development of
an integrated theoretical model an effort will be made to enumerate and define the personality constructs
operant in the personalities of HDs responsible, via the selection of IHL compliance decisions, for
particular outcomes; this accomplished, a set of preliminary hypotheses based upon the causal linkages
between personality constructs and compliance decisions and outcomes shall be offered and tested.
2. Independent Variables: Personality Constructs
The proposed theory of IHL compliance hypothesizes that the presence or absence of four constructs
in the personalities of HDs are responsible for state compliance with or violation of IHL; in the theoretical
model these personality constructs, which serve as independent variables, are “militarism,” “anomism,”
“hostility,” and “adventurism.”
a. militarism
“Militarism” is a global construct consisting of numerous subconstructs that tap a set of
intercorrelated beliefs, values, images, and attitudes. The militarist is more likely to consider military
alternatives than his nonmilitaristic counterpart, more prone to escalate conflictual situations, and more
likely to lead his state to war.311 Nationalism and a favorable attitude toward power have been identified
as the subconstructs most predictive of the level of conflict and cooperation associated with a
decisionmaker both cross-sectionally and longitudinally;312 nonetheless, all thirteen subconstructs that
typify the militarist, specifically nationalism, a favorable attitude toward power, patriotism, aggression,
authoritarianism, militarism, competitiveness, dogmatism, introversion, isolationism, ambitiousness, low
self-esteem, and military experience are incorporated in the theoretical model. The ideal-typic313 militarist
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scores high, indicating the presence of the subconstruct in his or her personality profile to an extent
significantly greater than the average person, on each subconstruct.
i. subconstructs of militarism
“Nationalism” is a belief that one’s nation is superior to and more honorable than other nations by
virtue of its superior culture, tradition, race, ethnic composition, philosophy of government, or other
characteristic(s),314 as well as the motivation to “develop, protect, maintain, or refine” this culture,
tradition, race, or philosophy.315 Nationalists are more prone to defend fellow nationals in word and in
deed, and more likely than non-nationalists to serve in the armed forces of their state of nationality.316 On
the other hand, nationalists are less able to make subtle distinctions and gradations than are nonnationalists.317 Nationalism is positively intercorrelated with other subconstructs, including militarism,
318

authoritarianism, dogmatism, isolationism, and a favorable attitude toward power.

The foreign policy

outputs of nationalists tend to be more conflictual than those associated with their non-nationalist
counterparts,319 and these effects are heightened in the context of cultural dissimilarities between the
nationalist and the target of foreign policy.320
“Favorable attitude toward power” [“FAP”] is a composite subconstruct which refers to the
beliefs held by the individual in the desirability and utility of possessing and employing force in the
pursuit of objectives. Specific indicators include positive attitudes toward the military, nuclear weapons,
war, coercion, and control over others.321 FAP is positively intercorrelated with competitiveness,
authoritarianism, aggression, isolationism, ambitiousness, and distrust.322 The militarist believes that
power, and in particular military power, is essential to preserving international peace323 and thus has a
strongly favorable attitude toward power and the use of force.324
“Patriotism” is the “attachment [felt] by group members to their group and the state in which they
reside” that motivates individuals to be willing to sacrifice personal goals and individual well-being for
the benefit of the group.325 Patriotism is positively intercorrelated with nationalism.
“Aggression” is the trait that directs an individual to engage in self-assertive, self-protective,
domineering, hostile, and/or violent interactions with others.326 Aggression is positively intercorrelated
with FAP, isolationism, and low self-esteem.327
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“Authoritarianism” is the belief that the value of unquestioning obedience to authority is superior
to individual freedom of judgment and that the credibility of information is a function of the authority of
its source rather than of its factual reliability.328 Authoritarians rigidly adhere to conventional values and
social conformity, look for and condemn violators of tradition as a social threat, and are preoccupied with
329

hierarchies and social cohesion.

Authoritarianism is positively intercorrelated with isolationism and

nationalism.330
“Militarism” is the belief that war is a glorious and noble endeavor that serves the progressive
betterment of character, culture, and civilization.331
“Military experience” imprints upon an individual who serves in the national armed forces with a
set of beliefs, values, and images associated with that service, and individuals with military experience
tend to acquire a “culture of war” that leaves them with a more favorable attitude toward power and
conflict332 and renders them more quick to perceive external threats.333
“Competitiveness” is the motivation to participate in a struggle against others and the belief that
this struggle is necessary to the attainment of objectives and the satisfaction of wants and needs.
“Dogmatism” refers to the degree to which an individual is incapable of performing the following
cognitive processes: identifying linkages between concepts; employing a great number of dimensions in
the description of stimuli; utilizing a great number of rules in integrating components into a coherent
whole; tolerating contrary beliefs; objectively evaluating ideas with which he disagrees; employing
contingency analyses; adapting to ambiguity; generating alternatives; assimilating cues, particularly those
that run counter to preconceptions, from the external environment; and perceiving shades of grey and
nuances as opposed to thinking in “black and white.”334 Dogmatism correlates with aggression,
authoritarianism, and competitiveness.335
“Introversion” describes an attitude and a trait in which an individual directs his interests and
attention inward to his own thoughts and experiences rather than outward to external objects or people.
Introverts are less vulnerable to social pressure but less resistant to assimilating external cues than are
extroverts.336 Introversion is positively intercorrelated with aggression and FAP.337
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“Isolationism,” also known as “alienation,” is the negative value attached to interaction with
others, to the nurturing of relationships, and to helping other people and groups. Isolationists lack a
predisposition to establish, maintain, and restore positive relationships with others, to seek approval, and
to limit the type or degree of their conflictual relationships with others.338 Isolationism is positively
intercorrelated with FAP,339 aggression,340 competitiveness,341 and low self-esteem.342
“Ambitiousness” is the value attached to personal accomplishment, and ambitious individuals are
predisposed to strive for success in tasks involving leadership and the demonstration of intelligence.343
Ambitiousness is positively intercorrelated with aggressiveness.344
“Low self-esteem” is the absence of a belief in one’s own capability, inherent worth, and
entitlement to the respect and admiration of others; individuals with low self-esteem are not selfconfident, patient, receptive to external cues, or likely to perceive themselves as competent and wellregarded by their peers,345 but are more prone to violent behavior than are those with high self-esteem.346
Low self-esteem is positively intercorrelated with aggression.347
ii. militarism: summary
The ideal-typic militarist is a nationalistic patriot with prior military service who views the use of
power favorably, is an aggressive competitor and keenly ambitious, and is authoritarian and dogmatic yet
introverted and isolated from others and beset with low self-esteem. While the pure ideal-typic militarist
may exist only in theory, militarists score high, indicating the presence of the subconstruct in his or her
personality profile to an extent significantly greater than the average person, on a majority of the
subconstructs.
b. Anomism
“Anomism” consists of five subconstructs—disrespect for law, disrespect for legal authorities,
amoralism, ignorance of law, and ignorance of IHL—that tap a set of intercorrelated beliefs, values,
images, and attitudes regarding the rule of law. The anomist has little regard for the law or legal
authorites, lacks moral or ethical qualms about violating legal obligations, and knows little of the
substance of law generally and even less about IHL. In brief, the anomist is a serial and unrepentant
lawbreaker. The ideal-typic anomist scores high on each subconstruct.
i. Disrespect for Law
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Although “[e]veryone breaks the law sometimes, and some people break it often[,]” for many
individuals law is an object of reverence,349 and obedience to legal commands is nearly a quasireligious
obligation.350 Many, and perhaps almost all, people quite simply believe that law must be obeyed for the
351

simple reason that it is law.

The anomist, in contrast, accords no independent normative value to legal

obligations and regards legal obedience in purely instrumental terms: if obeying the law suits his selfinterest, he does so, but if obedience thwarts the pursuit of his ends, law is but another objective
impediment that must be overcome or negotiated away.352 Disrespect for law is negatively correlated with
educational attainment.353
ii. Disrespect for Legal Authority
Respect for legal authority is widely diffused across demographic, cultural, and geographic
domains.354 Most people accord legal authorities, including the police and the judiciary, the presumption
of integrity, competence, and legitimacy, and as a consequence are likely to voluntarily cooperate and
comply with them in their official capacities.355 By contrast, anomists treat legal authorities just as they
do legal obligations: not as inherently worthy of respect or obedience but rather as potential constraints to
be factored into calculations of how best to pursue self-interest.
iii. Amoralism

“Amoralism” refers to an absence of absolutism exercised in the evaluation and judgment of
character, conduct, ethics, and values. Its converse, moralism, can be, but is not necessarily, religiously
motivated. Several scholars suggest that moral judgments are more consequential than the perceived
certainty or threat of punishment in decisionmaking with respect to compliance with legal obligations,356
and at least one argues that “morality [is] the most important factor in shaping law-related behavior.”357
As Tyler explains,
[P]eople d[o] not simply act in pursuit of gains. Rather, their own personal sense of right and wrong
influence[s] their behavior. Most people give little or no consideration to the possible gains and losses
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associated with illegal behavior. Instead, they simply engage in the behavior that they think is morally
358
right.

Although morality can undermine compliance with law where the specific rules in question are perceived
as morally illegitimate, most people regard compliance as a moral duty and consider non-compliance
morally unjustifiable.359 Moreover, many individuals consider the moral evil occasioned by
noncompliance to be greater than the evil of obeying a law with which they disagree, and consequently
comply on moral grounds.360 The ideal-typic anomist, however, accords no moral virtue to compliance
and is agnostic, and thus amoral, with respect to right and wrong.
iv. Ignorance of Law
“Ignorance of law” is the absence of formal legal education. Those with legal training may be
more likely than those untutored in the law to regard legal obligations as significant in relation to other
commitments.361 Although legal training “does not assure that [decisionmakers trained in the law] will
cast their votes for law observance, . . . some knowledge of the law, some appreciation of its significance,
362

and some attitudes and habits of respect for the law find a place in the process of decision.”

Moreover,

363

although most decisionmakers may know little about law, legal knowledge is an important determinant
of compliance: the more a decisionmaker understands his legal obligations, the more likely s/he will be to
comply.364 Accordingly, the anomist scores high on an index of ignorance of the law.
v. Ignorance of IHL
“Ignorance of IHL” refers to the absence of legal training in the IHL issue-area. As with the
subconstruct “ignorance of law,” knowledge of IHL is a determinant of compliance with IHL, and the less
a decisionmaker knows about IHL the less likely s/he is to comply with the regime.
vi. summary, operationalization, and intercorrelations
While the pure ideal-typic anomist may exist only in theory, s/he is ignorant of the law, regards
compliance with legal rules and authorities in purely instrumental terms, and complies only where it
serves self-interests: morality does not factor into the analysis.
c. Hostility
“Hostility” cconsists of ten subconstructs—distrust, narcissism, cynicism, misanthropy,
ethnocentrism, hostility, Machiavellianism, lack of empathy, selfishness, and anti-internationalism —that
tap a set of intercorrelated beliefs, values, images, and attitudes regarding human relationships. The idealtypic hostile scores high, indicating the presence of the subconstruct in his or her personality profile to an
extent significantly greater than the average person, on each subconstruct.
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i. Distrust
“Distrust” refers to a belief in the inherent lack of goodness in human beings; individuals with a
high degree of distrust have misgivings about the intentions and activities of others and are wary of other
actors.365 Individuals with a high degree of distrust are more likely than those who are less distrusting, or
more idealistic,366 to overperceive, and overreact, to threats.367 The most distrustful decisionmakers can be
termed “paranoid,” defined as intensely suspicious of others, convinced that others are scheming to cause
them harm or impose their will, and prone to see enemies in everyone despite contradictory evidence.368
Paranoids tend to resort unnecessarily to forceful measures in response to perceived threats.369 Distrust
intercorrelates with cynicism and hostility.
ii. Narcissism
“Narcissism” is the belief that one is endowed with great power, physical appeal, and the right to
exploit and dominate others.370 Narcissists crave attention and constant reassurance and need to be
perceived as powerful, appealing, and worthy of love and admiration.371 Narcissists are preoccupied with
grandiose fantasies of wealth and fame, devoid of conscience or remorse, and willing to use whatever
force is necessary to achieve goals.372 The most malignant of narcissists, or “antisocial personalities,” are
often reckless, sadistic, suicidal, and prone to depression.373
Narcissists are self-absorbed and are not possessed of deeply-held beliefs about the external
world: their images of others are flexible, and other actors are of value or of concern to the narcissist only
to the extent that they enhance his personal self-interest or present him in a good light. For the narcissist,
what is good for himself is good for his state, and foreign policy issues are reducible to considerations of
how particular decisions advance his concept of self.374 Because they are detached from reality to the
extent of their self-absorption, narcissists are systematically inclined to overestimate their own
capabilities and fail to recognize external constraints.375 Narcissism is positively intercorrelated with
dogmatism, isolationism, and disrespect of law and legal authorities.376
iii. Cynicism
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“Cynicism” is the belief that others are self-interested, insincere, and motivated primarily by
material considerations, and the corresponding negative general image of humanity.377 Cynics expect the
worst of others, and consequently are more likely to perceive threats than are individuals who view others
as inherently cooperative, sincere, and motivated by norms.378
iv. Misanthropy
“Misanthropy” is a generalized dislike, and even hatred, of human beings. Simply put,
misanthropes are antisocial, do not seek or enjoy the company of others, and actively seek to avoid or, in
the alternative, to cause harm to other persons.
v. Ethnocentrism
“Ethnocentrism” is the belief that one’s own ethnic, racial, or cultural group is superior to others
and the attitude that association with persons of one’s own ethnic, racial, or cultural group is preferable to
association with members of other groups.379 Whether ethnocentrism has biological determinants or is
simply a social construction is as yet uncertain.380 Whatever the cause, ethnocentrics project their
preference for members of their own groupings onto the international system, and the degree of their
cooperation with other states is, in some measure, determined by the degree of ethnic similarity or
dissimilarity.381 Accordingly, justification for hostility is readily available to the ethnocentric who
identifies ethnic dissimilarities between his own state and the target of his decisionmaking and attributes
hostile intent to the target on the basis of these dissimilarities;382 greater vigilance is thus required to
protect against this threat.383 Taken to extremes, ethnocentrism creates a culture of fear that rationalizes
infliction of harm on out-groups to preempt the threat they pose.384 Ethnocentrism is positively
intercorrelated with aggression, distrust385 and selfishness.386
vi. Hostility
“Hostility” is the perception that others hold highly negative images of, and have strongly
negative intentions toward, one’s self, group, or state.387 In some sense, hostility is the corollary of
distrust in that it is an assessment of the degree of distrust operant in the calculus of external actors. The
greater the perception of hostility, the less likely a decisionmaker will be to recognize disconfirming
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information and the more likely s/he will be to perceive external actors as aggressive, to escalate
threats,390 and to meet the perception of aggression with force.391 Although heightened perceptions of
hostility may correspond to political realities, particularly in the context of long-standing military
confrontations wherein the citizens of belligerents become sensitized to expect hostility from their overt
adversaries,392 most individuals can distinguish “immediate and genuinely hostile out-groups” without
“detecting hostility from the entire world.”393 Clinically hostile individuals, however, are caught in a
“siege mentality” that persists independently of reason.394 Hostility is intercorrelated with distrust,
aggression, and patriotism.395
vii. Machiavellianism
“Machiavellianism” is the set of values that denies the relevance of morality in politics and
asserts that deception, stealth, and manipulation are justified in pursuing and maintaining power and selfinterest.396 The Machiavellian is “completely ruthless in the struggle for power,” devious, and utterly
amoral in the pursuit of self-interest.397 Neither norms, nor laws, stand in his way.398 Machiavellianism is
positively intercorrelated with hostility, ethnocentrism, narcissism, distrust, amoralism, selfishness, and
lack of empathy.
viii. Lack of Empathy
Empathy is defined as the “projection of one’s own personality into the personality of another in
order to understand him better” and the “ability to share in another’s emotions or feelings.”399 It is the
trait that disposes an individual to seek out and understand the views, interests, and values of other
persons and groups.400 Empathy may ameliorate self-interest and guide decisionmakers toward
considering the consequences of their decisions for others; through its effects, empathy may dampen the
frequency and intensity of international conflict. 401 By contrast, “lack of empathy” is the incapacity to
form accurate perceptions and judgments of others and inflexibility in adapting to and learning from

388

FALKOWSKI, supra note, at 295.
See SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 265 (theorizing that high levels of hostility correlate with the presumption of the
“inherent bad faith” and aggressiveness of other actors and the tendency to cast others as “enemies”).
390
See POST & ROBINS, supra note 369, at 26 (explaining that some individuals “lack the basic social skill of reacting to a
provocation by either ignoring it or meeting the level of provocation” and instead “meet hostility with greater hostility”).
391
See, e.g., Avi Shlaim, Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, 28 WORLD POL. 348
(1976) (correlating hostility with perception of threats); Dan Jacobson & Daniel Bar-Tal, Structure of Security Beliefs Among
Israeli Students, 16 POL. PSYCH. 567, 580 (1995) (correlating hostility with the use of force in foreign policy); DAVIS, supra
note_, at 5 (stating that the tendency of decisionmakers to adopt aggressive foreign policies is reinforced by the belief that their
state is “surrounded by a hostile environment”).
392
See Jacobson & Bar-Tal, supra note 393, at 585 (describing the preoccupation with security that has become the “master
symbol in the Israeli-Jewish ethos” and a “kind of ‘religion’” in response to millennia of military conflict with numerous
surrounding states, peoples, and terrorist groups).
393
POST & ROBINS, supra note 369, at 57.
394
See McGOWAN & SHAPIRO, supra note 240 at 53-60 (postulating correlation between irrational perceptions of hostility and
violent foreign policy decisionmaking).
395
See POST & ROBINS, supra note 369, at 57 (distrust and aggression); Alexander Thompson, Applying Rational Choice
Theory to International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 285 (2002) (patriotism).
396
See generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (W.K. Marriott transl. 1916) (1505).
397
See Glad, supra note 375, at 33.
398
See RAYMOND ARON, POLITICS AND HISTORY (M.B. Conant transl 1995) (defining machiavellianism as the sacrifice
of morality to expedience).
399
nd
WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 458 (2 College Ed. 1984).
400
SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 266.
401
See generally M.L. Hoffman, Toward a Theory of Empathic Arousal and Development 227-56, in M. Lewis & L.A.
Rosenblum, eds., The Development of Affect (1978).
47
389

402

incoming stimuli.

Individuals who lack empathy are more likely to dehumanize their adversaries and to

legitimate conflictual policies in regard to their opponents.403 Lack of empathy is positively intercorrelated
with aggression404 distrust, and hostility.405
ix. Selfishness
Altruism is the value placed upon aiding others despite high risks and high costs and despite the
absence of the expectation of an external reward; altruism is arguably the polar opposite of selfishness.406
The paradigmatic example is the self-sacrifice of the soldier who saves a number of his comrades from
certain death by throwing himself upon a grenade in their midst, absorbing the blow but ensuring his own
demise.407 “Selfishness” is the antithesis of altruism and is positively intercorrelated with lack of
empathy, low self-esteem, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism.408
x. Anti-internationalism
“Ant-internationalism” describes an orientation toward the global environment that shuns
cooperative participation in a wide range of international affairs, including educational, sporting, cultural,
social, economic, and security arrangements. Anti-internationalism is, to some extent, the corollary of
hypernationalism: anti-internationalists view unfavorably the creation and maintenance of transnational
networks to enhance international contacts and cooperation, and, given a choice between national
sovereignty and transnational regulation, are disposed to prefer the former.409 Anti-internationalism is
positively intercorrelated with distrust, hostility, aggression, and lack of empathy.410
xi. Hostility: Summary and Operationalization
The ideal-typic hostile is a self-absorbed, delusional, and amoral individual who is deeply
distrustful and suspicious of the intentions of others and sees threats lurking everywhere. S/he bears an
animus toward humanity that is mitigated only in regard to persons of his or her own racial, ethnic, or
cultural group, and s/he is prepared to do anything and everything, including use aggressive force, to
defeat the omnipresent threats posed by outgroups about whom s/he knows or cares little.
d. Adventurism
“Adventurism”consists of seven subconstructs—risk tolerance, internal locus of control,
impulsivity, anxiety, optimism, stress, and maleness —that tap a set of intercorrelated beliefs, values,
images, attitudes, and biological predispositions regarding the tolerance of uncertainty and the role of
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chance. The ideal-typic adventurist scores high, indicating the presence in his or her personality profile to
an extent significantly greater than the average person, on each subconstruct.
i. Tolerance of Risk
Uncertainty, or risk, is an immutable characteristic of the universe,411 and individuals vary in their
tolerance for it.412 Several theories posit that certain individuals are cognitively disposed to greater
tolerance of risk than are others,413 while other theories focus on the decisionmaking context and suggest
that high-stakes decision problems, particularly those that arise during armed conflicts, are most likely to
promote risk-taking behaviors.414 “Tolerance of risk” is a measurement of the degree to which an
individual will routinely choose courses of action that, although they may offer the prospect of gains,
carry with them significant possibilities of injury, damage, harm, or loss. Risk-tolerant individuals are
more likely to take chances and expose themselves and their states to danger in the pursuit of absolute and
relative gains than are risk-averse individuals, who tend to seek the decision that satisfies minimal policy
objectives with the least possibility for loss.415 The most risk-tolerant individuals are inclined to forgo
easy gains in pursuit of quixotic objectives.416 Tolerance of risk is positively intercorrelated with
417

impulsivity and internal locus of control.
ii. Internal Locus of Control

“Internal locus of control” refers to the belief that one is capable of exerting a positive influence
over the external world significant enough to bring about a particular future result chosen by and
favorable to the individual. For individuals whose locus of control is external to themselves, the belief
that no matter what they do their destiny is preordained can lead to decisional paralysis and mental
inactivity. In contrast, individuals with an internal locus of control attribute causality of and
responsibility for their behavior to themselves rather than to the external world.418 Will, and not Fate,
determines their future. Consequently, decisionmakers with an internal locus of control are more likely
than those with an internal locus of control to challenge environmental constraints and “push the limits of
what is possible” and less likely to remain passive or accept compromise solutions.419
iii. Impulsivity
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“Impulsivity” is the trait characterized by the inability to self-modulate sensory input, inhibit
sensation-seeking behavior, or consider the consequences of actions.420 Impulsivity is negatively
intercorrelated with intraversion.421
iv. Anxiety
“Anxiety” is the trait in which an individual is particularly prone to evaluate stimuli as dangerous
and to experience concomitant feelings of worry, distress, and panic. Anxious individuals are more likely
than non-anxious individuals to perceive and respond to threats and to have greater difficulty in relaxing
after stimulation.422
v. Optimism
“Optimism” is the belief that the future will generally produce preferred outcomes and that it is
prudent to expect the best of people, things, and events. Optimists are disposed to underestimate risk and
overestimate their own capabilities.423 Optimism is positively intercorrelated with tolerance of risk and
internal locus of control.424
vi. Stress
“Stress” is the aggregate of the physical and emotional responses produced by an individual in
425

unconscious adaptation to environmental stimuli.

Individuals vary in their perceptions of stress and in

their ability to preserve cognitive functioning as stressors mount, yet all experience degradation in their
ability to generate alternatives and choose optimal courses of action in situations that threaten core values
and interests.426 The more pronounced the stress experienced by a decisionmaker, the less likely s/he is to
generate alternatives and the more likely s/he is to elect high-risk options.427 Stress is positively
intercorrelated with aggression, cognitive simplicty, and tolerance of risk.428
vii. Male Sex
Some aspects of personality relevant to decisionmaking are likely sex-specific. Although sexrole differences may be constructs of socialization rather than biologically determined,429 men are
significantly and consistently more likely than women to be competitive, aggressive, ethnocentric,
Machiavellian, distrustful, ambitious, and lack empathy.430
420
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viii. Summary and Operationalization: Adventurism
The ideal-typic adventurist is an impulsive gambler who is so optimistic that he can assert his will
upon events that he will risk all for the sheer thrill of pursuing the prospect of a victory no matter how
small or unlikely. He resolves the tremendous anxiety and stress that accompanies his risky behavior by
trusting blindly and, in effect, rolling the dice.
3. Dependent Variables: Decisions and Judgments Regarding Anticipatory Self-Defense
The PT model of IHL compliance [“PT-IHLC”] regards the presence or absence of the
personality constructs of militarism, anomism, hostility, and adventurism in the personalities of HDs as
independent variables [“IVs”] that determine state compliance with IHL and treats these decisions and the
resulting judgments of other actors as the dependent variables [“DVs”]. To test the strength of the
causative relationship at this primary stage of theory development, a constituent sub-regime of IHL—that
governing war initiation—has been selected as the initial building block upon which the more general
study of compliance decisions throughout the range of IHL issues, including the selection of methods and
the choice of means, will be subsequently built.431 Specifically, the DVs in the present study concern
compliance with that aspect of the subregime of IHL governing the resort to war prior to the occurrence
of an armed attack, termed “anticipatory self-defense” [“ASD”].
DVs include the following:
(1) whether ASD is considered as an option;
(2) whether ASD is selected;
(3) whether attempt is made to defend an exercise of ASD;
(4) whether an exercise of ASD is defended on legal grounds;
(5) whether other actors regard an exercise of ASD as lawful at the time of its exercise;
(6) whether other actors regard an exercise of ASD as legitimate at the time of its exercise;
(7) whether the state engaging in ASD is subject to legal sanctions;
(8) whether other actors regard an exercise of ASD as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect;
(9) whether the HD who ordered his/her state to engage in or refrain from ASD would make the
same decision if offered the opportunity to decide again; and
(10) whether an exercise of ASD can fairly be said to have contributed to world order.

a. introduction: ASD
For most of history the sovereign prerogative of states to resort to armed conflict was immune
from regulation,432 and well into the 20th century states exercised the right to engage in war in response to
a host of perceived offenses, to collect debts, and to acquire territory.433 However, the Covenant of the
League of Nations434 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928435 advanced the crystallization of an as yet
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inchoate international customary prohibition on “aggression,” commonly defined as the use of armed
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state.437 In turn, the emerging
jus ad bellum438 found expression in 1945 in the Charter of the United Nations,439 as well as application at
440

441

Nuremburg, and quickly acquired the status of a peremptory norm.

Article 2(4) of the Charter

categorically proscribes “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state,”442 and thus it is “well settled in modern international law that no nation may
engage in aggression.”443
Nevertheless, imposition of a sharp prohibition on aggression has not disabled the “inherent
right” of states to self-defense.444 Although the UN Charter has had a transformative effect on the law
governing the resort to force,445 states remain free under customary international law to use force “in
446

conformity with the Charter.”

Accordingly, states resort to armed self-help to defend their territory and

political independence and protect their nationals and property abroad from threats of death or injury,447
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and they do so without impinging the territorial integrity or political independence of states that fail in
their duty to protect aliens and alien property within their jurisdiction.448 Moreover, self-defense remains
so intrinsic to the concept of sovereignty even in the Charter era that the right is likely “one that would be
asserted by nations absent recognition in international law.”449
In fact, the Charter does not of its own force disable or impair the right to self-defense, nor is it
clear that its framers intended that it do so.450 Article 2(4) prohibits only three specific applications of the
threat or use of force: (1) where prejudicial to the territorial integrity of states; (2) contrary to the political
independence of states; and (3) “in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”451 In other words, a use of force not excluded by operation of Article 2(4) is theoretically
permitted, and provided it cannot legitimately be construed as challenging either the territorial integrity or
political independence of a state or as inconsistent with the primary purpose of the UN—the
“maintenance of international peace and security,”452—it is arguably permissible.453 The use of force
under such circumstances is arguably not inconsistent with the maintenance of international peace and
security and not contrary to the Charter. Even more directly, Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes454
the “inherent right” of a state subjected to aggression to engage in self-defense, and to receive the
assistance of other states to that end.455
Precisely when the right to self-defend is transformed into a right to employ force is a hotly
contested question. The customary international law doctrine of ASD456 holds that when a state is faced
448
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literature review suggests that a majority of commentators now supports the right of a state to protect its nationals where
necessary by armed force, for opposing views see, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES 301, (rejecting right of intervention to protect nationals); HENKIN, supra note 6, at 145 (same).
449
Byard Q. Clemmons & Gary D. Brown, Rethinking International Self-Defense: The United Nations’ Emerging Role, NAV. L.
REV. 217, 218 (1998). Indeed, as soon as the Kellogg-Briand Pact entered into force the U.S. and nearly a dozen other states
moved to qualify the instrument with an authoritative interpretation providing that nothing in the text “restricts or impairs in any
way the right of self-defense[,]” which is “inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty.” United States, Identic
Notes, 1928, reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT’L L. Supp (1928).
450
See TIMOTHY L.H. McCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (1996) (concluding, after analysis
of the legislative history, that the Charter was not intended to terminate customary international law with regard to the use of
force or to draw all uses of force within the scope of Article 2(4)); BROWNLIE, supra note 449, at 271 (finding “no indication
that the Charter language was meant to do anything other than reflect the current right of self-defense)); D. BOWETT SELFDEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 (1956) (citing Doc. 1179, I/9(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 247 (1945)) (stating that
under the UN Charter “self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired); Sean D. Magenis,Natural Law as the Customary
International Law of Self-Defense, B.U. INT’L L.J. 413, 414 (2002) (Charter framers did not intend to limit the natural right of
states to self-defense); George Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties Have Said,
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 351 (1998) (concluding the framers understood self-defense to be an inherent and inalienable right);
Thomas Mallison & Sally Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or
Self-Defense, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 420 (1982) (concluding from its drafting history that the Charter incorporates
in toto the inherent right of self-defense ex ante in customary law).
451
UN Charter, supra note 440, at Art. 2(4).
452
Id. at Art. 1(1).
453
See Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 521-22 (same); but see Rex J.
Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms Control Agreements: “Star Wars” and Other Glimpses
of the Future, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 73, 90-92 (1985) (conducting detailed exegesis of the travaux preparatoires of the UN
Charter to reach the conclusion that “Article 2(4) was not intended to permit force to be used even when not inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.”).
454
Article 51 is not an affirmative grant but is rather the recognition of an inherent right of self-defense. See Walker, supra note
451, at 351-52 (clarifying status of the right to self-defense in the Charter as a recognized, and not a conferred, right).
455
See UN Charter, supra note 440, at Art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations[.]”).
456
ASD is sometimes referred to as “preemptive self-defense.” See, e.g., Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive
Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 599, 600 (2003 (equating the terms).
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with an imminent threat of armed attack it may lawfully resort to proportional acts of defensive armed
force to preempt the attack before it is inflicted.457 The question remains unresolved whether the
transformations wrought by Charter include impairment of the right of states to engage in ASD even
under the narrowly delimited circumstances of necessity resulting from an imminent threat of sufficient
magnitude.458 For restrictivists,459 ASD is a dangerous warrant for manipulative, self-serving states to
engage in prima facie illegal aggression while cloaking their actions under the guise of legal legitimacy.460
For restrictivists Article 51 is unambiguous in its requirement that an armed attack occur prior to the
lawful exercise of self-defense. For the pragmatists, however, to read the Charter hypertechnically to
require that a state assume the posture of a “sitting duck” and submit to potentially decisive first strike,
thereby risking its survival, would completely alter customary law as it existed at the birth of the UN and
“protect the aggressor’s right to the first stroke,”461 a logically and morally bankrupt conclusion.462 ASD is
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In the strict sense, the doctrine of ASD is inapplicable to ongoing conflicts, under which circumstances the formal state of
belligerence has been created, military operations are not designed to anticipate enemy attacks, and the rights of belligerents to
self-defense cannot be said to depend upon whether it is possible to demonstrate an imminent threat, as the threat exists from the
moment of the first strike. See Schmitt, supra note 454, at 535 (“Once the first attack in an ongoing campaign has been launched,
the issue of [ASD] becomes moot.”).
458
Some commentators add the requirement that the threat be of sufficient magnitude as to justify resort to ASD on the theory that
lesser threats can be managed without resort to force. Addicott, supra note 444, at 778.
459
A number of commentators hew to the restrictivist position and reject the post-Charter viability of the customary international
law doctrine of ASD as incompatible with the regime regulating the resort to armed conflict established by the Charter. See, e.g.,
DINSTEIN, supra note 433, at 159-85; LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8-10, 121-22
(1995); ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 32 (1987); BROWNLIE, supra note
449, at 257-61, 273-79, 366- 67; Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Prevent Terrorist Attacks, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 541
(1999). At least one restrictivist approves ASD on policy grounds but rejects the doctrine as incompatible with the Charter. See
Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25
Harv J L & Pub Poly 539, 539 (2002) (suggesting that although ASD can be a sound policy argument “it would plainly violate
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”).
460
See Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, in International Law: A Contemporary Perspective 394-410
(Richard A. Falk eds. 1985) (developing arguments in support of this concern).
461
Waldock, supra note_, at 498; see also id. “[I]t would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending State
to allow its assailant to deliver the first, and perhaps fatal, blow[.]”); Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards
a Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-Terrorism, FLA. J. INT’L L. 151, 184-85 (2002) (extrapolating the logic of a prohibition on
ASD into a blanket of territorial inviolability for states that harbor the “most blatant preparation for an assault upon another
state's independence[.]”).
462
“Suppose military intelligence at the Pentagon received indisputable evidence that a hostile State was poised to launch
intercontinental ballistic missiles, at a fixed zero hour only 24 hours ahead, against New York, Boston and Washington, would it
be an aggressor under the Charter if it refused to wait until those cities had received the missiles before it reacted by the use of
force? . . .[I]s it bound by law to wait for its own destruction?” STONE, supra note 449, at 99. Some restrictivists concede that a
coherent theory of legal regulation of force in international relations must make room for ASD in some very limited
circumstances. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 433, at 172-75 (arguing that the U.S. could legally have attacked the Japanese
fleet en route to Pearl Harbor on the ground the U.S. had “clear and convincing” intelligence that the Japanese were committed to
attack); WALZER, supra note 36, at 81 (allowing the permissibility of ASD where the enemy demonstrates “a manifest intent to
injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing
anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk.”); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE THREAT OF TOTAL
DESTRUCTION AND SELF-DEFENSE 259-60 (1964) (“[I]n the absence of effective international machinery the right of selfdefence must . . . be extended to the defence against a clearly imminent aggression, despite the apparently contrary language of
Article 51[.]”). However, not all restrictivists are as tolerant of even a slight exception, and thus representatives to the San
Francisco Conference questioned whether the argument that the Charter could be construed to abolish customary rights of selfdefense was politically and legally defensible. See, e.g., U.N. Doc.A/2211, paras. 392-93 (indicating questioning of the delegates
by Representative Maktos (U.S.) and van Glabbeke (Belgium) as to whether the U.S., if it had received prior notice of an
impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, would have been branded an aggressor had it engaged in ASD to destroy the
Japanese forces detailed to bomb Pearl Harbor). A former jurist of the ICJ demonstrates the continued incongruity of the
restrictivist position nearly sixty years later:
[C]ommon sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous provision in a text in a way that requires a state
passively to accept its fate before it can defend itself. And, even in the face of conventional warfare, this would also
seem the only realistic interpretation of the contemporary right to self-defence . . . [T]his view accords better with State
practice and with the realities of modern military conditions than with the more restrictive interpretation of Article 51[.]
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 242 (1994).
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thus, for pragmatists, consistent with the entitlement of states to defend against brewing threats even
before they are attacked.463
B. Operationalization
A sharp theoretical bifurcation on the question of the lawfulness of ASD in the abstract dictates
the result that ASD is almost invariably appraised in light of, and following, specific applications in
practice. Moreover, although a specific exercise of ASD is immediately opened to contestation, its legal
legitimacy is often not ripe for review until long afterwards, when the defending state finally declassifies
and submits the sensitive intelligence that established the factual predicate upon which its decision to act
rested to public review.464 Accordingly, it is difficult to assess a particular act of ASD as “legal” or
“illegal” ipso facto. However, it is possible to establish causal linkages between personality profiles and
decisions to resort to, or refrain from, the exercise of ASD under circumstances where the question as to
whether or not to act in anticipation of a potential attack arises or might reasonably have arisen, and,
secondarily, to link personality profiles to third party decisions as to whether instances of resort to ASD
are lawful or otherwise justified.
Accordingly each DV will be dichotomized and scored as a either “yes” for the presence of the
outcome or “no” for its absence. Operationalization of DVs 1-3 are self-explanatory; DV 4 requires
simply an assessment of whether the defending state offers any justification whatsoever for its actions;
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For a discussion of ASD as the natural legal duty of states, see William Bradford, The Duty to Defend Them: A Natural Legal
Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2004, forthcoming).
464
Some commentators insist that states engaging in ASD submit to an international “jurying” process whereby the evidence
adduced by the state seeking a variance is “tried” aforehand with the onus on the requesting state to prove its purity of motives,
the proportionality of the proposed use of force, and the severity of the threat. See Thomas M. Franck, The Use of Force in
International Law, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, at 15-17 (2003); Thomas Graham, National Self-Defense, International
Law, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 14 (2003) insisting that if international relations is to become lawgoverned, “states must openly justify their actions[,]” to include decisions to engage in ASD, to the review of states and
international organizations). However, considerations of bureaucratic inefficiency, opposing political interests, and the absence
of effective transnational procedures for protecting shared intelligence sources and methods militate against submission to an
international jury. To wit, the establishment of the factual predicate of an imminent threat is a time-consuming process made all
the more so by the machinery of the UN system. See Post-Cold War International Security Threats: Terrorism, Drugs, and
Organized Crime Symposium, MICH. J. INT’L L. 655, 716 (discussing bureaucratic inefficiencies and glacial pace of the UN
system); Michael A. Lysobey, How Iraq Maintained its Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: An Analysis of the
Disarmament of Iraq and the Legal Enforcement Options of the United Nations Security Council in 1997-1998, 5 U.C.L.A. J.
INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 135, 152-53 (2000) (describing Security Council as “plodding” and subject to the “whim of whatever
political and economic factors are motivating the Council.”). Moreover, proof requires the sharing of intelligence, something
states are loathe to do with all but their closest allies for fear that revelation of the evidence will permit deductions as to how the
evidence was acquired (methods) and by whom (sources), as well as the possibility that reviewers sympathetic to the target might
share the intelligence with the target. Sara N. Scheideman, Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism, 50 Syracuse
L. Rev. 249 (2000); see also Linkie, supra note_, at 573 (explaining that the U.S. cannot reveal all its evidence without
compromising the human intelligence sources, who may be placed within terrorist organizations or supply networks, or
disclosing its methods of interception and decryption of enemy communications); Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism:
The Strikes Again bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 567 (1999) (“[I]n the midst of a . . . war, a country defending its
territory and its nationals will rarely be able to disclose intelligence sources in a public forum.”); Graham, supra this note, at 7
(conceding that it is very unrealistic to suggest that states be forced to disgorge the intelligence upon which they rely in taking
measures to preempt attack). Moreover, even after reviewing the evidence, states unwilling on other grounds to approve a
proposed exercise of ASD are far less likely to concede that the proffered evidence is probative of the existence of an imminent
threat. Id. Worse yet, the inaccessibility of the target state to the state engaging in ASD, coupled with the interest of target states
in concealing relevant evidence of WMDs or terrorist training centers that would otherwise supply the “smoking gun” creates
difficulties in acquiring and assembling all the evidence necessary to establish the factual predicate beyond a reasonable doubt
that would be required in a domestic criminal case, yet the most strident critics of a particular exercise of ASD are likely to
demand that the acting state clear this evidentiary hurdle. John-Alex Romano, Combating Terrorism and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Reviving the Doctrine of a State of Necessity, GEORGETOWN L.J. 1023, 1039-40 (1999). Even if the burden of
proof were to be reduced to merely require a state to prove the facts justifying an exception to the general prohibition against selfhelp by “sophisticated pleading backed by relevant and highly probative evidence,” as some suggest should suffice, states will be
hard-pressed to satisfy this lesser standard. Franck, supra note 465, at 16.
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DV 5 directs an inquiry into whether and how other states and the UN judge the lawfulness of the
exercise of ASD, whereas DV 6 examines whether, although other states regard the act of ASD to have
been formally unlawful they nonetheless recognize the legitimacy of its exercise in the specific
circumstances by refraining from statements of condemnation; DV 7 is an assessment of whether formal
legal sanctions are imposed upon the defending state; DV 8 is an assessment of whether, after the passage
of time and the revelation of additional facts bearing upon the imminence of the threat, the act of ASD is
now regarded as lawful and/or legitimate by other states; DV 9 is self-explanatory; and DV 10 requires a
subjective assessment of whether, in light of all the available evidence and without any regard to the
legality of the act of ASD in question, the actions of the defending state can objectively be said to have
been preservative of peace, stability, justice, the rule of law, and/or other superordinate values held in
common by the international community.
C. Causal Linkages and Preliminary Hypotheses
The following linkages between independent and dependent variables are proposed at this
juncture as preliminary hypotheses [“PHs”]:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

The more militaristic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD as an option;
The more militaristic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to engage in ASD;
The more militaristic the decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD;
The more militaristic the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD on legal, as opposed to
strategic, grounds;
The more militaristic the decisionmaker the less likely most other actors will be to judge the use of
ASD to be lawful;
The more militaristic the decisionmaker the less likely most other actors will be to regard an exercise
of ASD as legitimate;
The more militaristic the decisionmaker the less likely other actors will be to impose legal sanctions;
The more militaristic the decisionmaker the more likely other actors will be to regard an exercise of
ASD as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect;
The more militaristic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be, in hindsight, to make the same
decision again with regard to ASD;
The more militaristic the decisionmaker the less likely his/her decision with regard to ASD can fairly
be said to have supported world order;
The more anomistic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD as an option;
The more anomistic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to engage in ASD;
The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD;
The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD on legal, as
opposed to strategic, grounds;
The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely most other decisionmakers will be to judge the
use of ASD as lawful;
The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely most other actors will be to regard an exercise of
ASD as legitimate;
The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely other actors will be to impose legal sanctions;
The more anomistic a decisionmaker the less likely other actors will be to regard an exercise of ASD
as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect;
The more anomistic a decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be, in hindsight, to make the same
decision again with regard to ASD;
The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely his/her decision with regard to ASD can fairly be
said to have supported world order;
The more hostile the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD as an option;
The more hostile the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to engage in ASD;
The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD;
The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD on legal, as
opposed to strategic, grounds;
The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely most other decisionmakers will be to judge the use
of ASD to be lawful;
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26. The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely most other actors will be to regard an exercise of
ASD as legitimate;
27. The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely other actors will be to impose legal sanctions;
28. The more hostile a decisionmaker the more likely other actors will be to regard an exercise of ASD as
lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect;
29. The more hostile a decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be, in hindsight, to make the same decision
again with regard to ASD;
30. The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely his/her decision with regard to ASD can fairly be
said to have supported world order;
31. The more adventurist the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD as an option;
32. The more adventurist the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to engage in ASD;
33. The more adventurist the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD;
34. The more adventurist the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD on legal
as well as strategic grounds;
35. The more adventurist the decisionmaker the more likely most other decisionmakers will be to judge the
use of ASD to be lawful.
36. The more adventuristic the decisionmaker the more likely most other actors will be to regard an
exercise of ASD as legitimate;
37. The more adventuristic the decisionmaker the less likely other actors will be to impose legal sanctions;
38. The more adventuristic a decisionmaker the more likely other actors will be to regard an exercise of
ASD as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect;
39. The more adventuristic a decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be, in hindsight, to make the same
decision again with regard to ASD;
40. The more adventuristic the decisionmaker the more likely his/her decision with regard to ASD can
fairly be said to have supported world order.

III. Personality and IHL Compliance: Testing the Theory
A. Data
Testing the theory requires analysis of available psychobiographical data concerning those HDs
who made verifiable decisions with respect to whether to engage in ASD during historical armed conflicts
in circumstances where a claim of right to engage in ASD, however contestable, either was made or could
arguably have been made on the basis of available facts.465 Because the legal subregime regarding ASD
did not arise until, arguably, 1929, data is necessarily unavailable before that year.466 However, available
data, drawn from a series of 11 military crises, including World War II (1939-1945) the Cuban Missile
Crisis (1962), the Six Day War (1967), the October War (1973), the Strike on Osiraq (1981), Libya
(1986), Panama (1989), Iraq (1993), North Korea (1996), Afghanistan and Sudan (1998), and Iraq (2003),
as well as from psychobiographical sources,467 permits dichotomous measurement and scoring of each
relevant HD on each personality construct. The universe of HDs encompasses 6 U.S. Presidents
(Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Ronald W. Reagan, George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton,
and George W. Bush) and 4 HDs of other nationalities (Josef Stalin, Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, and
Menahem Begin).
1. World War II (1939-1945)
a. Josef Stalin, Soviet Union: OPERATION BARBAROSSA (1941)
i. IVs: scores on personality constructs
a. militarism
465

The selection of cases in the present study may be faulted for over- or under-inclusiveness; however, it is intended not to
authoritatively resolve the question of which exercises or force, or failures to exercise force, can be considered as instances of
ASD but rather as a means to test a theory, prompt discussion, and generate future research directions.
466
See supra at p._ (discussing origins of jus ad bellum).
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Soviet premier Josef Stalin [“JS”] was a Georgian ideologue who reposited his loyalty not in the
Georgian nation or even the Soviet state but rather in international communism. Nevertheless, a
communism triumph was an objective for which JS violently and diligently labored his entire life, first as
a professional revolutionary and bank robber, then as a brutal organizational man in the Bolshevik
structure, and finally as the Soviet premier,468 and because “nationalism” includes a belief in the
superiority of a “philosophy of government”469 JS is scored as a nationalist. JS was a brutal dictator and a
pure authoritarian who ruled by mass purges, engineered starvation, show trials, and fear, and he ordered
over 30 million Soviets to their deaths over a twenty-year period.470
Although JS lacked military experience or knowledge and in fact held a low opinion of the
military,471 he was a hyper-competitive and –ambitious personality with a “single-minded sense of
purpose” who believed a great struggle—economic, political, and military—was necessary to defeat
capitalism and fascism.472 He was a consummate dogmatist who despised intellectuals and was “totally
convinced that he was always right and the only person farsighted enough to lead his country.”473 JS was
a socially withdrawn introvert with no interests save statecraft and no personal friends, and in fact others
avoided him out of fear.474 Still, JS was a “man of enormous self-confidence” and self-esteem who scores
high on all subconstructs of militarism save for military experience, and thus is scored as a militarist.
b. anomism
JS possessed a “strong streak of criminality and madness”475 that resulted in his expulsion from
the seminary and induced him into an early career as a revolutionary, terrorist gunman, and bank robber.476
He was corrupt to the core,477 “devoid of any scruples” and a “master of sanctimoniousness, hypocrisy,
and mendacity”478 who never experienced guilt or remorse for his mass murder of millions.479 JS, who had
no legal training, scores high on every subconstruct of anomism and is scored an anomist.
c. hostility
Psychobiographers have reached a near-consensus that JS was a megalomaniac, a narcissist,480
and a clinical paranoid481 whose deep-seated antipathy toward the West was the animating force of his
life.482 JS was a “first-rate tactician, intriguer, and plotter, playing enemies and potential enemies against
467

See POST, supra note 232 (describing sources of psychobiographical data, including biographies, content analyses of
speeches, press conferences, addresses, informal remarks, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, etc.).
468
WALTER LAQUEUR, STALIN 7-9 (1999) (chronicling JS’s violent rise through the Communist system); Michael G. Smith,
Stalin’s Martyrs: The Tragic Romance of the Russian Revolution, in Redefining Stalinism (Harold Shukman ed. 2003), at 100-02
(same).
469
See supra at p._.
470
LAQUEUR, supra note 469, at 10, 33-34, 134.
471
Id. at 91, 219, 224 (noting JS’s disregard for and tactical and strategic ignorance of military matters).
472
Id. at 14, 149.
473
Id. at 160.
474
See id. at 8, 147, 160 (describing JS as an introvert feared by others).
475
Id. at 12.
476
Id. at 7-8.
477
See Jefffrey Brooks, Stalin’s Politics of Obligation, in Redefining Stalinism, supra note 469, at 50 (describing the “gift-giving,
bribery, [an] official favours” JS used to cement political relationships among cronies).
478
LAQUEUR, supra note 469, at 14.
479
Id. at 132.
480
See id. at 15 (noting that JS demanded extravagant praise in official biographies, poems, plays, songs, and other media and
thrived on a cult of personality).
481
See id. at 134 (discussing expert opinions as to clinical diagnosis of JS).
482
LAQUEUR, supra note 469, at 204.
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the other[,]”and as his deeds and his utter amoralism together attest, if only one pure cynic, misanthrope,
and Machiavellian has ever walked the earth, his name was Joseph Stalin.483 Although JS’s fixation was
ideological rather than ethnocentric, he hated his son in large measure for his marriage to a Jew.484 JS was
a hostile, brutal man devoid of empathy and ruthlessly selfish, and under JS the Soviet Union had no
485

allies, only temporary non-enemies.

In short, JS scores high on every subconstruct of hostility and thus

is scored as hostile.
d. aventurism
JS’s entire political program—communism—was predicated upon the assumption that mankind
had the power to bring about the end of history, and although JS lived during a period of extreme trial and
tribulation he remained remarkably optimistic that communism would succeed and that the Soviet Union
would triumph over Nazi Germany.486 His early criminality and his failure to consider the consequences
of the 1930s show trials, which destroyed the nucleus of the Red Army and many of the scientists that
would prove necessary to the defeat of Nazism, suggests that JS was a risk-tolerant and impulsive
personality.487 JS thus scores high on all subconstructs of adventurism and is scored an adventurist.
e. summary of independent variables: JS
JS is scored as militaristic, anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic.
ii. DVs: ASD and OPERATION BARBAROSSA
Despite ample evidence that Germany intended to launch OPERATION BARBAROSSA—the
invasion of the Soviet Union—in spring 1941,488 JS, whether convinced that reports were the product of a
vast Allied conspiracy,489 that Hitler would not attack until defeating the UK, that a rapprochement with
Hitler was possible,490 or that Soviet forces were unprepared for war until 1942 at the very least, did not
seriously consider or engage in ASD.491 It is unlikely JS would have made a different decision if given the
opportunity, as it is unclear whether a military advantage would have accrued to the Soviet Union while
the political costs of attacking Germany would likely have outweighed any minor gains.
b. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S.: Pearl Harbor (1941)
i. IVs: scores on personality constructs
1. militarism
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See Robert Service, Stalinism and the Soviet State Order, 7, 8, in Redefining Stalinism, supra note_ (describing JS’s view that
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See supra note 471 (discussing the deaths of millions during the show trials).
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See LAQUEUR, supra note 469, at 89, 220 (stating that JS had documentary evidence of the impending OPERATION
BARBAROSSA but deliberately ignored it); Christopher Andrew & Julie Elkner, Stalin and Foreign Intelligence, in Redefining
Stalinism, supra note 469, at 78 (noting that a great many Soviet intelligence agents and military intelligence officers reported
Nazi preparations to attack Russia throughout June 1941).
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Id. at 78 (describing JS’s “pathologically suspicious” approach to intelligence analysis and his denunciations of those who
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THE INEVITABLE WAR 1936-1941 xiii, 216-19 (2002) (offering this explanation for Soviet inaction in 1941).
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Uri-Bar Joseph & Arie W. Kruglanski, Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom
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Although he did not harbor notions of the racial or ethnic superiority of the people of the U.S.,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt [“FDR”] was a patriotic nationalist who believed that the U.S. was a
unique nation, by virtue of its democratic traditions and devotion to liberty,492 with a special historical
mandate that charged him with a duty to lead its people through their struggle to overcome the Great
493

Depression and the menace of fascism to a “rendezvous with destiny.”

Recognizing and deeply valuing

power as an instrument of policy, FDR led the U.S. in amassing and deploying tremendous military might
to the defeat of the Axis powers.494 Although he had a tendency to be domineering and assertive, FDR
was not an aggressive personality.495 Nevertheless, he had a strong authoritarian streak that manifested in
his hierarchical management style, his unwillingness to consult with advisors, and his insensitivity to
subordinates,496 and although FDR cannot be fairly described as a militarist,497 and despite his lack of
498
military experience, he did not shy from the use of force to defend his core values. Curiously, despite

his lofty accomplishments and great ambition,499 FDR was not a particularly competitive person,500 and his
choice of the Democratic Party as his political home was to a large extent predicated upon his desire to
avoid the unpleasantry of competing for office-holding with his nephews, the sons of former President
Teddy Roosevelt and members of the GOP.501
Although FDR was of above-average intelligence with a powerful memory and great personal
502

energy, he is described as a “second-rate intellect” of fairly limited cognitive complexity.503 At the same
time, although FDR was superlative at and very interested in maintaining interpersonal relationships, his
interest in affiliation may have been primarily instrumental: he has been characterized as “difficult to
know,” “aloof,” and disinterested in personal friendships. This characterization may be a function of
perceptions of the low self-esteem that plagued FDR following his debilitating battle with polio and his
confinement to a wheelchair.
FDR scores high on nine of thirteen subconstructs of militarism—nationalism, FAP, patriotism,
authoritarianism, dogmatism, ambitiousness, introversion, isolationism, and low self-esteem—and thus is
scored as a militarist.
2. anomism
492
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Although FDR publicly hailed the rule of law as one of the virtues of liberal democracy, and its
absence as one of the vices of totalitarianism, in his private persona FDR regarded law as primarily a
constraint susceptible to manipulation. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he was censured by the
Senate for using illegal investigative means to identify and entrap homosexual sailors.504 When faced with
a hostile Supreme Court, he attempted to change its composition by legislative fiat,505 and, as evidenced
by his order interning Japanese Americans during World War II506 and his approval of illegal wiretaps and
postal interceptions,507 constitutional rights were, for FDR, subordinate to his role as commander in chief
during wartime, which role he exercised largely independent of democratic political constraints prior to
late 1941.508 His attempts to transform legal institutions and rules or, alternatively, to interpret law to
serve his objectives, suggests that FDR regarded legal authority, just as law, as external constraints that
could be overcome by contrary power.509 Similarly, although FDR described the Axis powers as an
“unholy alliance,”510 he did not always demonstrate a commitment to strong moral precepts in his personal
life, having succumbed to a decades-long affair with his secretary beginning in 1918 that irreparably
damaged his marriage.511 Available evidence strongly suggests that, although he attended Columbia Law
512
School until 1906 (it is unlikely he had any training in IHL), for FDR moral considerations did not

generate any duty to adhere to legal commands. Accordingly, FDR scores high on four subconstructs of
anomism—disrespect for law, disrespect for legal authority, amoralism, and ignorance of IHL—and thus
is scored an anomist.
3. hostility
FDR, although neither a paranoid nor a misanthrope, was a cynical, suspicious man513 who
anticipated the worst in others and did not abstain from manipulation to accomplish his objectives.514
Similarly, FDR has not been described as either particularly empathetic or altruistic: he was a realist who
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understood and appreciated the relevance of power and self-interest in international relations. Still, his
alliance preferences were motivated by instrumental concerns and not by a common ethnicity or culture,
and as such he was not clinically ethnocentric.515 Moreover, FDR did not detach from reality, nor did he
demonstrate the recklessness associated with narcissists.
Furthermore, FDR was, even if by necessity rather than by design, a committed internationalist
who recognized and capitalized upon the need for cooperative relationships with allies in order to defeat
the Axis.516 Although FDR exhibited some of the values associated with Machiavellianism,517 particularly
during the two years before U.S. entry into World War II,518 he cannot be characterized as entirely ruthless
or utterly amoral,519 and the better description might be that he was a calculating, self-interested realist.
Accordingly, because he scores high on five of ten subconstructs of hostility—distrust, cynicism,
hostility, lack of empathy, and selfishness—FDR can be scored as either hostile or non-hostile; artful
intuition directs the scoring of FDR as hostile.
4. adventurism
Although he strongly believed in his ability to transform the domestic and international order, and
although he was an optimist who assured the American people that “they only thing [they] ha[d] to fear
was fear itself,”520 FDR was a cautious, risk-avoiding person who, during the most stressful decade of
history, waited for situations to develop before committing himself.521 FDR recognized the limitations of
will and the vagaries of fate and waited for the proper correlation of both, so much so that many scholars
suggest that his over-caution resulted in failures to “exploit the leadership possibilities of the modern
presidency.”522 However, FDR was calm, even serene, during stressful times,523 and because the best
available evidence suggests that FDR scores high on only three subconstructs of adventurism—optimism,
stress, and male sex—he is scored as a non-adventurist.
5. summary of independent variables: FDR
FDR is scored a militarist who is anomistic and hostile and yet not adventuristic.
ii. DVs: ASD and Pearl Harbor
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Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the U.S. undertook no
estimate of the likelihood of such an attack, no determination of the probability of the damage that might
be incurred, and no measures of preemption.524 Quite simply, the U.S., despite a series of warnings that an
525

attack was part of a Japanese plan to dominate the Pacific, did nothing.
526

at least contemplate ASD against Japan, he did not.

Despite the impetus for FDR to

Overconfidence, a widespread belief that the

Japanese would not launch a surprise attack,527 and an overwhelming preoccupation with the German
threat to the detriment of planning for a Pacific war have been offered as explanations;528 others suggest
that FDR was committed to entering the war but simply refused to do so save for in circumstances that
could not be characterized as other than self-defense.529 Still, given the opportunity to revisit the
decisional moment and preempt the Imperial Fleet at sea, where U.S. naval power was more than a match,
it is hardto imagine FDR, a man who knew war was inevitable and could have used his vast rhetorical
power to explain to the American people that the Japanese attack had already been underway, would have
refrained from doing so.
2. President John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
a. IVs: personality constructs
i. militarism
John F. Kennedy [“JFK”] was an ardent nationalist who challenged Americans to rise to the
burden of national service and dedicated his presidency to the fulfillment of a historic duty to “pay any
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and
success of liberty[.]”530 During World War II he served valorously in the South Pacific, setting the stage
for his political career, and throughout his life he retained the belief that power was indispensable to the
defense of freedom.531 However, JFK’s highly collegial and respectful management style disqualified him
as an authoritarian,532 and although a spirit of intense competitiveness and an “overpowering need for
achievement” were legacies of his domineering father, he did not adopt an aggressive approach to
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533

interpersonal relationships and in fact expressed a strong antipathy to aggression.

Similarly, although

JFK valued power in instrumental terms, he did not view force, as distinct from the ends force could be
tasked to serve, as glorious or noble.
JFK was a cognitively complex and non-ideological person who understood the complexities of
foreign policy and actively solicited contrary opinions in his decisionmaking; he was the antithesis of a
dogmatic.534 His statement to the captive people of West Berlin in 1961, “Ich bin ein Berliner,” coupled
with his great charisma, good sense of humor, and personal charm, evidence his need for affiliation and
connection with others.535 Despite his lifelong poor health, and his concern that he would die at an early
age from Addison’s disease,536 JFK had relatively high self-esteem.
In sum, JFK scores militaristic on six of thirteen subconstructs—nationalism, FAP, patriotism,
military experience, competitiveness, and ambitiousness—and thus is scored a non-militarist.
ii. anomism
Despite his general political conservatism, for JFK, law and morality were concepts applicable
primarily to lesser persons.537 During his tenure in the White House, JFK’s view of law and morality
tended to be flexible in any circumstances. [He] also had no qualms about widespread wiretapping of his
538
friends and enemies to plug leaks and to gather damaging evidence for use against suspected individuals.

He was completely untroubled that his book, Why England Slept (1940), reached the best-seller list only
because his father purchased the majority of the copies, nor did it disturb him that the award of the
Pulitzer Prize for his book, Profiles in Courage (1953), was procured through the intervention of a
journalist crony of his father and that the book itself was ghostwritten.539 Moreover, JFK took what can
best be described as a very “casual view of his marriage vows[.]”540 Although JFK did not have any
formal legal training, he was advised by his brother, Robert, whom he appointed Attorney General. There
is no evidence that either had any specific legal training in IHL.
In sum, JFK scores high on all five subconstructs of anomism and thus is scored an anomist.
iii. hostility
As his wiretapping of friends and foes alike evidences,541 JFK was a deeply suspicious person
who was “fascinat[ed] . . . with sinister gimmicks and trickery as tools of presidential action.”542
Moreover, he was a “deeply hedonistic” and self-centered person who viewed others, particularly women,
as objects to satisfy his needs.543 Although his high need for affiliation mitigated any tendency toward
misanthropy, his experiences with Soviet leader Nikita Khruschchev and Cuban President Fidel Castro
533
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exacerbated his cynicism and distrust and his sense that Communism, and communists, were invariably
hostile to him personally and the free world more generally, and he developed the firm conviction that
“any means was justified to bring down [Castro].”544 Strangely perhaps, JFK is cited for his great capacity
to empathize even with political adversaries, particularly in his conduct of the Cuban Missile Crisis
[“CMC”] wherein his ability to relate to Khrushchev’s concerns about U.S. missiles in Turkey and agree
to a mutual withdrawal of missiles is regarded as the basis for the peaceful outcome.545 Finally, JFK’s
selfless bravery in rescuing his crew members after the destruction of his vessel during World War II,
coupled with his commitment of the U.S. to an enormous undertaking in defense of global liberty in his
Inaugural Address and subsequent policy decisions, suggest that he scores high on the altruism as well as
the internationalism subconstructs.
In sum, JFK scores high on five of ten subconstructs of hostility—distrust, narcissism, cynicism,
hostility, Machiavellianism—and low on five subconstructs—misanthropy, ethnocentrism, lack of
empathy, selfishness, and anti-internationalism. JFK can thus be scored either as hostile or non-hostile;
artful intuition counsels in favor of the former.
iv. adventurism
JFK took unwarranted risks, and psychobiographers describe him as lacking any agenda other
than virulent anticommunism and the compulsive pursuit of glory.546 His response at the Bay of Pigs is
generally characterized as an impulsive reaction with little forethought and little political will.547
Although his decisions during the CMC demonstrate learning, and although his advisors report that he
was conscious of the desire to avoid miscalculation, he remained, in essence, a political gunslinger.548
Stress and anxiety were his constant companions: he lived under the shadow of disabling medical
conditions, and “treated each day as if it were his last, demanding of life constant intensity, adventure,
and pleasure.”549 Still, JFK retained a healthy measure of optimism, and believed he could assert
significant control over events provided he mustered enough energy and attention to detail.550 JFK scores
high on all seven subconstructs of adventurism and thus is scored an adventurist.
v. summary of independent variables: JFK
JFK was a non-militaristic yet anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic decisionmaker.
b. DVs: ASD and Cuban Missile Crisis
On 20 October 1962, the U.S., four days after acquiring credible intelligence that the Soviet

544

GOULD, supra note 497, at 133; see also MICHAEL BESCHLOSS, THE CRISIS YEARS: KENNEDY AND KHRUSCHEV
458 (describing JFK as “surprised and angry” to discover that the Soviets had lied by placing missiles in Cuba).
For JFK, crises were everywhere, and communism was at the root of it all. See OFFERMAN-ZUCKERBERG, supra note 299,
at 93 (“‘Crisis’ was a way of viewing the world for Kennedy.”).
545
See VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 14 (making this argument); GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 72 (“[I]f
anyone is going to write after this, they are going to understand that every effort was made to find peace and every effort to give
our adversary room to move.”) (quoting JFK comment to brother Robert during CMC).
546
OFFERMAN-ZUCKERBERG, supra note 299, at 96 (anti-communism); VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 16375 (glory).
547
GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 67-69.
548
See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS 40 (1967) (noting JFK did not want to enter a war out of “wounded pride”).
549
GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 72.
550
VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 163-75.
65

551

Union was deploying medium-range nuclear-armed missiles ninety miles from U.S. shores in Cuba,

demanded their removal and instituted a “pacific naval blockade,” an act of war under IHL,552 to prevent
further shipments. During a heated debate within the JFK Administration, senior officials of the
Departments of Justice and State urged JFK to claim ASD as the legal justification for the blockade and
subsequent airstrikes,553 and others counseled that to mount such an argument on the basis of the facts,
which in their estimation could not support a claim that an “armed attack” had occurred or that a threat to
the U.S. was imminent, would be to stretch the definition of ASD beyond reasonable bounds and
“trivialize the whole effort at legal justification.”554 Although opponents of ASD could not convince JFK
that the presence of missiles in Cuba did not constitute an imminent threat as a matter of policy,555 they
prevailed on the question of legal justification, and JFK characterized the blockade not as an act of ASD
under Article 51 but rather as regional action authorized by the Organization of American States556 under
Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter557 and justified under his constitutional “duty to defend the security
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of the United States” and to prevent a foreign power from extending its sphere of influence.

In subsequent days the Security Council staged a parallel debate along Cold War lines over
whether the blockade could be justified as a lawful act of ASD rather than an unlawful act of
aggression.560 The expressed U.S. justification was largely ignored, reflecting the broad understanding
that ASD provided the more legitimate, or even the sole defensible, position. A number of states
expressed strong opposition, alleging that the U.S. had adduced insufficient proof that the missiles had
been emplaced for offensive purposes to meet the imminence threshold necessary to permit the exercise
of ASD561 and that, as a consequence, the blockade was an unlawful exercise of force in violation of
Article 2(4). Others reached the opposite conclusion, judging the blockade a lawful act of ASD in
response to an imminent threat posed by offensive missiles.562 Despite the intensity of the debate,
563

however, the Security Council took no action,
for the resort to ASD.

564

a fact U.S. officials interpreted as implied authorization

On October 28, the CMC ended with a public concession by the Soviet Union

promising to withdraw all missiles from Cuba.565
Subsequent analysis has revealed a general agreement that the mere presence of Soviet missiles in
Cuba did not constitute an imminent threat to the U.S. sufficient to satisfy the standard elaborated in the
566

567

Caroline Case even though the U.S. response to the CMC is “widely accepted as legitimate.”

The

reason for the apparent gap between law and legitimacy may stem from the fact that many CMC scholars
read into the silence of the Security Council on the question of the legitimacy of ASD a widespread
implicit endorsement not only of the U.S. naval blockade but also of a more expansive legal basis for U.S.
military action in self-defense than is provided by Article 53.568 JFK’s decision to institute a blockade is
generally regarded as having been instrumental in forcing Khruschev to retreat from a reckless policy
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decision and in promoting enhanced dialogue and reduced superpower hostility. As such, the decision to
engage in ASD is one that contributed to world order and that JFK would have likely have made again
under identical circumstances.
3. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and the Six Day War (1967)
a. IVs: scores on personality constructs
i. militarism
Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol [“LE”] was a Zionist pioneer who dedicated his life to the
enormously ambitious project of re-establishing Israel after two millennia of diaspora. Although LE
served in the Jewish Legion of the British Army during World War I,569 there were decided limits to his
ambition, competitiveness, and militarism: compromise and finesse were his policy instruments of choice,
and power was to be used only sparingly.570 He was an easy-going and flexible person who would labor
to avoid disagreement and “[i]n every argument made an effort to see both sides of the coin[.]”571 LE was
“warm and wise,”572 with a “great sense of humor,”573 and he was excellent at establishing good rapport
and maintaining friendships with a wide range of people.574
In sum, LE scores as militaristic on only four of ten subconstructs of militarism—nationalism,
patriotism, military experience, and ambitiousness—and thus is scored a non-militarist.
ii. anomism
Available data does not offer much insight into LE’s attitudes toward law and legal authority. It
is likely unfair to generalize from his violation of British Mandatory arms importation restrictions prior to
the War of Independence in 1948.575 Moreover, LE had a traditonal Talmudic education and was raised
by devout parents, and although he appears to have developed a more non-ideological approach576 to
moral judgment than might be prescribed by his Orthodox ancestry577 he remained dedicated to being
perceived personally, and to having Israel perceived, as “one of the good guys.”578 He had no formal legal
training. In sum, LE scores high on only two of five subconstructs of anomism—ignorance of law and
ignorance of IHL—and thus is scored a non-anomist.
iii. hostility
Although the Russian pogroms “hung over [his] head all the time[,]”579 LE treated others as
worthy of his trust until he had reason to believe otherwise, and as ends rather than as means.580 His
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capacity to empathize and sacrifice his own interests for the benefit of others are well-chronicled, as is
his commitment to constructive engagement with other states on behalf of his embattled nation.582 LE thus
scores as hostile on none of the subconstructs of hostility and is scored as non-hostile.
iv. adventurism
LE was highly risk-averse and indecisive.583 Although he was comfortable in most social
situations,584 the demands of crisis decisionmaking filled him with anxiety and rendered him, to some
degree, paralyzed by fear of failure.585 Although he was optimistic generally, and although he remained
outwardly calm,586 under conditions of high stress LE was decidedly pessimistic and fatalistic.587 In sum,
LE scores as adventuristic on only three of seven subconstructs of adventurism—anxiety, stress, and male
sex—and thus scores as a non-adventurist.
v. summary of independent variables: LE
LE is a non-militaristic, non-anomistic, non-hostile, and non-adventuristic decisionmaker.
b. DV: ASD and the Six Day War
In May 1967, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, after months of hostile public statements
expressing an intent to destroy Israel,588 evicted the UN Emergency Force in Sinai,589 closed the Gulf of
Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping,590 and deployed Egyptian forces in an offensive posture
on maximum alert status near the Israeli border. Although Egypt conceded that the closure of the
waterways was a belligerent act, Nasser justified the measure on the ground that Israel and Egypt had
continued in a state of war since 1948 and that either party could engage in belligerency without altering
the legal status quo.591 In response, LE, although he still believed Nasser did not intend war but merely
wished to enhance his pan-Arab credentials by blustering against Israel,592 warned that Israel would regard
the re-opening of the waterways as an act of self-defense.593 In turn, Egypt defended the closure as an act
oriented toward ensuring the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.594
581
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dispatched emissaries to Western capitals to seek diplomatic assistance to resolve the brewing crisis,

Egypt incorporated the armed forces of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq under its unified command and began
flying combat air patrols in Israeli airspace.596
In the last days of May and the first weeks of June, a bitter schism divided the Israeli
government.597 One camp, led by the IDF, was adamant that unless ASD was immediately employed
against Egypt, Israeli survival was in jeopardy.598 A second, consisting almost exclusively of LE and a
few aides, refused to approve ASD until efforts to secure diplomatic support had been exhausted and
Israel could ensure “that the world knows that [sh]e waited long enough.”599 Only after Israeli diplomats
in the U.S. and Europe were rebuffed did LE conclude that Israel could make this case.600 On the morning
of June 5, 1967, Israel launched a decisive air campaign against the air forces of the UAR Unified
Command, to which the Arab states, despite suffering complete tactical surprise and the destruction of
their air forces, responded by attacking with ground forces across their borders with Israel. In subsequent
days Israel defeated combined Arab ground forces and captured the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and
the Golan Heights, and by June 10 all parties had accepted a ceasefire.601 An intra-cabinet debate over
602

whether to claim that Egypt had initiated hostilities was resolved in favor of the truth.

In the aftermath of the brief but decisive conflict, Israel justified its attack under Article 51 in part
on the premise that the closure of the Straits of Tiran constituted an “armed attack” justifying force in
self-defense603 and in part on the basis that the presence of the troops of a hostile state on its southern
border, coupled with the clearly expressed intent of that state to destroy Israel and convincing intelligence
that an Egyptian attack was imminent, posed a serious and imminent threat to its national security
justifying the exercise of ASD.604 The ensuing debate within the Security Council largely rejected the
former argument and centered upon the reasonableness of the Israeli attack, inquiring whether under the
circumstances the threat could have been considered sufficiently imminent to dispatch with the
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requirement of an “armed attack” as a condition precedent to self-defense.

As might have been

expected during the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its Arab clients steered the discussion
away from the threat Egypt and Syria had posed to Israel and focused formalistically on the text of Article
51, defining the Israeli action as ipso facto illegal aggression in violation of Article 2(4) by virtue of the
fact that Israel had been first to resort to the overt use of force. Predictably, the Russo-Arabic bloc
categorically refused to engage on the question of the availability of ASD.606 In contrast, although little
serious consideration was paid to the argument that the closure of the Straits of Tiran constituted an
“armed attack,” the U.S. and other Western states defended the Israeli position that the imminence and
magnitude of the threat justified the exercise of ASD, and this bloc shielded Israel from adverse legal
judgment: although the Security Council did not make an official pronouncement upon the legitimacy of
ASD in context, none of the three Resolutions that emerged from the aftermath of the Six Day War
condemned Israeli actions.607
Although the question of whether the threat to Israel was in fact sufficiently imminent to justify
ASD remains the subject of legal and political wrangling, most commentators view the Israeli claim that
the threat justified the response to be reasonable.608 More importantly, commentators generally read into
Security Council silence on the legitimacy of the Israeli ASD argument implicit support for the
proposition that the right to ASD continues in force under the customary international law of the Charter
era, particularly where the survival of a state is arguably at issue.609 Had LE not ordered ASD, it is likely
that Israel would have ceased to exist and that the second Holocaust promised by Nasser would have
materialized,610 and it is inconceivable that LE would have considered, in retrospect, that he had made
anything other than the proper decision.
4. Prime Minister Golda Meir and the October War (1973)
a. independent variables: scores on personality constructs
i. militarism
605
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Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir [“GM”] dedicated her life to the resurrection of the Israeli state
and the restoration of the Jewish people to freedom and independence.611 Although she preferred
negotiated compromise to blunt force,612 loathed war,613 and had no understanding of martial matters,614 she
was a tough authoritarian who “r[an] her Cabinet like a front-line officer, thumping the table for order,
615

and making blunt and rapid decisions.”

GM was a highly dogmatic leader who, although she would

allow others to speak, did not appreciate subtlety and would move quickly to decisions from which she
was immovable.616 Despite this, however, she was a friendly and gracious extrovert whose social skills
were instrumental in raising funds for the Jewish State617 and who enjoyed lifelong friendships,
popularity,618 and high self-esteem.619 In sum, GM scores as militaristic on six of thirteen subconstructs of
militarism—nationalism, patriotism, authoritarianism, competitiveness, dogmatism, and ambitiousness—
and thus is scored as non-militaristic.
ii. anomism
Although there is little information as to whether GM was remarkable in her respect for law or
her degree of moralism, as a child GM survived pogroms at the hands of the Cossacks, and from this
experience developed a lifelong fear of and revulsion for authorities.620 Coupled with her lack of legal
training, it is fair to conclude that GM must be scored as high on at least three of five subconstructs of
anomism—lack of respect for legal authority, ignorance of law, and ignorance of IHL—and thus she is
scored an anomist.
iii. hostility
After suffering persecution in Russia, it is unlikely that GM ever reacquired a significant degree
of trust in others. Nonetheless, GM did not become cynical or embittered, instead remaining a simple and
unaffected person who, despite her personal strength and political power, retained great compassion for
and sensitivity to others.621 Moreover, although she labored tirelessly on behalf of her own ethnic and
cultural group, there is no indication that she developed a sense that Jews were superior to, rather than
simple the equal of, other nations, and her foreign policy orientation reflected her desire for Israel to
become an enmeshed member of the international community. However, GM was well aware of the
degree of hostility that others manifested towards Jews generally and Israel particularly.622 GM thus
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scores as high on only two subconstructs of hostility—distrust and hostility—and thus is scored as nonhostile.
iv. adventurism
GM disliked risk, and dreaded accession to the office of Prime Minister where she would be
obligated to make momentous decisions: on becoming Prime Minister, she conceded that
I have always carried out the missions the state placed on me, but they have always been accompanied by a
623
feeling of terror. The terror exists now.

GM was a deliberate and cautious decisionmaker who believed that if she worked hard enough she could
624
be successful, and yet she carried around a sense of pessimism and fatalism that pervaded her

administration. GM often vented her emotions under the tremendous strain of her responsibilities.625
In sum, GM scores as high on only three of seven subconstructs of adventurism—internal locus of
control, anxiety, and stress—and thus is scored a non-adventurist.
v. summary of independent variables: GM
GM is anomistic yet non-militaristic, non-hostile, and non-adventuristic.
b. dependent variables: ASD and the October War
After six years of low-intensity conflict post-Six Day War, tensions began to build in the early
autumn of 1973, and Egypt stealthily began to deploy forces into the Sinai toward the Bar-Lev Line, the
series of Israeli fortified positions constructed after the Six Day War to deter Egyptian aggression. Syria
accelerated military mobilization simultaneously. By late September, Israeli intelligence was reporting
plans for a Syrian attack in the Golan Heights, Israel and Syria had begun to escalate an ongoing aerial
war,626 and evidence was beginning to mount of a planned Egyptian strike.627 GM, “confident that Israel’s
geopolitical situation had never been better”628 after its overwhelming strategic victory of combined Arab
armies in 1967 and advised by her senior military commanders that the chance of war with Egypt was
“very low”629 but that if war came Israel would so decisively defeat her adversaries that “they’ll need five
years to lift their heads up again,”630 did not respond to the Egyptian and Syrian mobilization. GM is also
reported to have commented that “there is always the possibility that [Israel] will need help, and if we
strike first, we will get nothing from anyone.”631
At 2:30 A.M. on October 5, 1973, a Mossad agent reported that Egypt and Syria were going to
initiate war in the “late afternoon” the next day, and at a cabinet meeting that morning Chief of Staff Dan
Elazar, having already sent out orders to the IDF to prepare to engage Egypt and Syria, recommended that
Israel engage in ASD in order to enhance the chance for survival and reduce casualties,632 while Minister
of Defense Moshe Dayan counseled in favor of a limited mobilization on the ground that a preemptive
623
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strike would portray Israel as the aggressor.

GM, hoping diplomacy would avert war and that if the

Arab states recognized they had lost the element of surprise they would not carry out their plans, and
convinced that if Israel struck first “we won’t get help from anybody,”634 transmitted a message to Egypt
and Syria through the U.S. advising that Israel would not engage in ASD but would meet and defeat an
635

Arab attack.

Expecting to continue the discussion on October 8th after Yom Kippur, the meeting

adjourned.
By the next day it was too late. Egypt launched OPERATION BADHR and Syria initiated
OPERATION AL AWDA in the afternoon of October 6th, and by October 8th Arab armies were advancing
and Israeli commanders were considering abandoning front-line defenses for fallback positions.636 GM
was so despondent over the news that she contemplated suicide.637 By the end of the week Israel had
turned the tide and staved off defeat, yet lthough she was absolved of responsibility for the near-disaster
by the Agranat Commission in 1974, GM resigned as a consequence of the political fallout of her
mistaken decisionmaking during the October War and left public life embittered.638 In retrospect, the
failure to preempt Egyptian and Syrian threats was a cataclysmic error that, but for U.S. intervention on
behalf of Israel, might have spelled the end of the Jewish state.
d. Prime Minister Menahem Begin and the Strike on Osiraq (1981)
a. independent variables: scores on personality constructs
i. militarism
Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin [“MB”] was a “deeply nationalistic” person whose
political identity was shaped by his study of Zionist philosophers Theodor Herzl and Vladimir
Jabotinsky.639 Power was not only the primary currency of his brand of Zionism but something to be
hoarded and used in self-defense: MB was an aggressive force behind a new ideology of the Jews as a
people who fought back against oppression rather than accepting their lot.640 According to MB,
From time to time [bullies] descended on me at school, but I learned to defend myself. I never bowed my
head. If someone raised his hand to me, I paid him in the same coin. There were times when I cam home
bruised and bloodied—but with the feeling that my honor was intact. As time went by I learned that the
641
ones who hit me treated me with respect when I hit back. They learned their lesson.

In short, MB “truly believe[d] that Israel’s enemies w[ould] respect her only if they respect[ed] and
recognize[d] her power.”642
In Palestine, MB joined the Irgun Zvi Leumi [“IZL”], an extremist paramilitary group opposed to
British mandatory power, and led a series of missions at great personal risk to pressure the British and the
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Palestinian Arabs to quit the country.

644

For MB “conflict was essential to political transformation.”

Moreover, MB was the paradigmatic dogmatist who could not be dissuaded from preconceptions,645 and
human relationships were valuable to him only instrumentally.646 He was an insensitive and authoritarian
647

648

leader and father who suffered from low self-esteem.

MB scores as militaristic on all subconstructs of militarism and is thus scored a militarist.
ii. anomism
In reprisal for the execution of IZL guerrillas convicted of terrorism, MB, who attended law
school at Warsaw University in the 1930s649 and was familiar with IHL,650 ordered the abduction and
hanging of captured British soldiers, an act he knew was illegal but which he justified out of necessity:
I understand only too well the feelings of the . . . families [of hung British POWs], but what choice did we
have? We were in the midst of a war for our liberation. The British regime threw its full military might
against us. They treated our fighters as if they were common criminals instead of prisoners of war. When
651
they sentenced men to death, we warned them that we would answer in kind.

Despite his demonstrated lack of respect for law and legal authority, MB had a coherent internal moral
652

code that prescribed, in effect, “an eye for an eye, and defend one’s honor no matter what the price.”
653

He was an observant Jew who placed his faith before most other considerations.

Moreover, MB

654

believed that the Jews had a “natural right” to the land of Israel and that any activities in support of this
right had divine imprimatur.655
MB scores as high on three of five subconstructs of anomism—disrespect for law, disrespect for
legal authority, and moralism—and thus scores as an anomist.
iii. hostility
During World War I, Cossacks burned down the Begin family home,656 and the experience of
pogroms and the Holocaust taught MB about the depths to which some would sink in expressing their
antisemitism. Although MB is not described in terms that would suggest any narcissism, he was just
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short of clinically paranoid and plainly cynical about the motivations of people in general.

Moreover,

MB was given to ethnocentric bias in his dislike and even hatred of certain groups, including Germans, in
reference to whom he remarked that “[e]very German is a Nazi” and a “murderer,”659 and Arabs, whom he
660

described as “no less evil than . . . Hitler.”

Former Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in 1963

unequivocally declared MB an amoral misanthrope:
Begin is clearly a Hitlerist type. He is a racist willing to destroy all the Arabs for the sake of the
completeness of the country, sanctifying all means for the sake of the sacred end—absolute rule. I see in
him a severe danger to the internal and external situation of Israel . . . These are not isolated acts, but a
661
revelation of method, character, and aspiration.

Whether this is the hyperbole of a political opponent is uncertain; nevertheless, MB, a hostile and
belligerent Zionist, was plainly neither empathetic, altruistic, nor a committed internationalist.

In

sum, MB scores high on all subconstructs of hostility save for narcisissm; he is thus scored as hostile.
iv. adventurism
As his years in the IZL make manifest, MB accepted risk as inherent in the project of political
transformation. His willingness to do so may have been a function of his optimism and his belief that,
because he was engaged in a noble effort—the salvation of his nation and the performance of justice on
earth—he could not fail, and thus what appeared as dangerous was in fact not truly so.662 Although MB
experienced anxiety when contemplating the prospect that Arab states were scheming to attack Israel and
that failure to preempt Arab plans might prove catastrophic,663 he planned strategy carefully, and when he
engaged in ASD he did so with much forethought.664 In sum, MB scores high on all but one subconstruct
of adventurism—impulsivity—and thus is scored an adventurist.
v. summary of IVs: MB
MB is scored as a militaristic, anomistic, and hostile adventurist.
b. DV: ASD and the Strike on Osiraq
By spring 1981, Iraq, with French assistance, was nearing completion of its Osiraq nuclear
reactor facility, a project which, although the Hussein government publicly claimed it would be dedicated
to peaceful research only, Israeli intelligence claimed to be a nuclear weapons production facility.665
When several months of Israeli efforts to alert the international community to the brewing danger and to
secure condemnation of the Iraqi attempt to acquire WMD were unsuccessful, Israel responded with
military force. At sunset on June 7, 1981, 8 Israeli F- 16 aircraft accompanied by six F-15 escorts
destroyed the Osiraq nuclear reactor with twelve two thousand pound bombs shortly before it could
657
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become operational.

MB personally defended the destruction of Osiraq as an act of ASD justified on

the grounds that if Iraq, a state committed to the destruction of Israel, were permitted to acquire a nuclear
reactor capable of producing weapons it would do so; that such weapons would certainly be used against
Israel at the earliest possible juncture;667 and that therefore Israel, and in particular its civilian population,
was subject to an immediate and direct threat by the existence of an operational, or nearly operational,
reactor.668 MB claimed further that even if the reactor had not been fully operational, had Israel delayed
until such time as it was fully operational before destroying it more Iraqi civilians would have been
exposed to radiation leaking from the facility, a likelihood supporting the conclusion that the threat was
already sufficiently imminent for purposes of Israeli compliance with IHL.669 In other words, the fact that
the threat emanated from the proliferation of nuclear weapons to an enemy state determined to use them
against Israel dictated a relaxed interpretation of imminence consistent with the magnitude and
seriousness of the particular threat profile as perceived by the intended target of that threat.
Arab states swiftly and publicly condemned the attack,670 and the Security Council, with U.S. and
UK support,671 followed suit, unanimously “condemn[ing] the military attack by Israel in clear violation of
the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct” and stating that Iraq was
672

entitled to “appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered.”
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could not prove that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons it intended to use in the very near future against
Israel and that therefore the Iraqi threat was not so imminent that it left “no moment for deliberation” and
created an immediate and overwhelming necessity to attack the reactor—a determination subsequently
reinforced by evidence that Israel had initiated preparations and planning for the destruction of the Osiraq
reactor at least as early as March 1981673—vitiated the Israeli claim of lawfulness674 and suggested that the
strike was a premeditated act in violation of Article 2(4).675 Although the Security Council imposed no
sanctions, it rejected the Israeli claim to ASD because the threat, viewed in light of the traditional rule
rather than in terms of the relaxed standard propounded by Israel, was deemed simply too prospective to
justify the use of force.
In the main, the contemporaneous judgment of the legal academy affirmed the Security Council
assessment that the Israeli attack could not be justified under the international law of self-defense on the
grounds that Israel had neither satisfied the imminence requirement676 nor exhausted peaceful means of
dispute resolution prior to engaging in self-help.677 At least one scholar drew the still-broader conclusion
that even if ASD had survived the entry into force of the Charter it could not be exercised except with the
prior approval of “some community of states.”678 In other words, the Israeli air strike in 1981 stood for the
proposition that the unilateral resort to force, however otherwise justified, was now incompatible with the
framework of the Charter. However, with the benefit of two decades’ hindsight some now question
whether, in light of the revelation of new information regarding the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons
program developed during the period from the Gulf War to the present, the Israeli claim that the threat
posed by Iraq was imminent might have justified the attack on Osiraq as an act of ASD despite the
absence of an “armed attack.”679 Only the most restrictivist of commentators do not yet concede that “it
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was unquestionable that Israel was the target of nuclear weapons”

and that the attack on Osiraq was not

an unlawful act of aggression but rather a “heroic and indispensable act of law enforcement[.]”681 Had
Israel failed to destroy Osiraq in 1981, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 it might well have been in
possession of nuclear weapons, and it is not inconceivable that a nuclear-armed Iraq might have been able
to retain the fruits of its illegal aggression and fulfill its objective of becoming a regional superpower. It
is fair to suggest that at least some actors now regard the attack on Osiraq as a lawful and legitimate act
that prevented the further destabilization of the Middle East. It would seem undeniable that MB would
not now decide the question of ASD any differently.
e. President Ronald W. Reagan and Libya (1986)
a. independent variables: personality constructs
i. militarism
President Ronald W. Reagan [“RWR”] believed the U.S. had a moral obligation not only to
marshal its military force to fight evil in the world but to support friends and allies in this quest,682 and in
support of this mission he presided over the largest peacetime increase in military spending in history.
RWR had an abiding belief in the inherent goodness, even superiority, of the U.S., and was adamant in
his refusal to allow any supranational form of government to reduce U.S. sovereignty.683 Still, RWR so
disliked confrontation that he would retain aides long after he desired to terminate them and compromise
with his political opponents whenever possible.684 However, RWR abhorred undisciplined or
nonconformist behavior,685 was habitually early,686 and considered authorizing the CIA to conduct
domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens suspected of disloyalty.687 These elements of personality suggest a
streak of authoritarianism. Furthermore, despite his own lack of military service, RWR was fascinated
with war and all that it entails,688 and he was “fierce[ly] patriot[ic].”689
That RWR became President is perhaps surprising, as he was a relatively uncompetitive person
who achieved success less by dint of aptitude and hard work than through good fortune and charm.690 His
success may be attributable in part to his ambitious approach to life: RWR believed very sincerely that
anything was possible, and he set lofty goals in his presidency, including victory in the Cold War and the
dismantling of the regulatory state. Although he was the consummate “black and white thinker”
inasmuch as for him every problem had a simple solution and all life was a struggle of good against evil
in which all morality is on the side of the U.S. and liberalism is merely a stage on the road to

680

Magenis, supra note 451, at 430; see also Beres & Chatto, supra note 667, at 440 (“[L]ooking back a decade and a half later it
is well-known that Hussein’s plans to build a French-supplied reactor . . . were designed to produce militarily significant amounts
of weapons[.]”).
681
Id. at 440.
682
Glad, supra note 300, at 46; R.A. DAVIDSON, REAGAN V. QADDAFI: RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
34 (2002) (“[T]he image that was foremost in everything [RWR] did was the projection of American strength.”).
683
GARY WILLS, REAGAN’S AMERICA: INNOCENTS AT HOME 247-48 (1987).
684
See DONALD T. REGAN, FOR THE RECORD: FROM WALL STREET TO WASHINGTON 98 (1988).
685
WILLS, supra note 684, at 34.
686
REGAN, supra note 685, at 275.
687
RONNIE DUGGER, ON REAGAN: THE MAN AND HIS PRESIDENCY 247 (1983).
688
WILLS, supra note 684, at 169.
689
DAVIDSON, supra note 683, at 34.
690
BARBER, supra note 304, at 465.
79

691

692

communism, RWR was a secure, confident, tremendously extroverted, and gregarious person who
placed great value on friendships and the goodwill of others.693 He had enormously high emotional
intelligence and good self-esteem.694 In sum, RWR scores high on seven of thirteen subconstructs of
militarism—nationalism, FAP, patriotism, authoritarianism, militarism, dogmatism, and ambitiousness—
and thus is scored a militarist.
ii. anomism
RWR was morally inflexible and absolutely rejected lying, cheating, stealing, homosexuality, and
premarital sex on religious and ethical grounds.695 He was very much a traditionalist in terms of moral
values.696 Although RWR lacked formal legal training, respect for law and legal authority were part and
parcel of his abiding moral commitment to social conformity.697 Accordingly, RWR scores high on only
one subconstruct of anomism—moralism—and thus is scored a non-anomist.
iii. hostility
RWR was so trusting of others that it “never occurred to him that anyone would give him
incorrect information.”698 His powerful and abiding sense of right and wrong, together with his generally
positive view of humanity, his remarkable empathy, and his facility in interpersonal relationships,
699

precluded narcissism, cynicism, misanthropy, and Machiavellianism.

However, RWR, as exemplified

by his adamant opposition to the Voting Rights Act, most civil rights legislation, and the teaching of
students in languages other than English, created the impression that RWR was at the very least racially
insensitive; in the words of columnist William Raspberry, “[t]he impression . . . is that Reagan is not a
racist...but that he simply does not give much of a damn one way or another. In practical effect it
amounts to the same thing.”700 Moreover, his image of the Soviet Union as the “Evil Empire”701 suggests
that he perceived, whether accurately or not, that a powerful external actor maintained a highly negative
image of and intention toward the free world.702
Still, RWR was committed to an international approach to the containment of Communism, and
thus cannot be scored as an anti-internationalist. Nevertheless, despite his commitment to the defense of
U.S. allies, there is inadequate information to conclude that RWR was an altruist rather than simply
committed to alliances on instrumental grounds. In sum, RWR scores high on three of ten subconstructs
of hostility and is thus a non-hostile decisionmaker.
iv. adventurism
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Although RWR established a bold agenda, he did not believe it necessary to take great risks as he
reposited great faith in good fortune and regarded his endeavors as ordained to succeed by a higher
power.703 RWR harbored extreme optimism and believed that “technology ha[d] a solution for
704

everything.”

He delegated responsibility for major policy initiatives to subordinates and acted

deliberately on the basis of their recommendations,705 and although stress accompanied his
responsibilities, RWR was so confident in success that it is unlikely he experienced its effects to the
degree others in his position would have.706 In sum, RWR scores high on three of seven subconstructs of
adventurism—tolerance of risk, optimism, and male sex—and thus is scored a non-adventurist.
v. summary of IVs: RWR
RWR is a militarist who is neither anomistic, hostile, nor adventurist.
ii. DVs: ASD and Libya
On April 5, 1986, one day after U.S. intelligence intercepted a cable indicating Libyan terrorists
would attack a target in Berlin the next day, a bomb detonated in a West Berlin nightclub known to be
frequented by U.S. military personnel, killing two U.S. nationals and wounding 78 others.707 Nine days
later, on April 14, U.S. FB-111 fighter-bombers departed from bases in England and attacked five
708

military and regime targets in Libya.

In his address to the nation, RWR indicated that the U.S.

possessed “clear evidence that Libya is planning future attacks” and stated that the “preemptive action”
was intended to “preempt and discourage Libyan attacks on innocent civilians in the future.”709 Although
in subsequent statements administration officials made reference to other claims to legal justification for
the attack, including as a reprisal for the terrorist bombing of April 5th and as an exercise of self-defense
against ongoing attacks on U.S. nationals and embassies abroad,710 the official legal justification posited
that Libya was actively planning future attacks against the U.S.,711 that no diplomatic resolution was
possible, and that the U.S. action constituted an exercise of the inherent right of ASD to preempt these
future attacks consistent with Article 51 of the Charter.712
Although the UK, France, Australia, and Denmark joined the U.S. in preventing Security Council
condemnation of the U.S. attack on Libya,713 many states judged the response to have been an unlawful
reprisal,714 as did the General Assembly.715 Furthermore, a great many states and commentators found the
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facts alleged in support of the argument that future attacks against which force had been directed were
imminent to be insufficient to support the claim of self-defense,716 and still others concluded that the
magnitude of the response was disproportionate to the alleged threat.717 Despite British support for the
notion that the exercise of the inherent right to self-defense “plainly includes the right to destroy or
weaken the capacity of one’s assailant, reduce his resources, and weaken his will so as to discourage and
prevent future violence[,]”718 the general conclusion within the international community was that the U.S.
attack on Libya was difficult to characterize as anything but a reprisal and that, as such, the question of
ASD had not arisen.
In retrospect, the sustained diplomatic and economic pressure on Libya since the 1986 strike has
contributed to the recent Libyan concession that it had in fact developed an extensive chemical weapons
program and the commitment to surrender those weapons;719 it is fairly arguable that, without the credible
threat of future military sanctions that the 1986 strike made possible, the Qadhaffi regime would not have
been motivated to refrain from terrorism in the intervening decades and to normalize relations with the
international community. It seems also clear that RWR would consider his judgment to engage in ASD to
have been well-advised.
f.

President George H.W. Bush and Panama (1989)

a. independent variables: personality constructs
i. militarism
At 17, the forty-first U.S. president, George H.W. Bush [“41”], volunteered for service as the
youngest U.S. Navy pilot in World War II and distinguished himself in action against Japan in the South
Pacific. Although he was no militarist and recognized that the human cost of war was great, he proved
himself willing to employ U.S. military forces to accomplish objectives in Panama, Iraq, and Somalia,
and his positive attitude toward force is further reflected in his judgment that gun control is “not the
American way.”720 41 insisted that the U.S. was the dominant world power and that he would
“ferociously defend that role against all comers at home and abroad.”721 His withering attacks during the
1988 campaign, his fondness for practical jokes,722 and his tendency to be angered by criticism723 are
indicators of aggression,724 even if he is generally described as opposed to “jugular politics.”725 During his
political career, 41 was fueled by a driving ambition and would “fight like a junkyard dog to get what he
wanted.”726 He thrived on competition and hated to lose,727 and his lifelong desire to emulate his father as
715
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well as his strong drive to fashion order, both personal and international, lead experts to identify
heightened authoritarianism in his personality.728
729

Still, if he lacked the “vision thing” and could sometimes be intellectually lazy or lack direction
730

731

and ambition, 41 is considered a cognitively complex person who solicited the contrary views of his
advisors732 and could untangle thorny issues and easily assimilate new and varied information.
Furthermore, 41 is an extroverted “man of action”733 and a “social animal” for whom “there is simply no
event that can’t be improved by the addition of more people.”734 The great value he places on
relationships,735 and the emphasis and skill be demonstrated in regard to multilateralism and coalitionbuilding in his foreign policy,736 evidence the absence of isolationism and anti-internationalism
respectively. However, despite his great emotional intelligence and stable temperament, 41, perhaps
struggling to overcome others’ perception of him as a coddled “wimp”737 and to live up to his father’s high
expectations, suffers from fragile self-esteem.738
In sum, 41 scores as high on eight of thirteen subconstructs of militarism—nationalism, FAP,
patriotism, aggression, military experience, competitiveness, ambitiousness, and low self-esteem—and
thus is scored a militarist.
ii. anomism
Commentators offer little insight into the personality of 41 in terms of the subconstructs
“disrespect for law” and “disrespect for legal authority.” That his was an administration largely free of
scandal and that he was appointed as Director of the CIA in order to supervise major reforms designed to
render that agency more legalized and transparent suggest he is perceived as one who is neither
disrespectful of law nor legal authority. Moreover, 41 placed much emphasis upon “family values” in his
domestic policy agenda and implemented moral criteria to assess the acceptability of policy options.739
Although 41 had no formal legal training, he scores high on only two of five subconstructs—ignorance of
law and ignorance of IHL—and thus is scored a non-anomist.
iii. hostility
Although he is a friendly and extroverted person, 41 believes we live in a dangerous world in
which many harbor harmful intentions toward the U.S.740 Even in the waning years of the Cold War, 41
considered the Soviet Union a threat, and 41 regards political change, even when for the better, with
727
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741

suspicion and a healthy dose of cynicism.

Still, he is a self-effacing “team player” who is “born to

742

please” others, rather than a narcissist or a misanthrope, and while he is a pragmatic and flexible leader
his moral foundation, his patrician sense of duty, and his great loyalty to subordinates743 suppress any
tendency toward Machiavellianism. His support for the Civil Rights Act of 1990, his support for the
marriage of his son Jeb to a Mexican-American woman, and his nomination of Colin Powell as Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that it is very unlikely 41 is a racist or an ethnocentric. Finally, his
eagerness to engage other states in the process of peace enforcement in Iraq, and afterward in the
negotiation toward a more comprehensive Middle East peace agreement, support the assertion that 41 was
no anti- internationalist. Thus, 41 scores high on only three of seven subconstructs of hostility—distrust,
cynicism, and hostility—and is scored a non-hostile decisionmaker.
iv. adventurism
41 is a patient person who is willing to take measured risks if the expected payoff is great enough
but is generally cautious.744 His overriding concern was to “first, do no harm” and “not to make things
worse,” and he revealed that he would “rather be called cautious than I would be called reckless.”745 Still,
as President 41 believed that there was a relationship between the selection of policies and outcomes, and
he had the “quiet confidence that there [wa]s nobody better qualified to make . . . the kind of high stakes,
history-making decisions”746 that faced him. If he was sometimes hasty747 or failed to consider alternatives
to, and consequences of, his decisions,748 he was also sometimes indecisive; above all, once 41 made a
decision he was confident and did not suffer from anxiety.749 In sum, 41 scores high on three of seven
subconstructs of adventurism—internal locus of control, optimism, and male sex—and thus is scored nonadventuristic.
v. summary of IVs: 41
41 is a militarist who is neither anomistic, hostile, or adventuristic.
b. DVs: ASD and Panama
By 1988, the regime of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, who had been indicted in February
in the U.S. for narcotrafficking, was engaged in a systematic pattern of violence and intimidation against
U.S. military and civilian personnel in Panama.750 41, who during the presidential campaign had
adamantly refused to accept any other solution to mounting tensions other than for Noriega to leave
power and stand trial, concluded in the summer of 1989 that military action would be necessary to install
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751

the democratically-elected Guillermo Endara whom Noriega had deposed.

By September 1989, U.S.

officials deemed an invasion of Panama a “very high probability,” and in October Noriega ordered the
Panamanian Defense Forces to shoot down any and all U.S. aircraft in Panamanian airspace. An abortive
October coup caused embarrassment to 41, as Congress, including members of his own party, criticized
his failure to support the rebels and resurrected the question of the “wimp factor.”752 By late October, the
commander of the U.S. Southern Command described U.S.-Panamanian relations as a “state of war.”753
On 15 December 1989, Noriega declared that “[t]he republic of Panama [was] in a state of war
[with the U.S.]”754 and later that evening PDF soldiers shot and killed a U.S. officer at a roadblock and
kidnapped and tortured a second officer and his wife.755 With that, 41 reached the decision to intervene,
claiming that U.S. citizens in Panama were in “grave danger” and that “every other avenue was
closed[.]”756 OPERATION JUST CAUSE [“OJC”], launched for the stated objectives of capturing
Noriega, preserving the safety of U.S. citizens, and protecting the Panama Canal treaties,757 and justified
on the ground that Noriega had declared war upon the U.S.,758 was initiated on 20 December, and within
two weeks Noriega was in custody and Endara was empowered in Panama. In the immediate aftermath,
41 formally justified OJC as an exercise of ASD consistent with Article 51 of the Charter.759
In the main, international response was favorable. In May of 1989, the OAS had demanded
Noriega’s resignation and removal from power,760 and international criticism upon the capture of Noriega
was largely absent. A Soviet-sponsored resolution that would have labeled OJC “a flagrant violation of
international law” was swiftly opposed and defeated by Great Britain, France, and Canada in the Security
Council,761 and the General Assembly abstained from the question. Scholars were more critical of the
assertion of ASD in conjunction with OJC; although some a number lauded 41’s decision to use force to
protect U.S. nationals,762 others regarded any threat to U.S. nationals as the consequence of U.S. pressure
751
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upon the Noriega government and thus rejected as unnecessary the use of force to protect U.S. nationals
endangered by, in effect, the actions of the U.S.;763 still others suggested that the threat lacked sufficient
imminence to justify ASD764 or criticized OJC as a disproportionate employment of force;765 the most
766

absolutist regarded OJC as an ipso facto violation of Article 2(4).

Still, the ouster of Noriega, and his

767

subsequent conviction and imprisonment for narcotrafficking, raised little criticism outside the confines
of the legal academy.768
In retrospect, most would likely conclude that OJC contributed to the stability of Central America
and to the reduction in international narcotrafficking,769 and the successful prosecution of Noriega,
coupled with the preservation of free transit through the Panama Canal, suggests strongly that 41 would
not be dissuaded from deciding to launch OJC again under identical circumstances.
g. President William J. Clinton and Afghanistan/Sudan (1998)
a. IVs: personality constructs
i. militarism
President William Jefferson Clinton [“WJC”] is the incarnation of the modern internationalist
who envisions the U.S. as one state among many. Although he has a respect for and appreciation of the
importance of power in international relations,770 WJC is not a patriot, and when called to military service
was skillful in avoiding the discharge of his duty. He is an aggressive person subject to fits of anger771
772

who, although capable of compromise, tends to “lash out against institutions or groups who opposes his
policies,” and when others criticize him he “disowns them and turns against them angrily.”773 Although
he is a dogmatist convinced he knows what is right and best for others and that those who do not embrace
his views are misguided at best and driven by “base motives” at worst,774 WJC is far too much a man of
expedience and moral relativism to be labeled an authoritarian. Furthermore, his avoidance of military
service disqualifies him as a militarist. That said, WJC is intensely competitive and ambitious (even to a
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fault), tremendously energetic and articulate, and extroverted. He is a charming person interested in
fellowship776 and wins friends easily, although he does not always inspire their loyalty.777 WJC is a selfconfident person with high self-esteem.778 WJC thus scores as high on four of thirteen subconstructs of
militarism—aggression, competitiveness, dogmatism, and ambitiousness—and is scored a non-militarist.
ii. anomism
Although he has a law degree from Yale University, WJC was disbarred by the Supreme Court of
Arkansas for perjury in the civil suit brought against him for sexual harrassment by a former state
employee. He is described as an “emotionally challenged” person with major “psychic shortcomings”779
and as a “skilled liar.”780 WJC does not behave as if he has any coherent moral principles save for selfinterest, and cannot be relied upon to adhere to his commitments.781 In short, WJC scores high on all
subconstructs of anomism save for ignorance of law and ignorance of IHL, and thus is scored an anomist.
iii. hostility
Although he is a committed internationalist,782 WJC sees the political universe as hostile,783 and as
President believed his opponents were “out to get” him and prevent him from accomplishing an
“important, major, or unusual” mission that he was valiantly struggling to accomplish.784 In short, WJC is
a narcissist who self-defines his modest achievements as “grandiose” accomplishments and who believes
he is special and therefore entitled to dispensations from the rules that govern others.785 He is incapable of
admitting even the slightest errors.786 Still, WJC is neither cynical nor misanthropic: he has a much
greater-than average capacity to empathize787 and actively enjoys his many affiliations. Nor is he an
ethnocentrist: WJC, our “first black President,”788 is famously comfortable with persons of other races and
nationalities and made improving race relations a centerpiece of his domestic agenda.789 However, his
mendacity, infinitely flexible moral code, and overweening concern with self-interest brand WJC a selfish
Machiavellian. In sum, WJC scores as high on all but three of ten subconstructs of hostility—
misanthropy, ethnocentrism, and lack of empathy—and thus is scored as hostile.
iv. adventurism
775
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WJC is a “breathtakingly reckless” and undisciplined person who was nearly forced from office
for lying under oath in a civil deposition about his relationship with a White House intern. Although he is
above-average in his belief that he is capable of asserting positive control over the world about him and
discounts the role of chance,791 his impatience and impulsivity frustrate his designs.792 Nonetheless, WJC
is an optimist793 who does not experience the degree of stress or anxiety that would be expected of an
individual as impulsive as he, and even after setbacks he continues to perceive his prospects for attaining
his objectives as extremely high.794 WJC thus scores as high on five of seven subconstructs of
adventurism—tolerance of risk, internal locus of control, impulsivity, optimism, and male sex—and is
scored an adventurist.
v. summary of independent variables
WJC is scored as a non-militarist who is anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic.
b. dependent variable: ASD and Afghanistan/Sudan
On August 20, 1998, twelve days after the al Qaeda terrorist group attacked and destroyed the
U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and during the height of a Congressional inquiry into presidential
misconduct that would eventually lead to his impeachment, WJC ordered cruise missiles launched at
several al Qaeda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and at the al Shifa factory in Sudan, alleging the
latter was a production facility for chemical weapons intended for al Qaeda.795

Although various

Administration officials hinted that the action had been undertaken in retaliation for the embassy
bombings,796 the U.S. invoked ASD as the legal justification for its attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan,
contending that the application of military force had been necessary to prevent specific imminent terrorist
attacks about which it possessed clear and credible intelligence.797
Some restrictivist scholars argued that the U.S. failed to established that the threat posed by al
Qaeda was sufficiently imminent as to be necessary for purposes of analysis under the Caroline standard,
and that the action must consequently be examined not as an exercise of ASD but rather as an act of
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reprisal for the embassy bombings.

To some degree, criticisms of the U.S. ASD justification hinged on

the sufficiency of the evidence offered in support of the claim: some commentators, otherwise supportive
of the inherent right of states to engage in ASD, questioned its applicability given the absence of
sufficient proof of imminence,799 while others, although generally hostile to ASD, evaluated the U.S.
claim on its merits while nonetheless concluding that the “questionable nature of some of [the U.S.]
factual assertions, and the circumstances surrounding the strikes, render the success of its legal
justification very unique.”800 Although the U.S. countered reports that the factory and the camp had been
developed by U.S. intelligence and military officials as a potential targets many months before their
destruction801 by releasing some of the intelligence upon which it had relied in reaching its decision to
destroy the sites,802 restrictivists seized upon these reports and other indications that the factory may not
803
have in fact been a chemical weapons production facility as proof that the strikes were indefensible as

acts of ASD inasmuch as any threats that had existed for months without necessitating a U.S. attack were
not suddenly invested with imminence by the destruction of the U.S. embassies.
Nevertheless, despite widespread and general dissatisfaction with the evidentiary support for the
U.S. strikes, the Security Council took no formal action,804 nor did the attacks or the justification therefor
confront substantial political opposition internationally.805 Although some commentators consider the
muted international response a reflection of the distaste for al Qaeda and grudging tolerance of
incomplete disclosure of intelligence sources and means in the particular case at issue, rather than an
affirmation of a right to ASD,806 pragmatists suggest that the U.S. strikes on Sudan and Afghanistan
demonstrate that the right of states to engage in ASD is, if not already a norm of customary international
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See Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 533,
536 (2002) (suggesting that, although the strikes may well have been directed towards future unspecified but anticipated al Qaida
attacks., the threats posed by such potentialities was not sufficient to constitute imminence for purposes of evaluation as an act of
ASD); Lacey, supra note_, at 296-97 (contending that on the evidence offered it is impossible for the U.S. to argue that the
destruction of its embassies required an instant, overwhelming response against the targets selected and that it had “no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation.”) (citing the Caroline standard).
799
On the basis of evidence made available for review it was difficult for commentators to comprehend precisely how the
destruction of the Sudanese factory was necessary to prevent imminent terrorist attacks, for if the attacks were in fact imminent it
was unlikely terrorists would receive weapons produced by the factory in the near-term future and any imminent attacks would
be conducted with weapons already in possession. See, e.g., Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A
Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 483, 535 (1999) (accepting ASD in principle but rejecting application to Sudan on the ground the U.S. had failed to
“convincingly explain that acquisition [of chemical weapons] and use was imminent.”).
800
Romano, supra note 465, at 1041.
801
See Vernon Loeb & Bradley Graham, Sudan Plant Was Probed Months Before Attack, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1998, at A14
(factory); Bradley Graham, Bin Laden Was at Camp Just Before U.S. Attack, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1998, at A1 (camp).
802
See Linkie, supra note_, at 569 (noting that the U.S. produced physical evidence that the al Shifa facility had been producing
chemical precursors for VX nerve gas). For further discussion of the U.S. evidence, see Pentagon and C.I.A. Defend Sudan
Missile Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1998, at A5.
803
See David L. Marcus, Franck Criticizes Bombing of Plant in Sudan, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 1998, at A9 (stating that
newly-released evidence suggests the Sudanese factory was in fact either a pharmaceutical plant or an animal feed plant as
claimed by Sudan).
804
Yoo, supra note 556, at 573. In a letter to the President of the Security Council justifying the U.S. attacks, the U.S. claimed to
have acted only after repeated warnings to Afghanistan and Sudan to “shut down terrorist activities and cease cooperation with
the Bin Ladin Organization[.]” U.N. Daily Highlights, Aug. 21, 1998.
805
See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Raids Provoke Fury in Muslim World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at A6 (discussing reactions to 1998
strikes and reporting that most of the hostility was confined to Islamic states); Romano, supra note 465, at 1041 (noting that the
justification of ASD was received “with scant objection from the international community.”).
806
See id. (“Perhaps the relatively passive international response is best explained by the wealth of intelligence information the
United States had amassed linking Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network to the embassy bombings and other past terrorist plots.”).
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law that predates and survives the Charter, emerging as lex ferenda.

Few states or commentators

conclude that the attacks were either lawful or legitimate, and it is doubtful, given the insufficiency of the
evidence and the lack of support for the action, that WJC would make the same decision again. After the
spectacular disaster of September 11th, 2001, it is impossible to say that the attacks of 1998 contributed to
world order by promoting a credible deterrent regime.
h. President George W. Bush [“43”] and Iraq (2003)
a. independent variables: personality constructs
i. militarism
President George W. Bush [“43”] is a nationalist and a patriot who has declared that his life’s
mission is to “wag[e] [a] struggle for freedom and security for the American people” against international
terrorism.808 Power, and in particular military power, is the primary instrument of his foreign policy, and
he enjoys wielding it to accomplish his objectives.809 43 is an aggressive personality who is concerned
that a failure to meet force with force will communicate the lesson of a “not very tough [U.S.]” and that
the enemies of the U.S. must feel threatened by U.S. power.810 While not an authoritarian or a militarist,
811
43 is an assertive and competitive personality who served as an Air National Guard fighter pilot.

43 tends toward low cognitive complexity, superficial thinking, and low introspection,812 although
he “exhibits depth of comprehension,” “visualize[s] alternatives and weigh[s] long term consequences,”
and “keeps himself thoroughly informed” on policy issues.813 He is an engaging and gregrious extrovert
who makes and keeps friends with ease and is inclusive in his social life.814 Although not particularly
high in his need for achievement,815 43 has embraced the “ambitious reordering of the world”816 to, in
effect, make the world safe from terrorism. Although his self-confidence is only moderate, 43 has high
self-esteem.817 In sum, 43 scores high on eight of thirteen subconstructs of militarism—nationalism, FAP,
patriotism, aggression, military experience, competitiveness, dogmatism, and ambitiousness—and thus is
scored a militarist.
ii. anomism
Although he cannot be described as an outlaw, 43 has a personal history of minor brushes with
the law, including driving under the influence, and his disdainful statement in regard to the applicability
of international law to the awarding of contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq—“International law?
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See, e.g., id. at 1040 (suggesting that the largely absent criticism of the U.S. strikes bespeaks “growing acceptance” of ASD).
The most pragmatist scholars insist that because the threat posed by WMD-armed terrorists requires a transformed imminence
standard the strikes were perfectly legitimate. See, e.g., Addicott, supra note 444, at 772.
808
th
BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 108 (quoting 43 in his address to the nation shortly after September 11 , 2001).
809
See VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 41, 98-99, 101 (stating that 43 “enjoys the power to direct others and to
evoke respect”).
810
WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 38.
811
See VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 98-99 (describing 43 as “authoritative without being authoritarian”); id.
(noting that 43 “creates rules and expects subordinates to follow them, though within reasonable limits”).
812
See id. at 98-99 (describing 43 as “anti-introspective and unwilling to acknowledge disturbing emotions, denying personal
difficulties or covering inner conflicts with self-distraction.”).
813
Id. at 93-95, 100.
814
See id. at 90, 98-99 (describing 43 as “[d]isarmingly affable and charming”).
815
Id. at 90.
816
WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 341.
817
VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 95-96.
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Nobody told me about that. I better call my lawyer.” —belies a general lack of respect for law and legal
authority. Still, 43 believes that the U.S. is engaged in a “monumental struggle between good and evil”
against terrorism819 and that U.S. foreign policy, particularly the liberation of the Afghani and Iraqi
peoples, is a moral obligation predicated upon a “value system that cannot be compromised—God-given
820

values.”

43 has no formal legal training. 43 scores high on all subconstructs of anomism save for

amoralism and is thus scored an anomist.
iii. hostility
For the most part, 43 sees the world as more cooperative than conflictual, and he harbors
relatively low distrust.821 Although he sees himself as a visionary who “seize[d] the opportunity to
achieve . . . world peace” through the defeat of terrorism,822 psychobiographers rate 43 moderately low on
823

narcissism indices.

He is neither a cynic nor a misanthrope; rather, he is a “generally benevolent and

824

approval-seeking” person who enjoys cooperative relationships and is possessed of great emotional
intelligence.825 However, 43 believes that many domestic critics view him as “the toxic Texan”826 and that
the U.S. is the target of a vast consortium of international terrorists, and he has proven “willing to scheme
in calculated fashion to realize personal ambitions,”827 suggesting elevation on the Machiavellianism
subconstruct. Moreover, although 43 prefers multilateralism, his post-9/11 approach to foreign policy
suggests a strong anti-internationalist bent that is difficult to reconcile with his more stable cooperative
preference. There is little evidence to suggest elevation on the selfishness subconstruct, although it is
possible to score 43 high without altering the global score on the hostility construct.
43 scores high on only three of ten subconstructs of hostility—hostility, Machiavellianism,
selfishness, and anti-internationalism—and thus is scored a non-hostile decisionmaker.
iv. adventurism
43 is a cautious and risk-averse person who nevertheless believes that he has a duty and the
capacity to lead the U.S. on a mission to make the world safe from terrorism, and he is highly
impulsive.828 Nevertheless, 43 is an optimist whose faith insulates him from significant stress or
anxiety.829 In sum, 43 scores as high on four of seven subconstructs of adventurism—internal locus of
control, impulsivity, optimism, and male sex—and thus is scored as an adventurist.
v. summary of IVs: 43
43 is a militarist who is anomistic and adventuristic but not hostile.
b. DV: ASD and Iraq
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WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 45 (quoting 43).
820
Id. at 131 (quoting 43 in regard to the universalism of the moral values upon which U.S. foreign policy rests).
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VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 90-96.
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WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 282.
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See VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 91-93.
824
Id. at 98-99.
825
VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 99-101 (describing 43’s “keen ability to read others’ motives and desires”).
826
WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 44.
827
VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 99.
828
Id. at 95-96 (caution); id. at 102 (impulsivity).
829
Id. at 98-99.
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In the aftermath of the horrific events of September 11 , 2001, the sobering prospect that
enormously destructive nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons might be brought to bear upon its
civilian population830 by suicidal terrorists living within its midst prompted the U.S. to undertake a
831

dramatic revision of its national security strategy.

The September 2002 National Security Strategy of

832

the United States of America [“NSSUSA”], also known as the Bush Doctrine, warns transnational
terrorists and rogue states that the U.S. has abandoned deterrence in favor of a robust and proactive
strategic doctrine that sanctions the use of military force to eliminate threats posed by the intersection of
WMD and an emerging breed of undeterrable adversaries833 before they can materialize. Specifically, the
Bush Doctrine unmistakably claims the legal right to unilaterally preempt an incipient threat that, even if
not yet operational, will, if permitted to mature, be reducible only at a much greater cost in lives and
treasure.834 Immediately upon its promulgation the Bush Doctrine sparked a legal debate over whether the
use of military force to prevent megaterrorism constituted one of the permissible exceptions to a general
prohibition on the use of force in international relations.835 Iraq provided the test case.
In September 2002, 43 advised the UN that it might become necessary to employ force against
Iraq to enforce existing Security Council resolutions and eliminate a threat to international peace and
security.836 In response, the Security Council in November of that year adopted Resolution 1441, finding
Iraq in “material breach” of obligations incurred under ceasefire agreements codified in a series of
seventeen earlier Security Council resolutions,837 including the obligation, under Resolution 687, to
disarm of weapons of mass destruction [“WMD”].838 For nearly a dozen years, Iraq had frustrated UN
weapons inspectors and flouted the terms of the ceasefire,839 and with Resolution 1441 the UN threatened
830

Fear that the terrorists responsible would attempt further attacks shaped the perceptions of the public and government
th
decisionmakers in the aftermath of September 11 . WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 349.
831
It may be impossible to overestimate the severity of the threat posed by the intersection of transnational terrorism and the
proliferation of WMD. See KATHLEEN BAILEY, DOOMSDAY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF MANY 6 (1991)
(describing this intersection as the gravest threat ever posed to U.S. national security); Roberts, supra note 800, at 483-84 (“The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . . is one of the most significant and protracted threats to international security . . .
ever faced by mankind.”).
832
See National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) [“NSSUSA”], available at www.
whitehouse.gove/nsc/nss.pdf.
833
The Bush Doctrine contends that deterrence, predicated upon the maintenance of the threat that attacks against the U.S. will be
met with an overwhelming response and thus redound to the detriment of the attacker, is ineffective against terrorists and rogue
states who have no values against which the threat of force in response might counsel restraint. See id. at 15 (contending the
“deadly threat of Islamic terrorists whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called
soldiers seek martyrdom in death,” is not susceptible to deterrence).
834
See id. (stating that the “immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our
adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit . . . let[ting] our enemies strike first.”); see also NATIONAL STRATEGY TO
COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 3 (Dec. 2002), at http:/www.whitehouse.gove/response/index/html
(“Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces
and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMDarmed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures.”); David E. Langer, Bush Renews Pledge to
Strike First to Counter Terror Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2002, at A3 (reporting message from President Bush to U.S. troops
in Afghanistan stating that the U.S. will preemptively strike against states developing WMD and that “America must act against
these terrible threats before they’re fully formed[.]”).
835
See Paust, supra note 799, at 533 (describing debates).
836
See George W. Bush, UN General Assembly in New York City Address (Sept. 12, 2002), 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1529 (Sept. 16, 2002).
837
SC Res. 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002), 42 ILM 250 (2003).
838
See SC Res. 687 (Apr. 3, 1991), 30 ILM 846 (1991) (obligating Iraq to surrender its WMD and submit to verification
inspections).
839
In 1998, Iraq expelled UN weapons inspectors, and from 1998-2002 no enforcement was undertaken despite Security Council
condemnation of the Iraqi expulsion. See SC Res. 1205 (Nov. 5, 1998) (condemning the expulsion as a “flagrant violation of
resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions.”). For a comprehensive discussion of efforts undertaken from 1991 to 1998 to
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“serious consequences” while allowing Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament
obligations[.]”840 Resolution 1441 required Iraq to submit, by 8 December 2002, “a currently accurate,
full, and complete declaration” on its WMD programs, demanded that Iraq cooperate “immediately,
unconditionally, and actively” with the UN, and stated that failure to do so would constitute an additional
material breach.841 When Iraq failed to make the requisite declaration,842 Secretary of State Colin Powell,
in February 2003, notified the Council of ongoing Iraqi efforts to obtain WMD.843
Despite the incontrovertible fact of the Iraqi material breach, U.S.-led efforts to prod the Security
Council into further action were unsuccessful.844 A bloc led by France, Germany, and Russia insisted that
yet another authorizing resolution was necessary to render an invasion of Iraq lawful on the theory that
1441 did not specifically authorize such an invasion and that the threat from Iraq was not sufficiently
imminent as to justify military action.845 Quite simply, 43 disagreed and issued an ultimatum, stating that
because “the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over” if
enforcement action was not taken, the U.S. “choose[s] to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it
can appear suddenly in our skies and cities.”846 When the Hussein regime offered no response, on 19
March 2003 the U.S., under the code name OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM [“OIF”], led an ad hoc
coalition of the willing of about forty states into Iraq, defeated the Iraqi armed forces, and deposed the
Hussein regime.847 On 1 May 2003, 43 announced the end of major combat operations, although lowintensity conflict continues at the time of this writing. The U.S. and allied states are currently in
occupation of Iraq and preparing for a transfer of power and sovereignty to an elected Iraqi government
on 30 June 2004. The Security Council has not imposed sanctions on participating states.
Even as it unfolded, OIF became the most hotly debated and contentious issue in international
law, as well as the spark for mass public demonstrations.848 Scholars divided sharply. One camp was
adamant that the threat posed by an Iraq armed with WMD, “either directly or through Iraq’s support for
terrorism, was sufficiently imminent to render the use of force necessary to protect the United States, its

enforce relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, see Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security
Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 576. 579-81 (2003).
840
SC Res. 1441, supra note 838, at para. 2.
841
Id. at para. 4.
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recycled information”); id. ((“The conclusion is inescapable that at the time of the outbreak of the 2003 conflict, Iraq had decided
to refuse to comply with its disarmament obligations.”).
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See U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehous.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200302305-1.htm.
844
Had the U.S. sought an additional authorizing resolution, there were inadequate votes in the Council. See Tom. J. Farer, The
Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 624 (2003) (indicating that fewer than 9
of the members of the Council would have voted in favor). France, Russia, and Germany were insistent that an additional
resolution was necessary on the theory that the initial authorization, provided by Resolution 687, had expired at some point
between 1991 and 2003, and that 1441 did not specifically provide that additional authorization. See Yoo, supra note 556, at 567
(discussing this position and arguing that it is incorrect as a matter of law). Security Council paralysis was thus the result of
Franco-German and Russian insistence that yet another Resolution was required to authorize force in response to Iraqi failure to
adhere to 1441, which resolution this triumvirate was certain to veto if proffered, and U.S. refusal to accept this position and seek
another authorization. See Wedgwood, supra note 840, at 580.
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Richard Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 590, 592 (2003).
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citizens, and its allies.”

Another held that the nature of the Iraqi threat was neither sufficiently

imminent nor necessary to justify the use of force,850 that existing resolutions did not confer legal
authority for invasion of Iraq,851 and that OIF thus “has about it an aura of ominous implication for
852

international order[.]”

Although OIF was arguably predicated upon far less controversial legal

853

justifications, the characterization of the grounds for intervention for domestic political consumption by
43 as ASD,854 along with a widespread perception that intervention could not be legally justified on any
other basis, has thrust the ASD question to the fore; several commentators query whether OIF stands as
an “international constitutional moment”855 that will prove decisive for the future of international law.856
Whereas, without conceding that intervention in Iraq was an act of preventive war, the U.S. and allied
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1998). Legal counsel for the U.S. Department of State supported these interpretations. See William H. Taft IV & Todd F.
Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 557, 573 (2003) (describing OIF not as ASD but as the
result of Iraqi material breach of resolutions, violation of ceasefire agreement, and the “final episode in a conflict initiated more
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examination of the sources of legal support for OIF and for an argument that 43 did not characterize its action as ASD, see Sean
D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L. J. _ (forthcoming 2004).
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states claim the forcible ouster of the Hussein regime as a triumphal success that liberated the Iraqi people
and rescued the credibility of the UN after an ignominious decade marked by failures to prevent famine,
end genocide, and enforce the disarmament of rogue states, a chorus excoriates the decision to intervene
absent Security Council imprimatur as a jurispathic act posing a grave threat not only to a half-centurylong commitment to multilateralism857 but to the international rule of law.858 Although the legality of OIC
remains contested, ultimately the legitimacy of OIF, which has produced decidedly positive effects such
as the ouster and capture of Saddam Hussein and the liberation of the Iraqi people from Ba’athist
dictatorship, may turn on the success of the transition to Iraqi sovereignty: as Falk suggests, “If the
American occupation is viewed as successful, then [OIF] is likely to be treated as ‘legitimate[.]’”859
B. Analysis
1. Methodological Considerations and Limitations
Although the relative underdevelopment of the field of international legal compliance dictates
that the generation, rather than the analysis, of theories is the predominant focus at this stage of research,
the ultimate objective remains the specification and testing of a theory with explanatory and predictive
potential. However, generalization and testing of theories in social science typically require a large
number of cases, and as a rule, as theoretical specificity and/or the complexity of the phenomenon under
investigation increases, the number of cases available for analysis decreases.860 Some phenomena,
including ASD, are so rare that there are insufficient cases to support the testing of general propositions
with traditional methods of quantitative analysis;861 indeed, the universe of data available to answer the
specific research questions posed by the present study is limited to ten cases. Moreover, phenomena that
are causally linked to human agency and social processes are so complex or so rooted in specific contexts
that quantitative methods “necessarily brush[] over the nuances”862 and render barren descriptions and
inadequate explanations.863
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Although the behavioralist revolution of the 1950s continues to exert subtle pressure upon social
scientists to transform these complex and contextually-sensitive social phenomena, including the general
study of legal compliance,864 into empirical research questions “answerable” with multivariate statistics,865
866

quantitative analysis is not always appropos.

Admittedly, quantitative, or variable-oriented, analysis

does afford a rigorous method whereby to assess broad patterns of covariation across a wide range of
cases.867 However, variable-oriented analysis is an inferential process that does not regard cases
holistically or compare them directly to each other but rather treats them as the aggregates of a limited
number of variables868 and generalizes from identifiable patterns of variance derived from the study of
samples of relevant cases. By drawing a limited number of independent variables from their natural
contexts and relegating all others to theoretical irrelevance, variable-oriented analysis forfeits the
opportunity to develop an appreciation for and understanding of the role of human agency in the chain of
causation.869 Moreover, the importune application of quantitative methods of analysis is deleterious to the
accessibility and impact of the scholarly enterprise more generally: by displacing “softer” methods more
appropriate to particular research agendae, variable-oriented analysis has played no small part in
“detach[ing] [social science] from its surroundings and from audiences.”870
One of the most fundamental canons in the social and natural sciences is that the nature of the
research question, rather than a particular methodological preference, should drive the design of
experiments and the selection of methods of data analysis. When the subject of investigation is such that
few cases exist, when the hypothesized chain of causation involves human agency and the social
processes surrounding decisionmaking, and when outcomes are framed as the consequences of specific
choices at unique decisional moments, a case-oriented approach, which treats cases, rather than variables,
as the proper subjects of investigation, is best suited to the identification and incorporation of the broadest
range of important independent variables in the development and testing of theories. Scholars of IHL
compliance, a data-poor field in its infancy, are thus well-advised to heed those who urge researchers in
pursuit of the relationship between law and decisionmaking to “discard . . . statistical modeling” in favor
of a “softer kind of empiricism.”871 The herculean challenge for those who do is to identify a method that
systematizes their labors and yields some degree of explanatory and predictive power while retaining
rigor, logical consistency, communicability, generalizability, and parsimony.
2. The Comparative Method
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The case-oriented approach, also known as the “comparative method,” fosters an extensive
dialogue between ideas and data by relying upon comprehensive historical research and interrogation of
data to guide the identification of important causal factors while simultaneously regarding each case as a
holistic entity and comparing it directly with every other case.872 Comparative researchers compare and
contrast combinations of casual factors in one case setting with different combinations in another setting
and, through a process of systematic “eyeballing,” identify patterns of similarity and difference in the
distribution of outcomes associated with various factorial combinations.873 Comparativists then apply the
“method of agreement” to identify which of the possible causal factors is constant across all cases of a
particular outcome or phenomenon and thereby discover degrees of isomorphism between seemingly
unrelated cases. While the comparative method does not necessarily prove a cause and effect
relationship, it does create an important point of departure for experimental research.874 As formalized
and applied to the present study, the comparative method treats each personality construct as a causal
factor/independent variable and each outcome as a dependent variable.
3. Formalization: Qualititative Comparative Analysis
a. introduction
In the natural scientific community it has long been regarded as axiomatic that events do not
simply happen but instead occur only under certain precisely delimited conditions. Formal scientific
methods, including laboratory experimentation, led researchers to find that the outcome of combustion
requires the presence of oxygen, that microbes were responsible for infectious disease, and that an
absence of Vitamin C caused scurvy. Similarly, Qualititative Comparative Analysis [“QCA”] rests upon
this fundamental axiom of causation that undergirds the scientific method. QCA is constructed upon the
premise that, short of formal experimentation, which is nearly impossible in the social sciences due to
ethical and logistical constraints, formal logic, particularly the process of induction, is essential to
determine the necessary and sufficient causal factors of particular outcomes in research settings
characterized by a scarcity of cases.
b. causal factors and outcomes
Specifically, QCA, an analytical methodology developed to aid the investigation of social science
questions grounded in human agency and beset with methodological problems resulting from a paucity of
cases, permits the investigator of a particular DV, or “outcome,” to identify, through detailed historical
research and interpretation of all existing cases of the outcome, a broad number, “n”, of probable IVs, or
“causal factors.”875 In QCA, these causal factors are measured dichotomously across the universe of
872
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cases. Each case is examined for the presence or the absence of the causal factor; the presence of the
causal factor is indicated by a capital letter, e.g., “A,” while the absence is indicated by a lower-case
letter, e.g., “a.”876 In any QCA analysis, the possible number of combinations of causal factors is thus 2n.
c. necessary and sufficient conditionality
Each of the 2n cases is placed in a matrix, known as a “truth table,” that illustrates the
associations of particular outcomes with particular combinations of causal factors that manifested in
actual historical cases. Where cells in the truth table are unfilled due to an absence of the particular
combination in the historical record, experimental research is required to augment history and exhaust all
possible combinations of causal factors.877 While it is asking too much of the method to expect it to yield
completely unproblematic and generalizable laws on the basis of very few cases, QCA nonetheless
specifies relationships of necessity and sufficiency between causal factors and outcomes that hold across
the entire universe of extant cases and that in turn serve as the basis for future experimentation. A
“necessary” causal factor is one that always precedes a given outcome/effect and in the absence of which
the outcome/event cannot occur, while a “sufficient” causal factor is a factor in the presence of which a
given outcome/effect must occur.878
d. prime implicants
After the specification of necessary and sufficient causal factors, QCA employs Boolean algebra
[“BA”], a mathematical system that uses symbols and set theory to represent logical operations in
algebraic form,879 to reduce several different combinations of causal factors productive of the same
outcome(s) to what are known as “prime implicants.”880 In formal logic terms, an “implication” is formed
when two statements are combined by placing the word “if” before the first and “then” between them,
e.g., “If I drink this glass of water, then my thirst will be quenched.” In an implication, the component
statement between the words “If” and “then” is known as the “antecedent” and, alternatively, as the
“implicans;” the statement which follows the word “then” is known as the “consequent” and,
alternatively, as the “implicate.” An implication asserts that its antecedent implies its consequent; thus, if
www.berkeley.edu/~census/521.pdf. For example, although smoking is associated with increased rates of lung cancer and can be
demonstrated through experimental research to cause lung cancer, alcohol consumption is not associated with increased rates of
lung cancer, and smoking and alcohol consumption are associated (smokers drink more than nonsmokers). Therefore, alcohol
consumption is associated with increased rates of lung cancer although it does not cause increased rates of lung cancer. Simply
put, association does not imply causation.
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the statement “I drink this glass of water” is true, it is also true that “my thirst will be quenched.” In
short, the essential meaning is the relationship asserted between the antecedent and the consequent: if the
antecedent is true, the consequent is also true.
Implication does not suggest, in the case of the example, that it is not possible to satisfy thirst in
any other manner, nor does implication imply that there may not be other outcomes attendant to the
drinking of the glass of water: in fact, beer may satisfy my thirst, or the water may be poisoned, and thus
although it serves the function of quenching thirst it may also produce death. Nonetheless, implication
does establish a definitive relationship between the antecedent and the consequent.
A “prime implicant” is special type of implication in which the antecedent is the minimum
combination of causal factors which together are either 1) sufficient to cause a particular outcome or
2) necessary to cause a particular outcome across the universe of possible cases and the consequent is the
particular outcome. Thus, for any given outcome y for which there is a prime implicant x , if x is a true
statement of existing causal factors then either 1) y must occur as a result of the existence of x or 2) x is
a prerequisite for the production of y. A prime implicant for any given outcome can be identified by (1)
surveying the universe of cases in which that outcome is expressed and eliminating each of the “n” causal
constructs for which there is more than one possible value from the causal construct combinations
associated with that particular outcome. Those constructs that remain in every case in which the outcome
is expressed together constitute the prime implicant for that outcome. Through determination of prime
implicants it is possible to isolate the particular necessary and/or sufficient causal factors, if any, which
produce the given outcome(s) over the universe of available cases.
e. probabilities: hypothetical analysis
When the historical record fails to exhaust all possible combinations of causal factors it is
impossible to specify necessary and sufficient causality in respect of particular outcomes. Under such
circumstances QCA directs the investigator to analyze preliminary hypotheses regarding the relationships
between causal factors and outcomes to derive probabilistic propositions than can serve as points of
departure for experimental research. For example, consider the phenomenon of “successful social
revolution,” which has occurred three times in history. In all three cases the causal factor of a “collapsing
monarchy” was present, but in only two—the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Chinese Revolution of
1949—was the causal factor of “strong charismatic leadership” present. In the third—the French
Revolution of 1789—it was absent.881 Accordingly, while “collapsing monarchy” is a necessary condition
for social revolution, “strong charismatic leadership” is not. However, the preliminary hypothesis, “The
stronger and more charismatic the leader of the revolutionary element, the more successful the resulting
social revolution,” is supported or affirmed by 2 of 3, or 66.7%, of cases, as is the probabilistic statement,
“A successful social revolution will be led by a strong and charismatic leader.”
4. QCA Applied to the Association of Personality Constructs and ASD Outcomes
a. personality constructs as causal factors
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See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS (1979) (identifying and analyzing the French
(1789), Russian (1917), and Chinese (1949) revolutions as the sole instances of social revolution in history).
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The four personality constructs, each of which is a causal factor and an independent variable, are
labeled as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

militarism: A (presence of construct/factor) or a (absence of construct/ factor);
anomism: B (presence of construct/factor) or b (absence of construct/factor);
hostility: C (presence of construct/factor) or c (absence of construct/factor);
adventurism: D (presence of construct/factor) or d (absence of construct/factor).

Table 1, “Personality Profiles,” aggregates the personality construct scores to create personality profiles
for each HD in each of the ten historical cases.
b. association of outcomes with personality profiles
The presence of each outcome/DV in a particular historical case is scored as “1,” while its
absence is scored “0.” Table 2, “Personality Profiles with Associated ASD Outcomes,” associates the
presence or absence of each of the ten outcome with each personality profile. As Table 2 illustrates, the
incidence of particular outcomes associates with the following personality profile(s), the first step in the
determination of prime implicants:
(1) consideration of ASD as an option: ABCD, ABCd, aBCD, abcd, aBcd, Abcd, and ABcD;
(2) selection of ASD: aBCD, abcd, ABCD, Abcd, and ABcD;
(3) defense of an exercise of ASD: aBCD, abcd, ABCD, Abcd, and ABcD;
(4) defense of an exercise of ASD on legal grounds: aBCD, abcd, ABCD, Abcd, and ABcD;
(5) other actors regard an exercise of ASD as lawful at the time of its exercise: Abcd;
(6) other actors regard an exercise of ASD as legitimate at the time of its exercise: aBCD, Abcd, and
ABcD;
(7) state engaging in ASD is subject to legal sanctions: ABCD;
(8) other actors regard an exercise of ASD as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect: aBCD, abcd, ABCD,
Abcd, and ABcD;
(9) decisionmaker who ordered his/her state to engage in or refrain from ASD would make the same
decision again in hindsight: ABCD, ABCd, aBCD, abcd, Abcd, and ABcD; and
(10) exercise of ASD can fairly be said to have contributed to world order: ABCD, ABCd, aBCD, abcd,
Abcd, and ABcD.

c. prime implicants of ASD outcomes
The “other actors regard an exercise of ASD as lawful at the time of its exercise” outcome and the
“state engaging in ASD is subject to legal sanctions” outcome are each associated with a single
personality profile, Abcd and ABCD respectively. Therefore, each profile is a prime implicant for its
associated outcome. However, for the eight other outcomes it is not possible to identify a prime
implicant, as for each personality construct the presence and absence of the construct associates with each
outcome in at least one personality profile. Furthermore, given the limited number of cases of ASD it is
premature to conclude that any construct(s) are sufficient, rather than simply necessary, conditions for the
production of any given ASD outcome. The sole exception is the hypothetical instance of an outcome for
which there is a single personality profile as the prime implicant across the entire range of 24, or sixteen,
possible personality profiles, yet in the universe of historical cases of ASD, only seven personality
profiles—ABCD, ABCd, aBCD, abcd, aBcd, Abcd, and ABcD—have been associated with ASD
outcomes. Where, as here, the history of ASD has not exhausted all possible combinations of causal
factors and it is therefore impossible to specify necessary and sufficient causality with regard to particular
outcome, QCA directs the investigator to undertake hypothetical analysis to derive probabilistic
statements and outcome maximizing combinations.
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d. hypothetical analysis
An initial qualitative analysis yields little to confirm or reject most of the PHs. As Table 3,
“Analysis of Preliminary Hypotheses,” illustrates, no PH is affirmed by all or zero of the ten cases.
Nonetheless, if there were no relationship between any of the personality constructs and any of the
outcomes, chance would predict that each hypothesis would be affirmed by fifty percent of cases and
rejected by fifty percent of cases.882 To affirm a particular PH for purposes of this study, an arbitrary
determination is made that it must be supported by at least sixty percent of cases in which the outcome is
expressed;883 in order to be able to reject a particular PH, and to affirm the alternate hypothesis expressing
the inverse relationship of the causal factor and outcome in question,884 it must be affirmed by forty
percent or fewer of the cases in which the outcome is expressed. This requirement establishes a
sufficiently significant improvement over chance such that some measure of confidence can be placed in
those PHs affirmed or rejected at this threshold. As Table 3, illustrates, of the forty PHs,, nine are
affirmed by sixty percent or greater of cases (#s 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 29, and 32), and six are affirmed
by forty percent or fewer (#s 12, 14, 22, 30, 35, and 39).
The following reformulated hypotheses, stated as working propositions [“WPs”], as well as their
obverses (negation of both personality construct score and outcome score), are offered at this stage of
theoretical development:
WP #1 (hypothesis #1): A militaristic decisionmaker will consider ASD;
WP #2 (hypothesis #2): A militaristic decisionmaker will engage in ASD;
WP #3 (hypothesis #9): A militaristic decisionmaker will be satisfied with his/her decision regarding
whether to engage in ASD;
WP #4 (hypothesis #10): A militaristic decisionmaker will make a decision in regard to whether to engage
in ASD that supports world order;
WP #5 (hypothesis #11): An anomistic decisionmaker will consider ASD;
WP #6 (hypothesis #12): An anomistic decisionmaker will not engage in ASD;
WP #7 (hypothesis #13): An anomistic decisionmaker will defend the exercise of ASD;
WP #8 (hypothesis #14): An anomistic decisionmaker will defend the exercise of ASD on legal grounds;
WP #9 (hypothesis #15): An anomistic decisionmaker’s decision to engage in ASD will not be regarded as
lawful by other actors;
WP #10 (hypothesis #22): A hostile decisionmaker will not engage in ASD;
WP #11 (hypothesis #29): A hostile decisionmaker will be satisfied with his/her decision regarding whether
to engage in ASD;
WP #12 (hypothesis #30): A hostile decisionmaker will make a decision in regard to whether to engage in
ASD that supports world order;
WP #13 (hypothesis #32): An adventuristic decisionmaker will engage in ASD;
WP #14 (hypothesis #35): An adventurist’s decision to engage in ASD will not be regarded as lawful by
other actors; and
WP #15 (hypothesis #39): An adventuristic decisionmaker will be satisfied with his/her decision regarding
whether to engage in ASD.

i. analysis of associative relationships
882

For a discussion of the theory of probability and the role of chance, see CHARLES M. GRINSTEAD & J. LAURIE SNELL,
nd
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On some DVs no outcome is expressed in several cases: i.e., where a decisionmaker does not elect to engage in ASD, no
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than establish a specific number of cases in which the hypothesized relationship must obtain, a percentage is used in recognition
of the fact that fewer than ten cases are available in regard to several of the dependent variables.
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For example, suppose the hypothesis “The more sunny the day is the fewer people on this beach will experience sunburn” is
determined to be true in 1 of 10, or 10%, of cases studied (perhaps because on the one sunny day only Bahamians were on the
beach, while on cloudy days Norwegians were in attendance). The alternate hypothesis, “The more sunny the day is the more
people on this beach will experience sunburn” is accepted as true in 9 of 10, or 90%, of cases.
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a. militarism and ASD
WPs 1 and 2, both affirmed by 60% of cases, seem intuitively obvious. We anticipate that
nationalistic patriots with military experience and a favorable view of power who are keenly ambitious,
inflexibly committed to a view of the international system as a zero-sum competition for survival, unable
or unwilling to integrate contrary information or to seek and heed the counsel of others, and convinced
that foreign policy is an arena in which they must aggressively battle to prove their worth to consider and
elect options, including ASD, that involve the use of force against rivals perceived to threaten the
interests of the states at their command, even if such options are controversial and even if the nature or
magnitude of the threat is uncertain. Information that confirms the nature and magnitude of a threat is
consistent with the worldview of the militarist and is credited as valid, whereas information that would
discredit the threat or suggest a non-conflictual or less conflictual response is discarded. The militarist
must defend the patria from attacks, which loom everywhere and which afford his reason for being, and
any means, even if considered by other actors as unacceptable, unlawful, or disproportionate, is legitimate
to this end.
WP 3 is somewhat more surprising. To the extent that extreme militarists are incorrigibly
convinced that the international system is an arena of perpetual conflict, incapable of considering nonmilitary instruments of policy, and unable to refrain from tasking the national armed forces to serve their
ambitions and prove their worth, it stands to reason that they would evaluate their decisions to engage in
ASD uncritically and learn little if anything from military failure, political criticism, or legal sanctions.
However, that militarists tend to be satisfied in the rectitude of their decisions in regard to the exercise of
ASD, and that non-militarists tend to regret their decisions, suggests that in circumstances where an
arguably imminent threat has arisen it may indeed be prudent to respond with ASD, and militarists are
more prone to do so than non-militarists.
WP 4, affirmed by 70% of cases, is even more unanticipated. The restrictivist camp regards IHL
as very much a prohibitory regime and treats the use of force as ipso facto unlawful unless authorized by
the Security Council;885 the entire framework of the UN Charter, a document born out of the horror of
World War II and intended to create a more peaceful and just international system,886 is erected upon the
moral premise that armed conflict is a scourge as well as the legal commitment to the principle that force
is no longer to be used to resolve disputes.887 That force, applied in anticipation of armed attacks, should
actually prove supportive of international order and justice, and that militarists, for whom force is the
preferred instrument of policy, should make a greater contribution to this end than non-militarists seems,
at least on its face, to pose a challenge to the moral philosophy and legal theory underlying restrictivism.
b. anomism and ASD
WP 5 is, as anticipated, affirmed by 70% of cases. Decisionmakers who are ignorant and even
disdainful of law and legal authorities and bereft of an internal moral code will naturally regard
international legal regulations on the resort to force in purely instrumental terms and afford them little if
885
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any independent weight in the decisionmaking regarding whether to engage in ASD. If ASD can
conceivably protect their states from an external threat, anomistic decisionmakers will consider ASD
whether consistent with or contrary to the law. Similarly, that anomists’ decisions to engage in ASD
would be regarded by other actors as unlawful, as WP 9 states and as 71.4% of cases affirm, is
unsurprising. Anomists’ disregard for law, authority, and moral considerations are expressed not only in
the substantive content of their decisionmaking but in the process whereby they negotiate and interact
with other actors and explain and justify their decisions. An anomist’s decision to engage in ASD, as
well as his or her explanation and justification for that decision, is likely qualitatively distinct from a
similar decision and the accompanying explanation or justification offered by a non-anomist.
WP 6, however, is completely counterintuitive. An anomist is precisely the personality expected
to engage in ASD notwithstanding any legal prohibitions to the contrary, and the finding, supported by
60% of cases, that anomists do not engage in ASD, is difficult to explain. By contrast, although WPs 7
and 8, both affirmed by 71.4% of cases, are also counterintuitive, it bears noting that all decisionmakers,
regardless of personality profiles, defended their actions when resorting to ASD, and all made legal
arguments; it it is at least as plausible to suggest that all decisionmakers reflexively seek to justify their
actions on a legal basis when engaging in the use of force as it is to suggest that anomism is associated
with the legal defense of the exercise of ASD.
c. hostility and ASD
It might be expected that self-absorbed, delusional, amoral decisionmakers who distrust and
dislike humanity and reject any limits on the means that may be used to defend against the welter of
threats they believe surround them would be strongly inclined to lash out with force against outsiders
regardless of provocation or of the consistency of such a response with legal obligations. Strangely, 60%
of the cases affirm WP 10, which states that a hostile decisionmaker will not engage in ASD. It is
difficult at this stage of theory development to specify why this may be so: it may be that hostility is no
absolute bar to the exercise of prudent discretion, or that other actors are more cautious in their dealings
with hostile decisionmakers and refrain from conduct that might be perceived as threatening. If the latter,
it might be questioned whether the manifestion of hostility has the effect of inoculating decisionmakers,
at least to some degree, against the machinations of other actors who choose on that basis not to make
states led by hostile decisionmakers the targets of their designs.
WP11, just as WP 3, is curious. Although sixty percent of cases affirm that a hostile
decisionmaker will be satisfied with his or her decision regarding whether to engage in ASD, it might
have been anticipated that the self-absorption, unmotivated distrust, detachment from reality, and hatred
for others that govern ideal-typic hostile decisionmakers would warp their judgments and yield decisions
they would ultimately come to regret. However, considered in conjunction with WP 10, which states that
hostile decisionmakers, in contrast to militarists, refrain from engaging in ASD, the high degree of
satisfaction indicated by WP 11 may be explained on the ground that hostile decisionmakers are somehow
able to prevent their hostility from coloring their decisionmaking. In the same vein, proposition 12,
which links hostility with decisions regarding ASD that support world order, may simply be a reflection
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of the tendency of hostile decisionmakers to refrain from engaging in acts of ASD that, if they were to
give rein to their hostility, would otherwise not be predicated upon genuine threats to their states but
would rather be malignant expressions of their narcissism, ethnocentrism, Machiavellianism, or other
subconstructs of their hostility.
d. adventurism and ASD
WP 13, affirmed by 60% of cases, states rather plausibly that anxious, impulsive gamblers who
reposit great faith in their capacity to assert their will upon events are willing to undertake a military
strategy that affords the prospect of significant benefits while nonetheless presenting significant risks in
terms of the political consequences should other actors regard the resort to ASD as a violation of law. For
adventurists, the risks associated with ASD are outweighed by the potential gains. WP 14, however,
affirmed by 71.4% of cases, implies that other actors are disinclined to regard the adventurist favorably,
and that the risk-taking propensity of the adventurist may be perceived as inherently and diametrically
opposed to the predictability that many members of the international community hope to secure by way of
the rule of law. Still, WP 15, affirmed by 60% of cases, suggests that there are important gains to be had
even if they come at a price: although adventurists may be regarded as law-breakers when they engage in
ASD, they regard their decisions to do so as having been correct under the circumstances. Success in
international relations, particularly if defined as the defense of the state against external threats, may well
require some risk taking
ii. Outcome Maximizing Combinations
Although only two ASD outcomes are linked to prime implicants, several other outcomes are
associated with a number of personality profiles that, although they cannot be reduced to prime
implicants, share at least one personality construct score across at least 60% of the profiles associated
with those outcomes. For example, PH #10, “The more militaristic a decisionmaker, the more likely
his/her decision with regard to ASD can fairly be said to have contributed to world order,” is supported by
seven of ten, or 70%, of cases, while six of eight, or 75%, of personality profiles associated with the
presence of the outcome “contributed to world order” contain the personality construct “A,” “militaristic,”
and thus reinforce PH #10.888 As Table 4, “Personality Constructs with Associated ASD Outcomes,”
illustrates, twenty-two associations satisfy the 60% confidence level.
An “Outcome Maximizing Combination” [“OMC”] can be determined for each ASD outcome.
Each OMC represents that construct or aggregation of constructs that yields the greatest probability,
relative to all other constructs or aggregates, of an association with a particular outcome. Each construct
for which hypothetical analysis yields at least a 60% probability of association with a particular outcome
is included in the OMC for that outcome. For example, for “consider ASD,” PH #1, “The more
militaristic a decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD,” is supported by 60% of cases,
and PH #11, “The more anomistic the decisionmaker, the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD,” is
supported by 70% of cases. Therefore, the presence of the constructs “militarism” and “anomism,”
indicated by the score AB, is part of the OMC. However, PH #21, “The more hostile the decisionmaker
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the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD,” is supported by only 50% of cases—the equivalent of
chance—as is PH #31, “The more adventuristic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider
ASD.” Consequently, neither the presence nor absence of either hostility or adventurism is included in
the OMC for “consider ASD.”
The following are the OMCs for each of the ten ASD outcomes:
(1) consider ASD: AB;
(2) engage in ASD: AbcD;
(3) defend exercise of ASD: b;
(4) defend exercise of ASD on legal grounds: b;
(5) exercise of ASD regarded as lawful by other actors: bd;
(6) exercise of ASD regarded as legitimate by other actors: none;
(7) exercise of ASD met with sanctions: none;
(8) exercise of ASD regarded as lawful or legitimate in retrospect: none;
(9) decisionmaker is satisfied with the outcome of the ASD decision: ACD; and
(10) ASD decision promoted world order: AC.

e. Probabilistic Statements of Association
A “Probabilistic Statement of Association” [“PSA”] is a synthetic statement of association
between a personality construct or profile and ASD outcome(s) demonstrated to be true across a
minimum of 60% the ten historical cases in hypothetical analysis as well as across a minimum of 60% of
the cases in which the outcome(s) is/are expressed [“outcome occurrences”] in QCA. Although PSAs
establish to a reasonable degree of confidence the existence of relationships of association between
personality constructs and ASD outcomes, they do not imply the absolute truth or validity of the
associative relationship, nor do they identify the microprocesses that “produce” associated outcomes. A
given instance of ASD can yield outcomes divergent from the explanations and predictions offered by
PSAs. Nonetheless, given current methodological and theoretical constraints, PSAs are perhaps the
fullest extent to which rigorous analysis can be extended.
The five PSAs are as follows:
(1) A militarist is more likely to consider ASD than a non-militarist; this PSA is supported by 6 of 10 cases
(60%) in hypothetical analysis and by 6 of 10 outcome occurrences in QCA for an average probability of .600;
(2) A militarist is more likely to be satisfied with his/her decision regarding whether to engage in ASD than
a non-militarist; this PSA is supported by 8 of 10 cases (80%) in hypothetical analysis and by 6 of 8 (75.0%)
outcome occurrences in QCA for an average probability of .775;
(3) A militarist is more likely to make a decision in regard to whether to engage in ASD that supports world
order than a nonmilitarist; this statement is supported by 7 of 10 cases (70.0%) in hypothetical analysis and by 6 of 8
(75.0%) outcome occurrences in QCA for an average probability of .725;
(4) A non-anomist’s decision to engage in ASD will be more likely to be regarded as lawful by other actors
than an anomist’s decision to engage in ASD; this statement is supported by 5 of 7 cases (71.4%) in hypothetical
analysis and by 1 of 1 (100%) outcome occurrences in QCA for an average probability of .857; and
(5) A non-adventurist is more likely to make a decision regarding whether to engage in ASD that is
regarded as lawful by other actors than an adventurist; this statement is supported by 5 of 7 cases (71.4%) in
hypothetical analysis and by 1 of 1 (100.0%) outcome occurrences in QCA for an average probability of .857.

The five PSAs assess explanatory and predictive probabilities for four of the ten outcomes; for
example, PSAs 4 and 5, taken together, indicate that in the event that a non-anomistic and nonadvenuristic decisionmaker engages in ASD, the probability that the decision will be regarded by other
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actors as lawful is 85.7%, whereas the likelihood that the exercise of ASD by an anomistic and
adventuristic decisionmaker will be judged lawful is 14.6%. No PSAs can be deduced on the basis of
existing data for the remaining six ASD outcomes.
C. Combined Theoretical Model
In Figure 1, “Formal Theoretical Model,” the solid, single-headed arrows indicate an associative
relationship between personality constructs and ASD outcomes. An attempt is made to distinguish the
strengths of the associative relationships by labeling each arrow with a coefficient ranging from -1.00 to
1.00: a relationship of perfect positive association is accorded a coefficient of 1.00 whereas a relationship
of perfect negative association is accorded a coefficient of -1.00. This measurement of coefficients is
analogous to the correlational coefficients used in statistical analysis; however, true measurement of
correlation is not feasible given the very small “n” available to the current study. Consequently,
relationships of association are employed in the manner of correlation coefficients to much the same end.
In the case of an arrow connecting a construct to an ASD outcome that is labeled with a positive
coefficient, the presence of the personality construct associates with the ASD outcome to which it is
connected (the obverse of this stated relationship is also true). For an arrow labeled with a negative
coefficient the absence of the personality construct associates with the ASD outcome to which it is
connected (again, the obverse of this relationship is also true). Note that only those associative
relationships with coefficients that round to greater than or equal to .6 or lesser than or equal to -.6 are
included in the formal theoretical model; the complete absence of any associative relationship would
dictate an coefficient of .5 for the linkage between the U.S. Presidential personality construct and the
unrelated outcome as well as -.5 for the linkage of the absence of the personality construct and unrelated
outcome.
“Coefficients of associative relationships” are measured by calculating the average of the
percentage of the cases in hypothetical analysis supporting a particular associative relationship between a
personality construct and a particular ASD outcome and the percentage of outcome occurrences in QCA
in which the associative relationship is evidenced between the construct and the outcome. Coefficients
are illustrated in Table 5, “Coefficients of Associative Relationships.”
D. General Observations and Caveats
Perfect explanation and prediction of human decisionmaking in a complex situation characterized
by stress and lack of information transcends not only the reality of the current state of science but also the
expectations of all but the most optimistic. The present theory is intended to offer some tools for
explanation and prediction, but attempts to read the proverbial crystal ball for insight into concrete future
outcomes in instances in which the prospect of ASD arises will prove less than completely satisfying at
best. Despite the identification of numerous associative relationships, it is important to stress the limited
and conditional nature of the causal significance of personality. Each and every decisionmaker in the
present study considered, and seven of ten elected, ASD. These findings suggest that the personality
constructs under analysis may be less significant than other variables, whether unidentified personality
constructs, objective analyses of external threats, the absence of reliable multilateral institutions that can
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be enlisted to maintain peace in lieu of self-help, or the lack of credible and effective legal sanctions to
deter unilateral and unauthorized action, in inducing decisionmakers to contemplate and elect ASD.
Moreover, all decisionmakers who engaged in ASD defended their decisions, and all grounded
their justifications upon legal arguments. This finding calls into question whether personality plays a
significant role in determining whether, and on what basis, states justify their resort to ASD, and may
suggest instead that the defense of ASD on legal grounds is simply a rational strategic accompaniment
that all but the clinically insane offer as a veneer for their actions, however thin, to minimize attendant
political and legal costs. Furthermore, the resort to ASD is almost uniformly regarded by a
decisionmaker’s contemporaries as unlawful: in only a single instance—41’s intervention in Panama—
was an act of ASD contemporaneously adjudged as lawful. That ASD should be deemed unlawful in
nearly all instances suggests that the legal judgment of the international community may be unrelated to
the personalities of the decisionmakers, a group of individuals endowed with a range of diverse
personality profiles, electing the strategy. Similarly, the general failure to sanction acts of ASD points
toward factors other than personality, such as the incapacity or unwillingness to organize collective
military sanctions or uncertainty as to the precise substantive content of the formal legal rules, as
responsible for the failure to require compliance.
Six of seven instances of ASD are regarded in retrospect as lawful and or legitimate, and eight of
ten decisions regarding whether to engage in ASD left decisionmakers satisfied and contributed positively
to world order. These findings suggest that the international community has, with the passage of time,
come to regard a practice it considered unlawful upon commission to be not merely lawful but, in effect,
the proper strategy under the circumstances. This in turn suggests not that personality is irrelevant but
rather that legal judgments regarding ASD may perhaps be so amenable to contemporaneous politicized
interpretation and contestation that the existing legal regime, to the extent it inhibits the exercise of ASD
by decisionmakers who, whether as a consequence of the influence of their personalities upon their
decisionmaking or for some other reason, would have engaged in ASD, is dysfunctional.
IV. Criticisms, Responses, and Directions for Future Research
Despite grounds for caution, this study has identified several associative relationships between
personality and various ASD outcomes, and one should not be too quick to discount the causal
significance of personality to IHL compliance at this juncture. Nonetheless, there are sure to be criticisms
of the present theory on any number of bases.
A. Criticisms
1. Reductionism
Those with intellectual commitments to theories that regard other levels of analysis as more
fundamental to the explanation of the behavior of states may dismiss personality as little more than “a
magic slogan to charm away the problems that [their] intellectual tools don’t handle.”889 Others, without
categorically rejecting its causal significance, may take exception to the claim that personality, rather than
the role of the foreign policy or military bureaucracies, domestic interest groups, the political or cultural
889
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nature of the state, or the distribution of military or economic power in the international system, is central
to explanations for state decisions concerning compliance with IHL; for these critics, personality
constructs are simply “noisy” variables, and the reductionism of personality-based theories is invariably
sacrificial of explanatory and predictive power.890
2. Lack of Parsimony
Still others, even if convinced that personality is relevant to the explanation of state compliance
with IHL, may fault the present theory on the ground that it is insufficiently parsimonious to be accessible
to a wide array of researchers that would otherwise wish to replicate and build upon its conclusions.
Personality theories are difficult to subject to empirical testing, and researchers must expend a great deal
of labor, time, and resources to acquire specific knowledge about the subjects of investigation as well as
requisite training in psychobiographical research, qualitative methodology, and formal modeling.891
3. Ecologically Fallacious
Finally, some may simply find the present theory perilously close to committing the ecological
fallacy of presuming that associative, or even causal, relationships that obtain within a very small “n” of
cases are generalizable to the universe of potential decisionmakers. Indeed, there may be another set of
personality constructs that generates better explanatory and predictive power, and it is possible that other
researchers engaged in replication studies will score decisionmakers differently and reach contrary
findings. Moreover, the prospect that a future clarification of the law regarding ASD may render the legal
regime more or less definitive may have implications for compliance decisionmaking and in turn for the
present theory.
B. Responses
1. Reductionism
The “perfect” model of compliance with the IHL regime governing ASD might well treat state
behaviors as resulting from a combination of causes and in turn amalgamate insights and variables from
all pretheories and all levels of analysis. However, such a model would be so cumbersome and so
difficult to conceptualize and apply that some reductionism would be necessary to permit other
researchers to engage in the critical tasks of replication and falsification. However, neither the naïve view
of IHL compliance as the mere projection of personalities nor the belief that decisionmaking is entirely
insulated from the effects of personality enjoys empirical support. If state behaviors could be explained
solely by reference to the personalities of decisionmakers there would be no discernible pattern of
behavior at variance with predictions derived from the analysis of those personalities. The data do not
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support this conclusion, and the present study does not make this assertion. By the same token,
personality is not epiphenomenal to IHL compliance: although there may be some circumstances in which
any decisionmaker facing the precise set of conditions will decide identically, decisions as to whether to
engage in ASD appear to be influenced, if not entirely determined, by personality. Because personality is
causally relevant to the explanation and prediction of IHL compliance, the proposed theory is not remiss
for taking personality seriously.
Whether, however, a theory of IHL compliance can fairly be branded as overly reductionist for
focusing narrowly upon the causal significance of personality to the neglect of variables from other levels
of analysis remains an open question.892 While it is possible to incorporate multiple levels of analysis
within a single theory, it is also possible, by building too many variables drawn from too many levels of
analysis into a model, for theoretical eclecticism to become hobgoblin to explanatory and predictive
power. Explanations of phenomena grounded in a single level of analysis are not reductionist per se, and
reductionist explanations are not necessarily unhelpful: it is only when explanatory and predictive power
is sacrificed to accommodate the objective of theoretical simplicity that this criticism is warranted.
Rather than blindly commit to spareness in the abstract, the responsible scholar “evaluates the relative
utility—conceptual and methodological—of the various alternatives open to him, and . . . appraise[s] the
manifold implications of the level of analysis finally selected.”893 Research in the newly-coined field of
law and neuroeconomics894 suggests that the ultimate locus of decisionmaking is the series of
neurochemical processes in the human brain that drive individuals to seek “rewards” and avoid
“punishments” at least partially independently of their cognitive or affective perceptions and beliefs.895 If
neural mechanisms are indeed responsible for theoretically significant aspects of human behavior, then
the argument that IHL compliance decisions can be explained and predicted by investigation of
personality alone is not a convenient reductionist gambit but rather a sound conceptual and
methodological commitment that can only benefit from an even more micro-level analysis of the
biological constituents of personality.
2. Lack of Parsimony
No theory attempting to offer policy-relevant explanations and predictions of compliance with the
IHL regime governing ASD, a contextually-bound phenomenon of great complexity, is likely to be
described as parsimonious. This is particularly true of a theory the development and testing of which
requires the acquisition of substantive and methodological training that imposes entry barriers to research
and renders it less accessible and replicable than theories predicated upon more familiar levels of analysis.
If parsimony, rather than explanatory and predictive power, is the measure of success, there would be
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grounds for concern. However, “[w]hen all other things are not equal, as is usually the case, we prefer an
accurate complexity over an inaccurate parsimony.”896 If the present theory harnesses as much
explanatory and predictive power as can be corralled at present, it behooves those who would challenge
its lack of parsimony to instead commit to the development of the research and experimental techniques
that will enable greater collaboration in the field of PT.
3. Ecologically Fallacious
Generalizing inductively from a very small number of cases is inherently problematic, for
anomalous individual cases are more likely to drive findings than they will in larger populations.
However, because the data employed herein constitutes the universe of historical instances of ASD it is
not a sample, and thus no inferences need be drawn that might build upon skewed data. Moreover, the
propositions, findings, and conclusions of the present study are conditional and intended to serve as an
explanation for a very limited number of context-dependent cases of ASD and even more importantly as
the point of departure for further research, rather than as a final and authoritative statement of the
relationship between personality and IHL compliance. Personality profiles remain unexhausted, and only
future experimental research and the passage of time can remedy this defect. The external validity and
usefulness of any theory will ultimately be judged by subsequent efforts at replication and falsification,
and by history.897 At present we must content ourselves with a rigorous yet methodologically imperfect
initial investigation that yields probabilistic and conditional findings.
4. Comparison to Other Theories
Perhaps the best defense of the proferred personality theory of IHL compliance against criticism
is a comparison of the explanations it offers in regard to the empirical data with the explanations and
predictions derived from the alternative pretheories. If PT is more congruent with observable patterns of
decisionmaking than alternative pretheories, then notwithstanding its reductionism or lack of parsimony
there is cause to believe that the theory that will ultimately render the most sophisticated explanations and
predictions will, at the very least, incorporate personality.
a. realism
Because nothing but the relative distribution of power is theoretically significant to realism and
neither law nor personality bears upon the behavior of self-interested states in an anarchic system, realism
explains all decisions regarding compliance with IHL in terms of power. ASD permits a state to maximize
its defensive power, and in the absence of a central executive with the capacity to enforce order, even
weak states, when threatened by other states, will always engage in ASD either singly or jointly with
other, more powerful allies to whom they promise services and benefits in exchange for their assistance.
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Realism thus predicts, contrary to empirical observations, that in every instance, or 100% of the time,
regardless of the personality of the HDs at their helms, states will consider and engage in ASD yet feel no
compulsion to defend their decisions on legal or other grounds.
b. ET
ET, although it maintains that an appropriate package of sanctions can in theory be crafted to
deter states from threatening their neighbors and thereby obviate the resort to ASD, concedes that states
will engage in ASD unless the threat of sanctions is sufficient to deter them. Because the Security
Council is singularly ineffective as a collective security mechanism, and because only the U.S. has the
sort of hegemonic power that is necessary to enforce IHL, ET would seem to yield not only the general
prediction that threatened states are obligated in every instance—100% of the time—to resort to ASD
independently of the personalities of their HDs but that the U.S., and states to which the U.S. extends
guarantees of defense assistance, will never be subject to the sort of threats that will render ASD
necessary. Both predictions are controverted by empirical evidence.
c. liberalism
Liberalism assumes that the nature of the state is dispositive of patterns of compliance with law
and that liberal democracies are much more likely to comply with the regime governing ASD than nonliberal states. If true, one would expect that at least a significant number of instances of resort to ASD
would be undertaken by illiberal states, and one might predict that when liberal states engage in ASD
their decisions to do so will be more likely to be regarded as lawful or at least legitimate. The data do not
support any of these hypotheses. The U.S. and Israel—two liberal democracies—are the sole states to
have engaged in ASD; put differently, no illiberal state has ever engaged in ASD, and 100% of the states
that have done so—compared to liberalism’s prediction of 0%--have been liberal democracies.
Moreover, in only one of seven instances—14.3% of the cases—was an exercise of ASD by either of
these two states deemed lawful by the international community, an outcome that runs counter to the
liberal prediction that democracies would comply with the law and, at least as importantly, be adjudged to
be in compliance as a general rule.
d. RCT
RCT predicts simply that if ASD is the battle strategy most likely to yield the greatest benefits to
a threatened state, the state, through its HD, will choose to engage in ASD regardless of his individual
personality; conversely, if ASD is less likely than another strategy to maximize relative wealth and
power, states will refrain. Under objectively threatening conditions of a certain magnitude, every HD,
according to RCT, will elect ASD. Should a HD refrain from ASD, RCT assumes that the threat was not
sufficiently severe and that an alternative battle strategy was more effective. Although each instance of
ASD is historically unique and thus difficult for RCT to organize into a coherent and consistent
explanation, retrospectively RCT can only conclude that whether a state engaged in or refrained from
ASD it was rational for the HD to have made the decision; in other words, RCT offers no testable
predictions. RCT, due to its presumption of inherent rationality, is even less equipped to offer insight into
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why states defend the exercise of ASD, how other actors evaluate the exercise of ASD, or whether an
exercise of ASD contributes to world order.
e. managerialism
By presuming that states are inherently interested in cooperation, MT is auto-relegated to nearirrelevance in the development of theories of IHL compliance, as utterly uncooperative a venture as is
imaginable. To the extent that MT is of any utility to theorizing in the issue-area of ASD, perhaps it can
explain the fact that all decisionmakers defend their exercise of ASD on legal grounds as simply an
expression of the universal desire of states to cooperate, and to appear to be cooperative, in their relations
with other states (a core prediction of RT) as well as a generalized commitment to law as the medium
wherein to facilitate cooperation.
f. RT
RT, which assumes that states value a reputation for compliance as an independent end, is largely
irrelevant as well, for states threatened with extinction privilege their survival above all else. RT is, along
with managerialism, better suited to other issue-areas of international relations. To the extent that RT is
taken seriously as the basis for prediction of state behaviors in regard to ASD, one might anticipate that
those states most generally committed to the rule of law—a group that includes the Western liberal
democracies and Israel—would be those least inclined to run afoul of the IHL regime governing ASD.
That the U.S. and Israel are the only two states that have engaged in ASD suggests that whatever
reputational costs are incurred through resort to ASD are minimal in relation to the gains and that
reputation is of limited significance in the issue-area of armed conflict.
g. TLP
TLP predicts that state compliance with IHL is a function of the degree of incorporation of IHL
within the domestic legal regimes; those states that best internalize IHL obligations within their municipal
law will demonstrate the highest levels of compliance. Accordingly, because it is the most sophisticated
military powers that have developed the most detailed and comprehensive codes of military regulations to
incorporate IHL obligations, TLP predicts that the leading martial states, including the U.S. and Israel,
should be far less likely than states with little military prowess and little formal domestic military
regulation to engage in ASD; yet quite the opposite is true: the only states that have engaged in ASD—the
U.S. and Israel—are among a very small and select group of states that have precisely-elaborated military
codes and well-articulated institutions of military justice.898
h. LT
LT offers no testable theory of IHL compliance: it is simply a general statement that states tend to
comply with IHL because law is perceived as legitimate. If, however, LT is correct in asserting that states
comply with laws that they perceive as legitimate, then instances of non-compliance must be treated as
symptoms of legal illegitimacy. Because no state or individual officially regards the formal regime
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governing ASD as illegitimate, however—states and individuals adopt varying interpretations of
obligations arising under the Charter and under customary IHL, but none disclaim the legitimacy of the
regime—LT must either predict perfect compliance with the regime or account for which individuals
and/or states regard IHL as illegitimate and why they do so, craft a more subtle explanation for the
linkage between compliance and legitimacy sympathetic to multiple interpretations of legal obligation
and correspondingly differential standards of compliance with the law giving rise to that obligation, and
explain how differential perceptions of legal obligation and legal legitimacy translate into outcomes.
History disproves the prediction of perfect compliance, and LT as presented limits an expanded account
that considers degrees of legitimacy while prescribing agnosticism regarding the cognitive, affective, and
perceptive milieux of individuals.
i. constructivism
Constructivism presumes that compliance follows ineluctably from the dissemination and
inculcation of norms favoring compliance within the preference structure of states and key individuals
and the codification of these norms in the content of legal regimes. Accordingly, constructivism predicts
that HDs will adhere to widely-shared normative understandings of appropriate behavior regarding the
resort to force, with cooperative and rule-governed conduct prevailing over power and self-interest.
However, even if one accepts that cooperative norms trump self-interest to the extent they succeed in
(re)constructing state and individual preferences, constructivism does not offer any account for how
norms transform preferences, for which norms are best descriptive of widely-shared preferences at any
given decisional point or, more importantly, for why some individuals fail to embrace a particular code of
normative content and why some act contrary to legal prescriptions and proscriptions even when they
purport to accept the normative basis for a given legal regime. Constructivism simply predicts, contrary
to empirical evidence, that individuals can be induced to prefer to comply and thus will in fact comply
with law generally and with the IHL regime governing ASD specifically; it does not offer a theory that
can be subjected to traditional methods of analysis or to experimental research.
j. OCT
The use of force in anticipation of an attack is a battle strategy that has always been perfectly
consistent with the normative structure of the martial code.899 If IHL compliance is a function of the
degree of congruence between the formal rules of relevant legal regimes on the one hand and the
organizational culture of the military bureaucracy on the other, as OCT theorizes, then, because a
pragmatist interpretation of the formal rules is available that permits the exercise of ASD, OCT predicts
that states will consider and engage in ASD each and every time they are credibly threatened with attack
regardless of the personalities of their HDs. However, although in each case ASD was considered, there
have been three cases where decisionmakers in states with military organizational cultures favorable to
the exercise of ASD elected not to make the decision to preempt attack. Moreover, if OCT provided an
adequate account of state and individual preferences, decisions to engage in ASD ought not be
contemporaneously regarded by other states as unlawful and illegitimate, as so often they have been.
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Because OCT predicts that (1) decisionmakers will engage in ASD at a 100% rate and that other actors
will almost invariably and contemporaneously regard each exercise as (2) lawful and (3) legitimate—
predictions at odds with empirical data indicating rates of 70%, 14.3%, and 42.9% respectively—a theory
that transcends the cultural level of analysis to develop the fine thread of personality running through the
OCT explanation is necessary.
5. Summary
Although the probabilistic statements of association and linkage between personality constructs
and ASD outcomes offered in the present study are necessarily tentative at this stage of theoretical
development, PT, although arguably reductionist and non-parsimonious, harnesses greater explanatory
and predictive power and offers a more complete and consistent account for a range of ASD outcomes
than existing pre-theories of international legal compliance.
C. Directions for Future Research
1. Experimental Research
a. experimental personality profiles
Although it would be premature to draw conclusions about causation on the basis of the
associative relationships identified across ten historical cases of ASD decisionmaking, a clear agenda for
future research emerges. As Table 6, “Universe of Personality Profiles,” illustrates, there have been a
total of only seven distinct combinations of the four personality constructs identified in the present study
as causal factors of ASD outcomes. However, as QCA indicates, these four personality constructs
generate a total of 24, or sixteen, possible combinations. Consequently, as Table 7, “Experimental
Personality Profiles,” illustrates, there are nine combinations of the four constructs that exist theoretically
within a sufficiently numerous population but cannot as yet be identified, analyzed, placed in a truth table,
and incorporated in the present theory. When, as here, the historical record fails to exhaust all possible
combinations of causal factors it is impossible to specify necessary and sufficient causality in respect of
any particular outcome unless the historical record can be augmented either the passage of time and the
availability of additional real-world crises wherein the question of ASD arises, or by the production of
additional cases in an experimental setting. Data associated with experimental profiles and derived from
simulation research can then be integrated with historical data and subjected to QCA.
b. experimental typologies
Much might be learned from the analysis of these experimental personality profiles, which, as
Table 8, “Experimental Profiles with Predictions of Associated Outcomes,” illustrates, are assigned the
following typologies to reflect the associative relationships anticipated in respect to each:900
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(1) AbCD (“The Soldier”): The Soldier will consider, engage in, and defend ASD on legal grounds, and
will be satisfied with his/her decision regarding ASD, which will in turn contribute to world order. There is
insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the decision of the Soldier to engage in ASD will be regarded as lawful
or legitimate either contemporaneously or in retrospect and whether the decision will be sanctioned;
901

(2) AbcD (“The Merchant”): The Merchant will consider,

engage in, and defend ASD on legal grounds,

and will be satisfied with his/her decision regarding ASD. There is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the
decision of the Merchant to engage in ASD will be regarded as lawful or legitimate either contemporaneously or in
retrospect, whether it will be sanctioned, and whether it will contribute to world order;
(3) aBCd (“The Malcontent”): The Malcontent will consider but will not engage in ASD, and s/he will not
be satisfied with this decision. There is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the decision not to engage in
ASD will contribute to world order;
902

(4) abCD (“The Mediator”): The Mediator will neither consider nor engage in ASD.

Whether or not s/he

does engage in ASD s/he will be satisfied. If s/he does engage in ASD, s/he will defend the exercise of ASD on
legal grounds, but there is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether other actors will regard the decision as lawful
or legitimate either contemporaneously or in retrospect, or whether the decision will contribute to world order;
(5) ABcd (“The Independent”): The Independent will consider ASD, but there is insufficient evidence to
anticipate whether s/he will engage in ASD and whether the decision will contribute to world order. If s/he engages
in ASD s/he will not defend the decision, and there is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the decision to
engage in ASD will be regarded as lawful either contemporaneously or in retrospect, or whether the decision will be
sanctioned. S/he will not be satisfied with the decision.
(6) AbCd (“The Sentry”): There is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the Sentry will consider or
engage in ASD, but if s/he does engage in ASD s/he will defend the decision on legal grounds, and the decision will
903

be regarded as lawful and legitimate contemporaneously and in retrospect.

No sanctions will be applied to the

Sentry’s decision to engage in ASD. Whether or not the Sentry engages in ASD, s/he will be satisfied with the
decision, and the decision will contribute to world order;
(7) aBcD (“The Jellyfish”): There is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the Opportunist will
consider ASD, but s/he will not engage in ASD. S/he will not be satisfied with the decision to refrain from ASD,
which will not contribute to world order;
(8) abcD “The Follower”): The Follower will neither consider nor engage in ASD. S/he will not be
satisfied with the decision to refrain from ASD, which will not contribute to world order;
(9) abCd (“The Hermit”): The Hermit will neither consider nor engage in ASD. S/he will not be satisfied
with the decision to refrain from ASD, which will not contribute to world order.

The results of further research should reinforce or undermine the predictions regarding
associations between personality and ASD outcomes, enable the elaboration of a formal theoretical
901

Although the results of OMC analysis do not shed light on whether The Merchant is likely to consider ASD, because each and
every historical decisionmaker considered ASD, and because The Merchant is likely to engage in ASD, it is assumed that s/he
will have considered ASD before electing it as a policy decision.
902
Although the results of OMC analysis suggest that there is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the Mediator will engage
in ASD, because the Mediator will not consider ASD it is logically impossible that s/he will engage in ASD.
903
Although OMC analysis indicates that there is insufficient evidence to anticipate that the decision of the Sentry to engage in
ASD will be regarded as legitimate, because the decision will be regarded as lawful, and because lawfulness is presumed to be a
more difficult burden to meet than legitimacy, it is presumed that the decision of the sentry to engage in ASD will be regarded as
legitimate. Moreover, although there is insufficient evidence to anticipate that the Sentry’s decision to engage in ASD will be
regarded as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect, because as the historical record indicates the perception of lawfulness and
legitimacy is more likely to arise in retrospect than contemporanously, the presumption is that an exercise of ASD judged lawful
and legitimate contemporaneously will remain so in retrospect.
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model, and serve as a springboard to yet further, and perhaps even more generalizable, research.
Simulation research offers a potentially fruitful route to this end.
2. Simulate Data
a. simulation research
In brief, “simulation” is the dynamic modeling of central features, relationships, and social
processes of the natural world that facilitates the direct observation and rigorous testing of complex
systems that are difficult or impossible to access with other methodologies.904 By rendering otherwise
inaccessible systems susceptible to investigation, simulation is indispensable in the linkage of historical
and experimental research in the development and testing of theories across a broad range of diverse
social and natural science subfields.905 Although simulation does not allow for direct examination or
incorporate all aspects of the referent system and is thus not a true experimental methodology, it has
tremendous heuristic value.906 Variables can be readily identified and manipulated, substantive
propositions of theoretical importance can be derived and tested, and data can be rapidly generated for
incorporation with other data sets and subsequent analysis.907
In the typical international relations simulation, human subject participants, selected on the basis
of some discrete personality or experiential characteristics determined through psychological profiling,908
are assigned to national teams909 and placed in a setting where constraints and incentives resemble the
referent world. A scenario—a detailed account of the sequence of political, military, and legal events
leading up to a specific crisis or confrontation910—is used to goad participants to manipulate resources and
make decision in pursuit of their exogenously and endogenously defined objectives.911 Only the
independent variables are prescribed through the selection of participants on the basis of their
psychological profiles, their assignment to specific teams, and the allocation of specific political,
economic, and military capabilities to each team through the scenario. The decisions of the participants
in response to the scenario and to the decisions of other participants—the dependent variables—are
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See generally HAROLD GUETZKOW, SIMULATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1963) (defining and
discussing simulation as an experimental research heuristic and developmental methodology); URS LUTERBACHER &
MICHAEL D. WARD, EDS., DYNAMIC MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 252 (1985) (noting that simulation is
ideally suited to the rigorous analysis of “complex decision problems in concrete settings”).
905
See Robert Mandel, Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making During Crises, 29 WORLD POL. 610, 614 (1977)
(theorizing that high-level decisionmaking during conditions of stress is univestigable save for by simulation); SANDOLE, supra
note 322, at 46 (describing simulation as the “best format for the controlled investigation of behavior”); E.W. PAXSON, WAR
GAMING 33 (1963) (stating that simulation offers scholars the opportunity to “make major contribution[s] to the pressing
questions which cannot await refinements in methodology.”).
906
See, e.g., GUETZKOW, supra note 905, at 7 (stressing that most simulations should be incorporated into the discovery phase
of science building as simulation is difficult to validate).
907
See HERMAN, supra note 336, at 167 (describing utility of simulation as a method for generating data and testing theories);
SANDOLE, supra note 322, at 48 (noting utility of simulation research to replication and validation studies).
908
See GUETZKOW, supra note 905, at 92-94 (describing assignment of participants on the basis of psychological profiles);
HERMANN, supra note 243, at 4-11 (discussing selection and assignment of simulation participants on the basis of participant
responses on psychological instruments); KNUTSON, supra note 288, at 327-35 (discussing creation of psychological
instruments to test, select, and assign participants on the basis of research protocols).
909
The number of participants and teams, and the determination and assignment of specific roles to team members, is determined
by the research question. See CHARLES HERMANN, CRISES IN FOREIGN POLICY 46, 46 n.14 (1963).
910
See HARVEY A. DEWEERD, A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION 3 (1973) (describing the
role of the scenario in simulation research).
911
See CHARLES WALCOTT, ED., SIMPLE SIMULATIONS II: A COLLECTION OF SIMULATION/GAMES FOR
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 1-3 (1980).
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entirely unregulated, and together with the personality profiles of the participants these decisions, and
their consequences, constitute the experimental data.
Comparisons between the behaviors of “real world” decision makers and simulation participants
are essential in establishing confidence in simulation as a research method in the study of international
legal compliance.912 While for some the “leaps to the laboratory” from real world settings may seem
“nonsensical,”913 most scholars accept that validity is a function of the degree to which simulation
research produces experimental data isomorphic to the referent world.914 Complete isomorphism is
impossible—an exact one-to-one relationship would require that the simulation be as large and complex
as the reality it represents—and because some aspects of any given phenomenon are irrelevant to a
particular research question a simulation need capture only the key features of the referent system or
process. Still, a high degree of isomorphism is necessary if simulations are to motive participant
decisions that have “real world” character, and although it is inevitable that some features of the “real
world” will be excluded, if the results of a simulation and either the informed intuitive expectation of a
future event or the results of a historical event have a similar structure and form, that simulation stakes a
prima facie claim to validity.915 In fact, extensive evidence suggests that simulation research does indeed
produce results highly isomorphic to reality.916
b. Project CLAW
In brief, Project Compliance with the Laws of War [“ PROJECT CLAW”] is a scenario-driven
simulation of a politico-military crisis designed by the author to generate additional cases of
decisionmaking with regard to the ASD outcomes under analysis in the present study. Participants will be
selected on the basis of their personality profiles, as determined by an assessment instrument, and other
relevant criteria. Participants will be assigned to roles on several national teams, including one which
will be subjected by the scenario to an imminent military threat and whose HD will possess one of the
nine experimental personality profiles. Nine simulation runs will be conducted during the spring and
summer of 2005, and the resulting experimental data will be integrated with the historical data and
subjected to QCA analysis and, where appropriate, “harder,” more quantitative methods. By exhausting
all possible personality profiles and integrating analysis of simulate and historical data, PROJECT CLAW
will generate greater confidence in the validity of the resulting associative relationships between
personality and ASD outcomes, enable the specification of necessity and conditionality, and permit the
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HERMANN, supra note 336, at 167; see also Joyner, supra note 304, at 332 (describing use of simulation of international
legal decisionmaking as an educational method and indicating that the success of the exercise depends upon the degree to which
participants assume their roles and the extent to which their decisionmaking is isomorphic with the decisionmaking of real world
participants in the foreign policy decisionmaking process).
913
H. GUETZKOW & J.J. VALDEZ, SIMULATED INTERNATIONAL PROCESSES: THEORIES AND RESEARCH 326
(1981).
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GUETZKOW, supra note 905, at 136.
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GUETZKOW & VALDEZ, supra note 914, at 63, 256.
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See, e.g., WALCOTT, supra note 912, at 121 (finding significant isomorphism between decisionmaking in simulation and in
actual historical cases); Dina A. Zinnes, A Comparison of Hostile Behavior of Decision-Makers in Simulate and Historical Data,
18 WORLD POL. 474, 496 (1966) (finding that “the simulate and historical worlds are comparable, or isomorphic[,]” in studies
of decisionmaking). For a detailed discussion of simulation methodology generally and as applied to the development and testing
of theories in international relations, see generally Guetzkow, supra note 915.
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development of a theory that can explain and predict ASD outcomes in causal terms as the product, in
some important measure, of the personalities of decisionmakers.917
3. Additional Dependent Variables
Investigation of the associative relationships between personality and compliance decisions in
regard to the IHL regimes governing aspects of the jus in bello, including the treatment of prisoners-ofwar [“POWs”] and the use of chemical weapons [“CWs”], will offer the prospect that the proposed theory
can be validated not only as regards the resort to armed force but across a broader span of substantive
issue- areas that transcend the jus ad bellum. By positing explanations predictions of compliance
decisions regarding the treatment of POWs and the use of CWs, the utility of the personality theory of
IHL compliance to scholars and practitioners will be much enhanced.
4. Additional Independent Variables
The substance and process of foreign policy decisions are in effect intervening variables to which
greater theoretical significance may be attributed in future iterations of this research.
5. Quantitative Analysis
Generation of sufficient numbers of simulated cases of ASD will allow the introduction of
quantitative analytical methods, including multivariate statistics, content analysis, and pathways analysis,
to complement QCA. The strengths of each method will compensate for the weaknesses of the other,
enabling more detailed analysis and greater explanatory and predictive power. Quantitative analysis may
permit integration of variables drawn from other levels of analysis to determine the causal significance of
personality-level variables relative to inputs from the international system, the political character of states,
and the nature of decisional units; such research will prove valuable in validating the causal significance
of personality in IHL compliance decisionmaking.
6. Micro-Level Theorization
Ultimately, a more powerful theory requires the investigation and specification of the neural
processes whereby personality is formed and translated into decisions. If so, future research will require
not only additional analytical methodologies but the incorporation of insights from cognitive
neuroscience, which in turn will require collaboration across several disciplinary boundaries.918
VI. Conclusions
Although compliance is the most central issue in the international legal academy, at least one
scholar, despairing that existing theories are ill-suited to issue-areas of high politics, has quit a corner of
the field and conceded that scholarship “may have a greater impact on human well being when it focuses
on areas in which international law can alter outcomes more reliably, including economic, environmental,
917

Little experimental research has been conducted within the field of international law, and yet a new generation of scholars,
many of whom work in subfield of compliance, recognize that progress will require the development and testing of theories of
causation and that this project will in turn require natural experimentation to guide the development and testing of theories. See,
e.g., Raustiala, supra note 27, at 397-98 (stating that evaluating and improving compliance with international law will require a
theory of causation that can be subjected to counterfactual analysis and natural experimentation, “a rare but wonderful aid to
analysis[.]” ). For a detailed description of the use of simulation to test a theory of foreign policy decisionmaking, see William C.
Bradford, U.S. Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in Arab-Israeli Crises: The Association of U.S. Presidential Personality
Constructs with Political and Military Crisis Outcomes 234-71 (1995) (doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, 1995).
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and labor issues.”

If most observers remain committed to the proposition that international law matters

by virtue of its positive (and perhaps normative) influence upon state behavior, empirical patterns of
inconsistency in IHL compliance may be attriting their ranks, or at least claiming from them some of the
terrain upon which the debate is raging.
However, surrender, and even retreat, is at the very least premature. IHL is neither
epiphenomenal to nor dispositive of the conduct of warring states. Moreover, the greatest impediment to
more effective legal regulation of war is not a demonstrable pattern of noncompliance but rather the
ongoing incapacity to explain and predict this pattern and offer policy-relevant guidance to the legal
architects charged with making those modifications necessary to enhance compliance. Undertheorization,
and not the inherent immiscibility of law and war, is the bane of IHL compliance, and it is to empirical
studies of the relationships between rules and behaviors that energies must be dedicated if armed conflict
is to be held within the domain of global governance.
This program need not exclude any particular school-of-thought or methodology. Although this
Article assumes that human agency is crucial to the production of the phenomenon of IHL compliance
and concludes that individual-level variables are therefore indispensable to explanations and predictions,
the most sophisticated model will likely incorporate insights from all pre-theories and variables from
multiple levels of analysis, including the nature of the foreign policy structures, the nature of the state,
dyadic interactions with other states, and the international system. Just as “[t]here is emphatically no
royal road to knowledge in the study of international relations[,]”920 there is no single method or paradigm
that will enable researchers to harvest all that is knowable about IHL compliance. Each method will
inform the others regardless of its own pretensions, and conflicts will generate dialectics that lead to
creative synthesis.921
Still, although the present account of the relationship is inchoate, the salience of personality to
IHL compliance is an existential reality. Dimensions of personality, including militarism, anomism,
hostility, and adventurism, are more effective in explaining data than are existing pre-theories, and an
adequate explanation is a necessary condition precedent to systematic predictions of future compliance
decisionmaking as well as to the purposive reconfiguration of the rules of IHL. Without an account of the
linkages between rules and behaviors, any attempt to enhance IHL compliance by altering the existing
regime will succeed only through the intervention of good fortune without which any tinkering is at least
as likely to degrade compliance as it is to bolster it.
Moreover, because personality matters, the bearers of personality matter, and the collective
energies and creativities of the international legal academy can no longer be devoted exclusively to the
918

See Chorvat et al., supra note 895, at 3-12 (describing insights from cognitive neuroscience gleaned from sophisticated
medical technologies that highlight the neural mechanisms involved in human decisionmaking regarding legal rules and establish
the limits of law to alter human behavior).
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Michael Banks, A.J.R. Groom, & A.N. Oppenheim, International Crisis Gaming: The Conex Experience, 1 IRRA STUD.
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See, e.g., ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 87 (1999) (suggesting that in
an era characterized by contestation between divergent normative systems and increasing complexity it is especially important
that scholars commit to interdisciplinary and intertheoretical cooperation if answers to many of the intractable problems in
international relations are to be realized).
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production and defense of state- or systemic-level theories without knowingly sacrificing significant
explanatory and predictive power. Although it is tempting for the man who has lost his keys at night in a
parking lot to search for them in those areas illuminated by street lights, his best strategy for finding his
keys is to search in the areas where reason and memory informs him that he is most likely to have
dropped them. The analogy is apt for scholars of IHL compliance: if personality variables harness greater
explanatory and predictive power than those drawn from other levels of analysis, pre-theories that
underemphasize personality or relegate it to irrelevance, whether due to unfamiliarity with the literature
and techniques that inform PT research or out of slavish commitments to their core assumptions, are
prioritizing illumination over a successful search.
Furthermore, personality is of significance not merely from a positive perspective. Enhanced
IHL compliance is a moral imperative and a crucial step in the deepening of international civil society. It
is therefore essential to identify the most propitious point-of-entry into the decisionmaking process in
order to facilitate the sorts of interventions that can serve this teleological mission. This Article suggests
that, because much of the variation in compliance is attributable to personality, manipulation of the legal
rules may well be a fruitless venture without simultaneously manipulating the personalities of HDs, either
through training or through the incorporation of analysis of compliance propensities in the matrix of
considerations governing their selection by domestic constituencies.922 If “history is a race between
education and catastrophe,”923 and if decisionmaking with regard to IHL compliance carries with it the
possibility for the latter, our prayers and best efforts should ride with the former. Crafting the most
effective IHL regime is not merely a matter of the conjuration and codification of proper rules and
institutions, although these are vital steps924: it is to the selection and training of the right people to
administer, interpret, and implement the normative content animating rules and institutions to which
stakeholders must also direct their attention. All those who would secure compliance with IHL must
abandon the “comforting seclusion from reality that the pure theory of law once provided[.]”925
The ultimate determinants of IHL compliance lurk in the minds of the individuals who must
decide whether to comply. Although competing pretheories offer complementary insights that will
advance knowledge, it will be difficult to supplant personality theory as the paradigm that models the
variables that most directly tap the phenomenon in question. Although the broader arenas of social

922
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science and humanities are hospitable to PT, advocacy of PT is a de facto call for a major re-envisioning
of the discipline of international legal compliance. During paradigmatic shifts, resistance and tension
brew within the discipline undergoing transformation.926 However, the mutual object of theorists in any
field should be the discovery and promulgation of new knowledge whatever its source and whatever the
method that reveals it.
Armed conflict is not some disembodied and unfathomable process that holds humans captive to
their own history. Rather, we are, to some important extent, authors and judges of, and therefore
responsible for, our future. Wars, and the acts and omissions undertaken therein, begin “in the minds of
men.”927 As the field of international legal compliance unfolds in a heretofore deeply conflictual
millennium, it behooves scholars to recall the insight of English literary giant Alexander Pope, who three
centuries ago, while pondering the divers paths down which Enlightenment scholars were treading in
pursuit of universal and infinite truths regarding the relationship of humanity to nature and to God,
reminded his peers that “[t]he proper study of mankind is man.”928 The study of IHL compliance is no less
than the study of mankind in a decisional crucible of his [and her] own making, and thus it is proper that
our focus be brought to bear upon the relevant dimensions of the personalities of the men and women
upon whom ultimate responsibility for compliance rests.
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